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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
Can we derive and internalise moral rules from pure rational agency? If such a 
project is possible then a contractarian moral theory is conceivable. Restricting the 
field of morality to social co-operation, David Gauthier is probably the pre­
eminent 20th century champion of such a theory from his Morals by Agreement, 
published in 1986, to his most recent writings. The purpose of this thesis is 
present, analyse and argue against his project. The main argument developed is 
that a pre-conception of morality cripples his rational calculus and that moral rules 
cannot be internalised through rational calculus alone.
In the first part of the thesis, I give full voice to Gauthier. His work from 1963 to 
1986 is presented and interpreted. In particular, in the first chapter I describe how, 
from his Hobbesian background and his research on practical rationality, Gauthier 
was led to develop a contractarian moral theory. Chapter two is then fully 
dedicated to developing the core features of Morals by Agreement, providing an 
interpretation that highlights its main strengths and weaknesses.
Gauthier’s work has been extensively commented upon since 1986 and Gauthier 
actively participated in the debates generated by his writings. Although he stopped 
defending his Morals by Agreement from 1993, he remained faithful to the idea of 
a contractarian moral theory.
In the second part of the thesis, I first review in chapter three the criticisms made 
of Morals by Agreement as well as Gauthier’s responses to them. By 1993, he had 
abandoned several key points of his theory. However, inspired by his Hobbesian 
background (chapter six), and within the framework of McClennen’s concept of 
resoluteness (chapter five), Gauthier renewed his attempt to derive co-operation 
from pure rational agency. Chapter seven is a discussion of this latest attempt.
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INTRODUCTION
Contractarianism is about an agreement between individuals who want to enter into 
social relationships with each others. It has been a branch of political philosophy since 
Glaucon challenged Socrates in Plato’s Republic.1 There are two issues at stake in an 
agreement: the first one is the agreement itself, its context and conditions, the second 
one is compliance with the agreement. If it is rational to agree on rules, practices or 
principles, it is less rational to abide by what was agreed. Indeed, it is a lot more 
advantageous to break the rules when (most of) the others comply with it.
In a famous paragraph, Hobbes described an imaginary Fool’s reasoning.
‘The Fool has said in his heart, there is no such thing as justice ... keep, or not keep 
covenants, was not against reason, when it conduced to one’s benefit. He does not 
therein deny, that there be covenants; and that they are sometimes broken sometimes 
kept; and that such breach of them may be called injustice ..; but he questions, whether 
injustice .. may not sometimes stand with that reason, which dictates to every man his 
own good; and particularly then, when it conduces to such a benefit, as shall put a man 
in a condition, to neglect not only the dispraise, and revilings, but also the power of 
other men’.2
To the Fool, Hobbes gave a political answer arguing for the need for a powerful 
sovereign. Hobbes did not trust men to keep their covenant and was convinced that 
there would be no viable society without a reliable enforcement system. Gauthier 
believes that men understand the language of reason and that, in their interest, they are 
able to internalise the constraints of the agreement. He believes that men can become 
moral by mere rational calculus, as long as they choose the appropriate mode of rational 
deliberation. In short he believes that it is possible to give a moral rather than a political 
answer to the Fool; he believes in a contractarian moral theory and proves it. The 
purpose of this thesis is to assess the success of his enterprise.
1 See Plato’s Republic, Book II
2 Leviathan, pp 538-539
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In this introduction we will define with more accuracy contractarianism and review its 
variety, main features and appeals. We will then see how Gauthier’s contractarian 
theory fits in this broad picture prior to introducing the main arguments of this thesis.
About contractarianism
Origins and main features o f contractarianism
It is usual to distinguish between two schools of contractarianism: the interest-based 
versus the right-based one. The first school is lead by Hobbes. Interest based contracts 
are like rational bargains between agents seeking mutual advantage; they start from a 
state of nature and they know their personal capacities and circumstances. The second 
school is usually identified with Locke, Kant or Rousseau. Agents in right based 
contracts have a shared interest in a common good and they seek reciprocity where 
everyone benefits from a fair and equal baseline.
It is also not unusual to distinguish between political and moral contractarianism 
although both are often part of the same contractarian theory. This second distinction is 
less clear than the first one. I suggest distinguishing them as follows. Political 
contractarianism involves an agreement on the political rules and structures of society 
whereas moral contractarianism involves a further agreement on what is morally right. 
As we shall see below, Gauthier has given a whole new sense to the idea of 
contractarian moral theory.
P. Vallentyne describes contractarian moral theories as follows: they ‘hold that an 
action, practice, law, or social structure is morally permissible just in case it, or the 
principles to which it conforms, would be (or has been) agreed to by the members of 
society under certain specified conditions.’4
This description lists the main features and shows the diversity of contractarianism in 
general and moral contractarianism in particular.
3 For this short introduction, I borrowed the definitions and distinction from Samuel Freeman’s 
‘Contractarianism’.
4 ‘Gauthier’s Three Projects’, p 3
7
• Contractarianism applies to actions, practices, laws or social structures. I assume that 
the distribution of wealth would also fit in this definition. For some theorists agreement 
is about the society the agents want to live in whereas for others, agreement is just about 
the distribution of the cooperative surplus.
• Contractarianism can be direct, i.e. agents agree directly on rules and social structure, 
or indirect, i.e. they agree first on moral principles and then on rules or social structure 
compatible with these principles.
• Contractarianism can be actual or hypothetical. It either describes what has happened 
or what agents would derive if they were to reflect on their social environment. Most 
modem contractarians describe a hypothetical contract.5
• The outcome of the agreement also depends on the original conditions to be specified 
by the theorist. For example, the agents in the pre-social conditions can either be 
bargainers in full knowledge of their capacities and circumstances, or deliberating 
agents who don’t know yet their identity in the future society.
Appeals o f contractarianism
Contractarianism has several appealing features. R. Sugden lists at least three main 
reasons to want contractarianism to succeed.6
Firstly, the contractarian approach does not presuppose any particular conception of the 
good life or of a good society.
‘By thinking of society as a scheme of cooperation, we avoid having to ask what really 
is good in an absolute sense. Even if we cannot agree on common ends, we can 
cooperate for mutual benefit. Society, on this view, is merely a mechanism that we use 
in common to achieve our separate ends.’7
5 The only noticeable contractarian who advocates actual agreement is G. Harman in his ‘Justice and Moral 
Bargaining’.
6 See ‘The Contractarian Enterprise’, pp 3-6
7 ‘The Contractarian Enterprise’, p 4
S
Secondly, contractarian theories can, by design, be endorsed by every member of 
society. Contractarianism is based on public justifications: it does not only identify the 
characteristics of a just society, it also justifies that society to its members in terms that 
each can accept.
Thirdly, the contractarian approach ‘limits the demands that society can make on the
Q
individual, or that individuals can make on each others’. The contractarian idea is 
based on reciprocity. Social constraints are agreed by the agents themselves which 
means not only that they limit these constraints to what is necessary and sufficient but 
also that these constraints must be agreeable to all.
S. Freeman adds an extra appeal to this list: there is an intuitive force to the agreement. 
If we agree to something that is agreeable not only to us but also to all the other parties 
than there is an underlying promissory obligation to comply with what has been agreed. 
There is mutual grounds and reliance for holding all to the commitments.9
Gauthier’s contractarianism
Where does Gauthier’s contractarianism fit in this big picture? I believe we must first 
insist on the fact that his contractarianism has evolved over the years. But before we do 
emphasise the evolution, it is useful to concentrate first on the constant features of his 
theory.
Constant features o f his contractarianism.
First of all Gauthier is both a Hobbes scholar and a Hobbesian. Gauthier wrote in 1969 a 
book which title was The Logic of Leviathan. In this book, he provides an original 
interpretation of Hobbes’ masterpiece. Ever since, he has regularly published articles on 
Hobbes. His interpretation and his focus have considerably evolved over the years but 
he has remained faithful to the 17th century philosopher. His work on Hobbes is an
8 ‘The Contractarian Enterprise’, p 5
9 See ‘Contractarianism’, section 1: the role of agreement.
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integral part o f the development o f his own theory. In this thesis, I emphasise the 
interactions and links between his evolving interpretation of Hobbes and his own 
theory. As I shall explain in my first chapter, I believe that Gauthier wants to give to 
Hobbes’ Fool a moral rather than a political answer. This motivation is at the heart of 
his contractarianism.
I insist on the fact that I am not a Hobbes scholar myself. All the sections on Hobbes in 
this thesis are a presentation of Gauthier’s research on the classical philosopher. I am 
not concerned with the accuracy or conformity of his work with the standard literature 
on Hobbes. I am only concerned with the relevance of his interpretation to his own 
contractarian moral theory.
Secondly, Gauthier is a moral rather than a political contractarian. Although his theory 
covers both fields, his primary ambition is to derive morality from rational agency. 
Gauthier believes that we live in a disenchanted world in which morality has lost its 
roots hence the distance he takes with traditional morality.10 He wants to create morality 
as an artificial virtue rationally derived and acquired. Gauthier usually distinguishes two 
parts to his contractarian theory: a theory of justice in which agents rationally derive 
common moral standards and a moral theory that deals with the internalisation by the 
agents of these moral standards.11 The moral theory is at the core of his research. 
Bargainers choose a moral principle on the basis of a calculation of self-interest. Then, 
as members of society, they abide by this principle in all future cases ‘including those in 
which it is not in their self-interest so to abide. In agreeing to and abiding by the 
principle individuals are morally transformed.’12 The purpose of his contractarianism is 
not only for agents to agree but it is also for agents to internalise and abide by the rules 
agreed. Morality is not a principle or a standard; it is primarily a human virtue.
The third constant feature of his theory is that the contract he refers to is hypothetical. 
Gauthier never describes what did happen but what would happen if agents were to 
reflect rationally on their social interactions. His contractarianism is justificatory and
10 This is a theme he often refers to. See for example ‘Why Contractarianism ?’ for his development on this 
topic.
II About the distinction between the two theories within his contractarianism, see for example ‘Public 
Reason’, p 36
12 Between Hobbes and Rawls’, p 25. This quote was borrowed from R.P. Wolff who was writing about 
Rawls, but Gauthier made its own as a good characterisation of his project in moral theory.
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normative rather than descriptive. Agents’ starting point is a state of nature usually
described as a vacuum of social norms and practices. In the state of nature, strategic
interactions prevail and they yield a sub-optimal outcome. Agents come to realise that
they could benefit more and interact better if they were to co-operate. Therefore,
Gauthier assumes that they are all willing to exit the state of nature and that the type of
1 ^society they want is a ‘co-operative venture for mutual advantage’ .
Last but not least, Gauthier is convinced that it is an intrinsic feature of human 
rationality to change and adapt to what is best or better for the agent. ‘At the core of our 
rational capacity is the ability to engage in self-critical reflection. The fully rational 
being is able to reflect on his standard of deliberation, and to change that standard in the 
light of reflection.’14 Through reason, agents are able to change their mode of rational 
deliberation. This characteristic of Gauthier’s contractarianism is quite unique to him15 
and most certainly central to his moral theory. The rationality as assumed in economic 
and game theories is the rationality that prevails in the state of nature, in the realm of 
strategic interactions whereas a constrained mode of deliberation structure social 
interactions. I shall argue that this change of rationality occurs while the agents are still 
in the state o f nature and that it is morally loaded since it carries in itself all the 
demands o f impartiality.
Evolution in his contractarianism.
We can say that the first version of his contractarianism was prepared between 1963 and 
1986, date at which he published his famous Morals by Agreement. This book is 
probably the first complete version of a contractarian moral theory. However, many of 
its parts are flawed and the theory has been heavily criticised. Gauthier initially tried to 
defend every single conception but stopped from 1993. Since then he has remained an 
ardent believer in moral contractarianism; he has continued to refer to Morals by 
Agreement as the backbone of his theory but he has taken his distance with some of the 
technicalities of the 1986 version.
13 Gauthier borrowed this definition from J. Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, p 4. Although his theory has 
evolved Gauthier has remained faithful to this definition and vision of society.
14 Morals by Agreement, p 183
15 Although, as we shall see Ned McClennen develops a similar argument.
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I believe that Gauthier made three major changes in the 1990’s. I also believe that these 
three changes combined together force Gauthier to take a serious Rawlsian turn in his 
approach.
Initially Gauthier was convinced that the Prisoner’s dilemma was the modem way to 
express the Fool’s challenge but he then realised that it was the wrong starting point. A 
contractarian moral theory or any theory of rational co-operation must solve an 
assurance game instead. The distinction is obviously crucial since an assurance game 
involves dynamic choice, intentions, plans and trust rather than mere strategic and static 
rational calculus.
Gauthier also seems to leave aside the theory of rational choice and the concept of 
rationality as utility maximisation. Gauthier distinguishes between the market strategic 
interactions and the constrained realm of politics. Gauthier abandons the language of 
utility, preference or maximisation and replaces it with deliberative rationality and 
resolute mode of deliberation. The bargainers are replaced by deliberators. Gauthier is 
more worried about the social structure than by the distribution of the cooperative 
surplus.
The last change is more a change of emphasis in his research on Hobbes. Gauthier 
deepens his understanding of Hobbes’ public reason and he develops his research on the 
philosopher’s theory of law. Both concepts are at the core of his new theory. Again, 
Gauthier is convinced that it is possible to give a moral rather than a political answer to 
the Fool: agents are able to internalise the constraints of public reason.
Main arguments of this thesis
Gauthier’s agents are in a hypothetical state of nature where there are no rules and no 
co-operation. Agents come to realise that they need to exit this state of nature if they 
want to benefit from the advantages of cooperation and from a social structure. Gauthier 
assumes that the only way out the state of nature is via a change of mode of rational 
deliberation: agents must pursue mutual advantage rather than individual benefit. Only
12
then can they be accepted as partners in the social project and can they benefit from the 
advantages of social cooperation. They are ‘fully rational’.
I believe that the concept of full rationality is artificial and does not come naturally to 
most agents. In cases of conflict between self and mutual interest, the agents will 
naturally follow the dictates of self interest. The ‘overall’ rational calculus that Gauthier 
suggests is not a sufficient motivation to change human nature.
To assume that the bargainers pursue mutual advantage amounts to allocating equal 
bargaining power to each of them. Gauthier claims that bargainers are all willing to exit 
the state of nature and to agree. Therefore, he claims, they are prepared to make 
concessions in order to be part of the bargaining process.
I claim that in doing so, Gauthier not only empties the bargaining process from its 
strategic interest but he also introduces a moral bias. Indeed, if as Gauthier defines it, 
morality is taken as impartial constraints on the pursuit of individual interest, than his 
conception of ‘full rationality’ carries all the demands of impartiality and constrains the 
agents’ choices and behaviour. His conception of morality is engraved in his definition 
of full rationality.
Not only do I believe that Gauthier’s moral standards are an input rather than an 
outcome of his theory, I also believe that he fails to demonstrate how agents actually 
internalise these moral standards by mere rational calculus; I believe that this rational 
calculus is flawed.
In order to assess Gauthier’s success in establishing a full rounded contractarian moral 
theory, I will articulate my thesis around two parts.
In the first part, I will trace back the foundations of Gauthier’s theory. In particular, the 
first chapter will show the emergence of a dual rationality from his interpretation of 
Hobbes’ Leviathan. Between 1963 and 1986, Gauthier discovers game theory and the 
theory of rational choice, he is introduced to the prisoners’ dilemma and step by step he
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puts in place all the elements of his Morals by Agreement. This first chapter will set the 
framework of his work.
In the second chapter, I will present my own interpretation of Morals by Agreement, I 
will define concepts like morality, justice or rationality, I will expose the issues at stake 
and I will develop the core conceptions one by one. Each conception is of essential 
importance in establishing this first fully achieved contractarian moral theory. We will 
show how and why.
In the second part, I will review the developments that took place after 1986. Morals by 
Agreement has been heavily criticised and the third chapter will be fully dedicated to 
presenting the main criticisms. We will see how Gauthier defended his theory and the 
concessions he had to make. He had to abandon some of the key assumptions and to 
admit the weakness of some of his core conceptions. In chapter IV, I will develop my 
own criticism and present my reason for thinking that this first attempt of a 
contractarian moral theory failed.
Gauthier is not easily dismissed. He remains convinced that a moral contractarianism is 
possible. If he acknowledges that some features of Morals by Agreement are defeated, 
he believes that the core of his theory is viable. In his most recent publications, he 
reemphasises his belief in a dual rationality and provides elements to improve on the 
original version of his theory. Based on these articles and on my understanding of his 
approach, I will highlight his main changes in chapters V and VI and attempt to 
reconstruct his new version of a contractarian moral theory in chapter VII. I will also 
develop my main criticism against it.
In conclusion, I will review Gauthier’s achievements and assess his contribution to the 
development of moral contractarianism. I believe that Gauthier has extensively 
contributed to the familiarisation of modem philosophers with the fabulous potential of 
this form of contractarianism. However, I believe that he has failed to bring his project 
to a viable state. Morality as an artificial virtue is not and will never be a stand-alone 
rational product. Moral standards or principles can possibly be rationally derived but 
they will never be internalised by mere rational calculus whichever rational calculus we 
apply.
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PARTI
THE FOUNDATIONS OF GAUTHIER’S 
CONTRACTARIAN MORAL THEORY
Introduction
In this first part, I trace back Gauthier’s intellectual process and the concepts that 
brought about Morals by Agreement. In chapter I, I highlight the influence of his 
research on Hobbes on the development of his own contractarian moral theory. I explain 
how his interpretation of the British philosopher guided his step into discovering the 
concept of a dual rationality. I also highlight the strong connection between Gauthier’s 
research and the developments in moral and political philosophy of the second half of 
last century.
In chapter II, I detail and interpret Morals by Agreement. I focus on the logic and the 
articulation of his core conceptions, highlighting the links between them and the role of 
his basic assumptions. In the light of this interpretation, I will develop my own criticism 
of his theory in chapter IV of Part n.
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CHAPTER Is THE BIRTH OF A 
CONTRACTARIAN MORAL THEORY
In this introductory chapter I would like to tell the story of the making of Morals by 
Agreement. The roots of Gauthier’s contractarian moral theory are in a three-period 
story: the birth of a project, the finding of a framework and the use of new tools.
The first period was in the late fifties when Gauthier wrote his doctoral thesis on 
Practical Reasoning. At the time, Gauthier’s main references were K. Baier’s The 
Moral Point o f View and R.M. Hare’s The Language of Morals. The young Gauthier 
believed in the potential of instrumental reason. He distinguished between prudential 
and moral practical judgments; he then attempted to prove that all practical reasoning 
takes the same form whether moral or prudential and depends primarily on the wants of 
the agent doing the reasoning. In chapter VII of his first book he already suggested 
basing “morality on a set of principles derivable, as general practical judgments, from 
prudential grounds”16. This project would remain the core of his research.17
The second period started when Gauthier had completed his doctoral thesis and stayed 
in Oxford to further his research on practical reasoning. His interest in Hobbes probably 
took root then. Indeed, for moral practical reasoning to take the same form as prudential 
reasoning, the agent has to include the wants of others in his wants. This condition 
poses a problem in the case of obligations and Hobbes was one of the rare philosopher 
who had given this problem some thought and the beginning of a solution. During the 
sixties, Gauthier developed his understanding of Hobbes until he published The Logic o f 
Leviathan in 1969. As we shall see, he amended this initial interpretation later.
Gauthier’s original interest in Hobbes was entirely motivated by his own research on 
practical reasoning. However, he would find in Hobbes the framework of his own 
theory. If the project to derive morality from prudential reasoning sprang from his 
student years, the concept of a proper contractarian moral theory was bom with his
16 Practical Reasoning p 81.
17 One will find further details on this initial project in the annex of this chapter.
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research on Hobbes. In 1969, Gauthier identified failures in Hobbes’s philosophy. He 
wanted to succeed where Hobbes failed. A new theory had to emerge within the 
Hobbesian framework. His work on Hobbes is an integral part of his own theory and we 
cannot understand one without understanding the other.
Then came what I would call the third period: the seventies. In 1971, Rawls published 
his theory of justice, in 1975 Buchanan wrote The limits o f Liberty and in 1976 
Harsanyi developed his general theory of rational behaviour. Game theory made its 
entry in the secluded world of moral and political philosophy.18 This explosion of new 
theories and tools was obviously going to influence Gauthier who became very much 
aware of their tremendous potential. The 70’s were the brewing years. Gauthier 
distinguished between a hypothetical state of nature and civil society. In the state of 
nature, only egoists can inhabit and they can only coordinate their actions. Rational 
cooperation and bargaining are steps toward civil society. Criticising Harsanyi, Gauthier 
created his arbitrator and on amending Rawls’s lexical difference principle, he created 
his maximin principle. He also borrowed the economic concept of rationality as utility 
maximization to develop his own concept of constrained maximization. Of course game 
theory was the engine of his research. The famous prisoner dilemma was the first 
challenge Gauthier wanted to tackle. It is while trying to solve it that he came to think of 
the concept of dual rationality: a straightforward or natural rationality in the state of 
nature versus a constrained or conventional rationality once in society. Gauthier worked 
in every direction without any pre-conceived idea of where he wanted to go. Between 
1970 and 1986, he developed most of the core conceptions that made the future Morals 
by Agreement19. His contractarian moral theory was bom.
About Hobbes
In 1963, Gauthier defended the view that an obligation arises from a commitment and 
not inversely. It is because I committed myself to do X that I am obliged to do X. 
Gauthier claimed that according to Hobbes, we have a right of nature i.e. the right to all
18 For those unfamiliar with all these theories and tools, please read the appendix.
19 Gauthier had brushed a summary of his Morals by Agreement in 1979 in ‘Bargaining Our Way Into 
Morality : A Do-It Yourself Primer’. In this article, one can find articulated the concept of the perfect free 
market as a morally free zone, the minimax and maximin principle, the concept of constrained 
maximization and the Lockean Proviso, every single concept contributing to demonstrate that morality so 
defined can be identified with rationality.
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actions compatible with self-preservation. I can kill if it can protect my life. However 
this very right leads to war and thus to a situation that endangers my life. Self- 
preservation is men’s good. Therefore it is in their best interest to surrender part of their 
right to secure this end. The covenant is a mean to this end. They must really renounce 
some of their rights to secure this end and this renunciation carries obligation. The 
making of a covenant is an obliging factor and this obliging factor becomes a sufficient 
reason for acting upon it if one is to reach the end one seeks.
A majority of contracting parties must keep the covenant otherwise it is in vain. This 
means that the covenant must oblige not that it does oblige. Hobbes is aware that there 
are situations where self-interest is in contradiction with the covenant. The main 
problem is there: the covenant rests on prudential grounds but the very same prudential 
grounds can lead men to break the covenant once agreed. That is where Gauthier 
departs from Hobbes since, at this stage, Hobbes needs to introduce the coercive power 
of the sovereign to secure the covenant. Unfortunately, “the effect of the sovereign is to 
by-pass the act of covenanting as an obliging factor”20. I don’t do X not because I 
voluntarily committed myself not to do X but because I fear the sovereign’s punishment 
if I do X.
From 1963 until 1969, Gauthier worked on the publication of a thorough research on 
Hobbes: The Logic of Leviathan. This second book was very much in the vein of 
Practical Reasoning. However it bore all the roots of his future project. Gauthier 
considered Hobbes as the “true parent of rational morality”21 but he also believed that 
Hobbes chose the wrong premises on the state of nature and that he failed to bring to a 
satisfactory completion the concept of rational morality. His own theory is primarily 
built by rectifying the double failure he found in Hobbes.
In the 70’s, Gauthier left aside his work on Hobbes to build up on his own theory. As 
said before, the core of Morals by Agreement was written during these years of research, 
taking on board the main developments of modem moral and political philosophy. In 
the late 70 and early 80’s Gauthier came back to Hobbes in several articles and his 
reading was then vastly influenced by his own freshly derived views on rational
20 Practical Reasoning pi 89
21 ‘Hobbes’s Social Contract’, p 72
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morality. Gauthier could almost detect the concept of constrained maximization in the 
Leviathan.
In 1963, Gauthier wrote:
“Obligation cannot be effective under the conditions imposed by Hobbes... The 
objections urged against his theory serve to defeat any attempt to show that a prudential 
reason for undertaking an obligation suffices to ground performance of the action to 
which one obliges oneself. Prudential considerations may lead us to undertake 
obligations, as Hobbes clearly sees, but these obligations must provide independent, 
moral reasons for acting in order to oblige. In obliging oneself, one may introduce moral 
considerations not previously relevant to one’s actions, and one may introduce them on 
prudential grounds. But the practical force of these considerations cannot depend on the 
ground for introducing them”22.
Gauthier remained convinced that moral considerations had to back the prudential basis 
for any covenant to be kept. However, his opinion on Hobbes’s achievement in this 
regard had changed by 1979:
“The tour de force in his [Hobbes’s] theory is the reconciliation of maximizing 
rationality with constraining morality. How can one be rational in accepting the 
constraints of the laws of nature and so not exercising one’s full right of nature? The 
answer requires Hobbes’s account of right reason. For his true moral theory is a dual 
conventionalism, in which a conventional reason, superseding natural reason, justifies a 
conventional morality, constraining natural behaviour. And this dual conventionalism is 
Hobbes’s enduring contribution to moral theory” 23
The purpose of this chapter will be partly to understand what happened between these 
two quotes, i.e. to understand how Gauthier’s research on rational morality influenced 
his interpretation of Hobbes. Our starting point will be Gauthier’s The Logic of 
Leviathan.
Hobbes is a rationalist. The laws of nature are rules of reason deduced from 
assumptions about human nature and human conditions. God created Man and Man 
created the Leviathan i.e. “an artificial man of greater stature and strength than the 
natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended”24. How exactly was this 
Leviathan created? Hobbes articulates his argument in three steps. Firstly he describes 
what he calls the state of nature that informs us of his vision of human nature. Secondly, 
he explains how through a social compact, men can come out of the state of nature and
22 Practical Reasoning pi 90-1
23 ‘Thomas Hobbes : Moral Theorist’, p 547-8
24 Leviathan, p 492
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live together in peace. Thirdly he explains how to keep the social contract once agreed 
upon. We shall follow below these three steps in the following three sections25.
I apologise in advance to the Hobbes scholars who might be frustrated by some of my 
simplifications. I have abstracted from Gauthier’s book on Hobbes only what was 
relevant to his own theory, going quickly on some points and being more thorough on 
others. My purpose is not to develop Hobbes’ philosophy but only to highlight its role 
in the development of Gauthier’s own theory.
25 These three steps are unfolded primarily in Part I chapters 13 to 15 of the Leviathan.
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Section 1: About the state of nature and the original position
In this section, I will review Gauthier’s description of Hobbes’ state of nature and his 
criticisms of it prior to detailing his own developments on the sate of nature and the 
original position. Gauthier feels uncomfortable with Hobbes’ psychological premises 
and prefers Locke’s vision of human nature as appropriative. He also starts to argue for 
what will become important in his theory i.e. that, for the sake of the future cooperation, 
agents are prepared to accept constraints on their original position. Last but not least, I 
will highlight the influence of bargaining theory in his embryonic approach to the 
original position or base point.
Hobbes’ state of nature in The Logic of Leviathan.
Hobbes starts by making a number of assumptions about human nature and the state of 
nature.
1. Men are equal in mental and physical power. Hobbes claims no man can be strong 
enough to feel secure; even if one man is stronger than the others, the others can always 
fight him by “machination or confederacy”.26
2. This equality of insecurity combined with scarcity o f goods leads to conflicting 
desires. If a man, through his abilities or labour, is in an enviable position, he can expect 
the fruit of his labour as well as his liberty or his life to be taken by another man. No 
man can secure himself or his position.
3. Men are prudent and concerned with self preservation. Hobbes assumes that men 
are pre-occupied not only with immediate but also with future self-preservation, self- 
preservation being an end in itself. It is the concept of prudence that will lead them to 
contract.
4. The best strategy is to attack. Men are naturally inclined to quarrel for competition, 
lack of trust or glory. Even if some would be happy to settle with modest means, there
26 Leviathan, chapter 13, p 531
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will always be some quarrelsome individuals in search of glory to attack them. In this 
context, defence and ‘wait and see’ strategies are unlikely to be successful.
From these assumptions, Hobbes concludes that the state of nature is a state of war of 
every man against every man. In the state of nature, there is neither property nor 
business nor prosperity. Nothing and nobody is safe; it is a state where the life of man is
on“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” . There is no social peace, no law and no 
justice.
Since all of Hobbes’s moral and political philosophy is based on his assumptions 
concerning the nature of man, Gauthier tried to understand what lead Hobbes to make 
such assumptions and more importantly how from these assumptions about men, 
Hobbes can conclude that they do contract. Gauthier’s focus is obviously primarily on 
assumption 3 since he believes that it is Hobbes’s concept of rationality that is the root 
of his moral and political philosophy.
On the next page, one finds Gauthier’s description of Hobbes’s instrumental and 
theoretical reasoning, their interactions and their limits. A quick look at it should 
provide the necessary background to what follows.
He describes the Hobbesian human beings as self-maintaining engines in permanent 
motion since external bodies recurrently affect the organs of sense. We are permanently 
moved by our passions. Only power can secure success ... never ending power. From 
this description of man combined with an assumption of equality and scarcity of good, 
men are necessarily led to compete. Assumption 4 is almost a conclusion to the three 
previous assumptions. Competition is a by-product of the very nature of men and their 
innate concern for self-preservation. In search of self-preservation, we end up living in a 
state of war. When fully rational we act against our own best interest.
Hobbes is convinced that were the appropriate moral, political and social arrangements 
in place, men could maintain themselves free of competition and the cause of war would 
be removed. Even those who seek war for the sake of it could be tamed and trained.
27 Leviathan, chapter 13, p 532
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How can Hobbes derive normative (moral and political) conclusions from factual 
(psychological) premises? According to Hobbes, the basic nature of human motivation 
is self-preservation. Whatever is a condition for self-preservation is a means to man’s 
end.
Gauthier considers that Hobbes is justified to claim that whoever accepts the 
psychological doctrine that self-preservation is man’s basic end, must also accept its 
imperatives as rationally required. However, Gauthier’s objections are more with the 
premises themselves. Firstly, he does not believe that self-preservation is a necessary 
and basic motive of human action. He agrees that self-preservation is very likely to be a 
motivation to act but it does not have to be the only one. Hobbes adopts a reductive 
account of human motivation. Other factors have to be taken into account in some 
situations. Secondly, he disagrees with Hobbes account of rationality: “those actions are 
most reasonable, that conduce to their [the agents’] ends”. Again, he finds this account 
too restrictive since he considers that actions can be reasonable without conducing to 
the agents’ ends.
Therefore Gauthier suggests modifying the inference as follows: 
from ‘X is a necessary means to self-preservation’,
we conclude that ‘men must do X to secure what they very probably want’
and then ‘men very probably have some reason to do X’.
This provides a reason but not a sufficient reason for the imperative ‘Do X’.
From premise 
Hobbes concludes
‘X is necessary to self-preservation’,
‘men must do X to secure what they want’ 
‘men, if rational, will do X’.and then
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Sketch 1: Hobbes’ practical and theoretical reasoning
DELIBERATION
(Practical reasoning) 
Succession of alternate appetites
MENTAL DISCOURSE
(Theoretical reasoning or Reason) 
Succession of alternate opinions
External objects act on 
the organs of sense and then on 
the brain to become motions of 
sense which then travel to the heart.
Motions of imagination 
in the heart (seat of vital motions)
If the vital motions weaken the 
movement than it is called pain; if it helps 
it, it is called pleasure. These motions 
becomes ‘endeavours’ i.e. aversions 
or appetites. Passions are species of 
aversions or desires.
The last appetite is the
WILL <---------
Reason aids deliberatic
1) At first level, it shows us the means to
2) “As we determine further consequence 
alters. Our judgment of the several cor 
appetite, will” The Logic of Leviathan
Absolute knowledge of facts i.e. 
knowledge of consequences from 
sense & memory recorded in definitions 
of words which proceeds into general 
affirmations and then into syllogisms
Motions of imagination 
in the brain
The last sum is the conclusion. These 
conclusions are opinions. They form 
a whole called science and science is 
power since it provides the means to ends.
The last opinion is 
------- JUDGMENT
m at several levels: 
obtain or avoid what we will.
;s of some acts, our desire to perform it or not 
isequences of an action determines our last
p!2
COMMENTS ON THE ABOVE
• Deliberation is fallible since ‘the will is always directed toward the promotion of our well 
being as we conceive it ... but passion may lead us to misconceive well being itself The 
Logic o f Leviathan p8. We can also mistake the means to the chosen end.
• ‘In so far as we judge correctly and fully, we will what conduces most to our ends. And 
so correct reasoning enables will to be rational appetite’ The Logic of Leviathan pl2
• Unfortunately mental discourse is fallible too: the first ground of discourse might not be 
definitions or the definitions might not be joined together into syllogisms.
• The fallibility of mental discourse poses the problem of right reason. Gauthier notes that 
Hobbes is not clear on the determination of right reason.
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Gauthier*s state of nature and original position: Lockean rather than Hobbesian
Gauthier wants to change Hobbes state of nature. Like Locke, he believes that men seek 
appropriation more than self-preservation. Indeed, he demonstrates that the goods that 
men seek must fulfil three conditions: a- Cooperation increases supply; b- Possession 
creates distributive problems; c- There is unlimited demand or at least the demand is 
superior to supply. The only goods that fulfil these criteria are the goods of 
appropriation (the universal measure of property being money). Men have a strong 
desire to appropriate. The appetite for food, drink or sex is satisfiable in a way that the 
desire to appropriate is not. Men being by nature appropriators, they can never find a 
satisfactory level of satiation for appropriative activity. Therefore men find themselves 
in conflict with respect to their desire for property. “The competitive search for power is 
easily derived from the insatiable desire for appropriation.”28Increasing competition 
means decreasing security of property. Thus “the state of nature leads to an outcome far 
worse for everyone than that would result were there a coercive force sufficient to curb 
each man’s appetite for power and to channel his desire to appropriate into an arena 
which is competitive yet peaceful -  the marketplace rather than the battlefield.” Men 
seek goods of appropriation being appropriators by nature and the market is the most 
natural and peaceful place for them to interact. However the perfect conditions for the 
free market to take place are not fulfilled30. Society has then to be rationally established 
and rationally maintained.
The state of nature is characterised by relations holding between any two persons where 
each acts on an independently selected principle of action. It is opposed to society 
which is characterised by relations holding between any two persons where both act on 
a mutually selected principle of action.31 Gauthier also described society as “an 
instrument which individuals mutually accept in order to achieve, for each, benefits 
unattainable without such a collective instrument”.32
28 ‘The Social Contract as Ideology’, p 148
29 ‘The Social Contract as Ideology’, p 148
30 For full details on the market as a morally free zone see ‘No Need for Morality : The Case of the 
Competitive Market’. This article is to be connected to the future chapter IV of Morals By Agreement.
31 ‘The Social Contract as Ideology’, p 141
32 ‘Rational Cooperation’, p 60
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Coordination occurs in the state of nature and it is a natural extension of maximisation. 
In an article on coordination Gauthier developed on the unusual richness of coordination 
in the absence of bargaining or society. He wrote: coordination “might be interpreted as 
exhibiting one of egoism’s successes. Even for straightforward maximisers, rudimentary 
practices of truthfulness and promise keeping can be defended, as resolving their 
coordination problems.”33
The state of nature and the social contract are not real but merely hypothetical. The 
purpose of the philosopher is two-fold: he has to explain the transition from a state of 
nature to society and to find the principles of cooperative agreement that rational 
individuals would choose in a suitably characterized position of free choice.
The transition from the state of nature to society is done by rational cooperation and 
bargaining. Gauthier answers three questions concerning this transition: firstly, from 
which threshold does rational cooperation and therefore society become worthwhile for 
mere coordinators; secondly, what to do about the natural assets and original 
inequalities of individuals in the state of nature prior to cooperating; Thirdly, how to 
suitably characterise a position of free choice from which individuals can choose their 
future cooperative principles.
The first two aspects are obviously strongly connected since the initial assets are 
unlikely to be the same for all parties to the cooperation. Gauthier acknowledges and 
addresses this connection as follows:
“The minimal cooperative utility represents that point at which an individual prefers to 
act on the basis of mutual agreement rather than to act in a directly maximizing manner, 
or, we may say, prefers civil society to the state of nature. There is no reason to suppose 
that this point is the same for all men. To the extent to which one person can expect to 
do better for himself in the state of nature than another, he will demand a higher 
minimal return from cooperation. Thus the minimal cooperative utility reflects what we 
may call the natural inequalities among men. Rational cooperation takes these natural 
inequalities as given.”34
Let us now visit Gauthier’s various articles to find the answers to the three issues raised 
above.
33 Moral Dealing p 5
34 ‘Rational Cooperation’, p 59
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About the threshold from which society becomes worthwhile.
Influenced by the development of bargaining theory, Gauthier sets three conditions for 
society to emerge35. He first introduces the concept of natural outcome i.e. the outcome 
of actions performed in the full state of nature. Society must improve on the natural 
outcome for everyone. He then defines an outcome as optimal if and only if any 
alternative outcome that would be better for some person would be worse for some 
other person. Society is possible if and only if the natural outcome is not optimal. 
Lastly, he defines an outcome as stable, or one in equilibrium if and only if no one can 
bring about an alternative outcome that is better for himself, by unilaterally changing his 
way of acting.36 When there is no optimal outcome that is stable, not only is 
coordination no longer sufficient but rational cooperation and bargaining procedures 
become necessary.
About the initial endowment o f the bargainers.
The next most urgent issue concerns the natural assets of the parties in cooperation. As 
we saw in the quote above, Gauthier takes the view that the initial assets of individuals 
are given. If A is strong, clever and hard worker, he would get more in the state of 
nature than B who is weak, slow and lazy. Cooperation has to improve on A’s utility in 
the state of nature proportionally more than on B’s utility in the state of nature.
When dealing with natural endowment, Gauthier claims:
“We must distinguish clearly between apportioning social benefits on an unequal basis, 
proportional to natural inequalities, and apportioning social benefits on an equal basis, 
after taking natural inequalities into account. The present theory requires the latter.” 37
If society is to be considered as a mutually accepted instrument whose function is to 
achieve benefits unattainable without it, then it has not only to assure each what they 
can attain for themselves in the state of nature but it also has to add a fair share of the 
benefits attainable only through cooperation.
35 See ‘The Social Contract as Ideology’
36 ‘The Social Contract as Ideology’, p 142
37 ‘Rational Cooperation’, p 60
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Gauthier considers that Rawls, by using the veil of ignorance, relies on a pre-conception 
of morality:
“His use of the veil of ignorance is ultimately motivated by his insistence that the 
parties are to seek a conception of justice appropriate to ‘free and equal moral persons’. 
The real differences and inequalities that characterize them are to be dismissed as 
morally irrelevant. Thus the principles of justice, in Rawls’s view, must be related to a 
prior moral conception of the person.”38
Rawls would not object to such a comment. He is the first to acknowledge his Kantian 
inheritance and the priority of the concept of right over the individuals’ good (rational 
plans of life)39:
“In justice as fairness one does not take men’s propensities and inclinations as given, 
whatever they are, and then seek the best way to fulfil them. Rather their desires and 
aspirations are restricted from the outset by the principles of justice which specify the 
boundaries that men’s systems of ends must respect. We can express this by saying that 
in justice as fairness the concept of right is prior to that of the good.”40
In order to demonstrate that Rawls’s suggestion and his lexical difference principle41 are 
incompatible with his contractual theory, Gauthier introduces two new definitions and 
one assumption. The social surplus is the proportion of primary goods produced 
through cooperation and that would not have been produced without it. The social 
potential of an individual is the maximum well being that he can expect under that 
optimal social arrangement that is most favourable to him. The social potential reflects 
individual natural endowments. Even if behind the veil of ignorance, she does not know 
her natural abilities, she knows that she has some natural talents that are different from 
those of the others so that, in the absence of an agreement, each would secure different 
levels of well being. “It is therefore possible for everyone to take account of the ‘no 
agreement point’ in her reasoning, even though no particular person knows how it will 
affect her.”42 The ‘no agreement point’ will become the ‘base point’ or ‘status quo’ and 
the social potential will become the target point.
38 ‘Justice as Social Choice’, pl76
39 See appendix section 3, a
40 A Theory of Justice, p 27-8
41 Rawls’ lexical difference principle states that “in a basic structure with n relevant representatives, first 
maximize the welfare of the worst off representative man; second, for equal welfare of the worst 
representative, maximize the welfare of the second worse off representative man, and so on until the last 
case which is, for equal welfare of all the preceding n-1 representatives, maximise the welfare of the 
welfare of the best off representative man” A Theory of Justice, p 83
42 ‘Justice and Natural Endowment’, p 159
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Gauthier claims that what is rational behind the veil of ignorance has to remain rational 
once the veil of ignorance is lifted for every single party to the contract, in whichever 
social position. That is where Rawls fails. When the veil of ignorance is lifted and each 
is aware of which primary goods she could have expected without agreement and which 
primary goods she can expect as a result of the agreement, she will want as many 
additional goods as possible for herself. She will not accept a smaller share of the social 
surplus simply to increase overall equality of benefit. Rawls lexical difference principle 
takes natural assets as common assets. Therefore, once the veil of ignorance is lifted, the 
naturally gifted person finds his talents and efforts primarily directed to the advantage 
of the naturally deprived. He will not find it rational to agree to principles that “require 
him to accept a lesser proportionate benefit, simply to increase overall equality of 
absolute benefit.”43
Rational cooperation, as suggested by Gauthier, preserves fixed social inequalities
among men but ensures equality o f opportunity to each to realize their social potential.
“To accept any stronger form of equality would be to require some members of society 
to make proportionately greater sacrifices than others, and this would be rationally 
unacceptable to utility-maximizing individuals.” 44
About the original position
However, if Gauthier removes the veil of ignorance, he is aware that for the bargaining 
process to be fair, the pre-bargaining conditions must be fair. Through fairness of the 
bargaining background, Gauthier wants to secure the rationality of compliance once in 
society. He therefore imposes some pre-conditions on the original position. He requires 
that the principle of rational choice be defined for an ideal decision maker and for an 
ideal society.
“We achieve this ideal conception ... by taking each [bargainer] to be adequately 
informed not only about his own good but also about that of his fellows.
43 ‘Justice and Natural Endowment’ p 164. Rawls had anticipated such an argument and his reply was as 
follows : ‘The more advantaged, when they view the matter from a general perspective, recognise that the 
well-being of each depends on a scheme of social cooperation without which no one could have a 
satisfactory life; they recognise also that they can expect the willing cooperation of all only if the terms of 
the scheme are reasonable. So they regard themselves already compensated, as it were, by the advantages to 
which no one (including themselves) had a prior claim. They forego the idea of maximizing a weighted 
mean and regard the difference principle as a fair basis for regulating the basic structure.’ A Theory of 
Justice, p 88
44 ‘Rational Cooperation’, p 62
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Communication among the persons must be full and free; no one is able to deceive 
another about anyone’s interest or bluff successfully about what anyone is willing to do. 
The process of bargaining must be thought of as effectively cost-free... No one is in a 
position to benefit by his superior ability to outwit the others. Threats are useless... we 
require that the process of bargaining exhibit procedural equality and maximum 
competence among the persons who are to agree on the principles of justice... Each 
bargainer thus serves as an ideal representative of the particular person he will be in the 
social world to be shaped by the agreed principles of justice; thus fairness is assured at 
the procedural level.”4
Gauthier’s concern for ensuring a fair bargaining process goes further. We saw above 
that the rationale for an individual to bargain depends on his ‘no agreement point’. It 
might not be beneficial for some individuals to interact at all or cooperate with others in 
view of their initial position. Therefore, Gauthier creates the ‘base point’ or ‘status quo’: 
this is the pre bargaining payoff. This base point represents what each person “could 
expect to gain from her own efforts in the absence of any agreed or cooperative 
interaction.”46 Gauthier specifies: “voluntary compliance with the terms of cooperation 
is rational in general only if the base point is not itself considered disadvantageous in 
relation to no interaction.”47The original position could be such that discrepancies 
between potential bargainers would discourage some from interacting or to interact, 
taking as given the established discrepancies.
Gauthier specifies that for some purposes, the base point may be the final outcome, 
namely when bargaining fails, while for other purposes it may be the initial situation of 
the bargainers, that historical state of affairs prevailing prior to the bargaining and from 
which bargaining proceeds. In any case the status quo is established outside the bargain 
itself.
“If it is the result should bargaining fail, then it is determined by the structure of the 
situation in which the would-be bargainers must act, and by the states of affairs possible 
should they not bargain. If on the other hand the status quo is the initial situation, then it 
is determined by the historical background of the bargaining situation. In either case, it 
is given from the standpoint of bargaining itself.”48
This condition on the base point reflects the same concern as the conditions on the 
bargaining process mentioned above: no interaction should benefit some parties to the 
agreement by worsening the situation of others. This conception of the state of nature
45 ‘Justice as Social Choice’, p 177-178
46 ‘Justice as Social Choice’, p 179
47 ‘Justice as Social Choice’, p 182
48 ‘Social Choice and Distributive Justice’, p 246
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not only ensures the fairness of the process and moralises the base point for cooperation 
but it also secures compliance in social interactions. The future Lockean proviso is bom.
Gauthier considerably modified Hobbes’ state of nature. His account of human
motivation owes more to the idea of an appropriative human nature than to self-
preservation. The original position and natural assets are taken into account when
bargaining. Gauthier adopts a Lockean original position rather than a Hobbesian one.
“Principles of justice may be conceived as the outcome of a rational bargain or 
agreement among all of the members of society, who consider how they would adopt ex 
ante, from the perspective of the state of nature, their fundamental terms of association. 
I argue that if terms of association are to gain voluntary and enduring recognition, and 
so provide a stable basis for society, they must be accepted from the perspective of a 
Lockean rather than a Hobbesian state of nature -  That is a state of nature already 
constrained by a form of the Lockean proviso.”49
The Lockean proviso and the willingness to rationalise and moralise the base point are 
already present in his mind. The rationality of the process depends on its fairness from 
the pre-bargaining position onwards.
49 Moral Dealing p 6
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Section 2: The making of the covenant.
In this section, we will first rapidly review the key features of Hobbes description of the 
making of the covenant. According to Hobbes, prudence, reason and the hope of 
securing property lead men to contract with each other. This aspect of Hobbes 
philosophy is usually very familiar to political philosophers and will become relevant 
later in this chapter. More importantly, we will then review Gauthier’s treatment of the 
topic. Gauthier gives flesh to the making of the covenant by introducing a bargaining 
procedure. Nowhere in Gauthier’s theory do we feel as much the influence of the 
philosophical environment in which he works than in his maximin concept. Gauthier 
refers to Nash, Arrow, Harsanyi, Sen, Rawls, Kalai and Smorodinsky or Nozick. He 
talks about social choice, welfare, distributive justice, Pareto-extension rule and 
bargaining procedure. One can say that his major contribution to the debate was to 
introduce in a comprehensive way game theory and bargaining theory into modem 
contractarianism.50 However, Gauthier borrows concepts from these existing bodies of 
knowledge and adapt them to the needs of his own theory. One can question the 
legitimacy of such a strategy. Indeed, some of these concepts rely on specific 
assumptions without which they can lose their validity or properties. To borrow them 
and modify the assumptions to accommodate a contractarian framework can be a 
dangerous game to play.
Hobbes and the laws of nature.
According to Hobbes, men have a right of nature when in the state of nature, i.e. “the 
liberty each man has, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of 
his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing any thing, 
which in his own judgement, and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means 
thereunto”.51 However, through reason, men find a way out of this state of war. Hobbes 
edicts what he calls a law of nature i.e. “a precept or general rule, found out by reason, 
by which a man is forbidden to do that, which is destructive of his life, or takes away 
the means of preserving the same; and to omit that, by which he thinks it may be best
50 See Braithwaite for a first attempt.
51 Leviathan, chapter 14, p 533
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preserved”. According to the first law of nature, “every man, ought to endeavour 
peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may 
seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war”.53
The right of nature is described as a liberty whereas a law of nature is described as a 
general rule. The former spells out what is permitted whereas the latter spells out what 
is required. Both the right and the law of nature are summed up in the first law. One is 
required to seek peace wherever possible but, if it is not possible to obtain, one is 
allowed to defend himself and use means of war.
The second law of nature gives the nature and conditions of the social contract: “that a 
man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth, as for peace, and defence of himself 
he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so 
much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself’.54 In 
order to enter into and benefit from the agreement, men have to surrender part of their 
liberty at the sine qua non condition that the others are doing the same. In 1982, 
Gauthier interprets this point as follows: “The liberty that each person should continue 
to enjoy, so that peace may prevail, must be determined, not by each person’s 
calculation of the benefit to himself which he may obtain by his own actions, but rather 
from each person’s calculation of the overall benefit to himself that he may expect from 
the interaction of all”55. As we shall see, this interpretation takes into account two 
different concepts of rationality.
Then comes the third law of nature without which any covenant would be vain and 
empty words: “men perform their covenants made”.56 This is a law of justice. Justice is 
keeping the covenant. Injustice is the non performance of what was agreed. Whatsoever 
is not unjust is just. There would be no social contract and a state of war if it were not 
for the third law. Again in 1982, Gauthier interprets the connection between the second 
and the third law introducing the concept of intention. “We may say that if one does not 
intend to adhere to one’s agreements, and so does not intend to follow the third law, 
then one does not sincerely enter the agreements, as required by the second law. To put
52 Leviathan, chapter 14, p 533
53 Leviathan, chapter 14, p 534
54 Leviathan, chapter 14, p 534
55 ‘Three Against Justice’ in Moral Dealing, p 133
56 Leviathan, chapter 15, p 538
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the second law into effect, then, one must also put the third law into effect; in agreeing 
to a limitation on one’s liberty, one must intend that one adhere to the limitation” .
McClennen classifies the rest of the laws of nature as follows58: the fourth through the 
tenth prohibit holding attitudes that would make the social contract difficult to 
consummate. The eleventh through the nineteenth spell out procedures to adjudicate the 
disputes that are bound to arise in regard to our contracts.
The laws of nature spell out the precise terms of the social contract. They are the 
guarantor of a mutually advantageous state of affairs. Any move away from these laws 
would lead out of social peace back to the state of war, hence the necessity of ensuring 
that these laws are compulsory and enforced.
As will be explained below, Gauthier’s two central arguments are as initially sketched 
in Practical Reasoning. Firstly, Gauthier argues that the obliging factor arises from the 
making of the covenant not from the covenant itself. “We do not limit our right of 
nature by rationally establishing the second law of nature. But once we have established 
it, we do limit our right of nature by acting in accordance with it. The limitation derives 
from our action not from the law, but our action is required by the law”59. The laws of 
nature are not laws but mere prescriptions. People should follow them but they have no 
force by themselves.
Secondly, Gauthier highlights a contradiction in Hobbes moral philosophy. Indeed, 
Hobbes’s moral concepts are the right of nature, the laws of nature, obligation and 
justice. These moral concepts have to be interpreted by taking into account his 
psychological doctrine (i.e. self-preservation is man’s basic end) if we want them to 
bear on his political philosophy. However, if we interpret them according to his 
psychological doctrine then Hobbes’s arguments lack something distinctively moral. I 
have no moral obligation to keep my covenant if, once entered into, it becomes contrary 
to reason for me to keep it. As we shall see, Gauthier will later introduce a new 
distinction between the security and motivation problem in his interpretation of 
Hobbes’s moral concepts.
57 ‘Three Against Justice’ in Moral Dealing, p i35
58 In a set of lectures delivered at the L.S.E. in the winter 2002-3
59 The Logic of Leviathan p 54
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Gauthier and the making of the agreement
Bargaining theory is an extension of game theory but the Hobbesian political 
philosophers rapidly seized the tremendous potential of such a theory. Indeed, 
bargaining theory claims that agents in full knowledge of their situation and endowment 
can agree on the redistribution of the cooperative surplus following a bargaining 
procedure. The theory sets the conditions for the cooperation and provides a unique 
solution60 taking into account each party’s bargaining power. Gauthier was immediately 
attracted by this theory but in order to appropriate it and use it in his own framework, he 
had first to restrict the field of morality and then modify the solution. If the first move is 
generally accepted, the second one is more problematic. In this sub-section, I have 
deliberately chosen to remove all technical discussions on Gauthier’s maximin and 
minimax, both principles being described and explained at length in chapter n. The 
focus here will exclusively be on Gauthier’s approach to the bargaining problem.
Gauthier* s restrictive conception o f morality
In 1974, Gauthier claimed that
“rational cooperation satisfies both a productive condition and a distributive condition, 
with respect to human well-being. It may then seem plausible to identify rational 
cooperation with morality, not in supposing that rational cooperation requires us to do 
whatever we ordinarily take to be morally right, but rather that it requires us to do what 
on reflection seems reasonable and justifiable in our moral practices. It enables us to 
subsume morality under rationality; what cannot be so subsumed we regard as 
irrational, and cease to consider moral. In particular, rational cooperation brings into 
relief those aspects of morality which we associate with justice and fairness.”61
This quote reflects an important step in the evolution of his philosophy. Gauthier 
departs from the traditional boundaries of morality and the change is two-fold: firstly, 
traditional morality is no longer the starting point of our moral enquiry but the by­
product of rational choice; secondly, the field of morality is restricted to the boundaries 
of distributive justice. We shall develop these two points below.
60 See Nash’s bargaining solution in the appendix section 1, b.
61 “Rational Cooperation’, p58
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The starting point is no longer traditional morality as we know it. Principles are 
rationally derived and then reconciled with moral practice. In 1974, Gauthier wrote 
about A Theory o f Justice:
“The hypothesis, which makes the theory a genuine theory, is that an account can be 
given of these factors which both matches our considered judgments about them, and 
relates them so that the conception of justice would be embodied in the principles 
chosen by rational men in the initial situation.”62
What is moral is what is derived through individual instrumental rationality and 
collectively agreed upon in order to obtain a mutually advantageous state of affair. The 
wants of others are included in my wants through agreement. We all agree on a 
principle of cooperation that is individually and rationally derived because it is 
beneficial to each of us. If it is rational for us to agree to it ex-ante (in the state of 
nature), it becomes rational for us to keep it ex-post (in society). Because I know that it 
is beneficial to every single party to the agreement, I have grounds to believe that they 
each will keep it and therefore I will keep it. Morality is what has been rationally agreed 
and will be rationally kept. We shall see in step 3 that Gauthier introduces a special 
form of rationality to fit the requirement of compliance ex-post. If Gauthier rejects 
Rawls’s original position and conception of justice and fairness, he retains his method. 
Once the hypothetical original position has been properly characterised, whatever 
principle the cooperators in search of an optimal outcome will rationally choose 
represents the new boundaries of morality.
Rawls claimed “The Theory of Justice is a part, perhaps the most significant part of the 
theory of rational choice”63. In 197964, Gauthier attempts to demonstrate that such a 
claim is justified. The boundaries of morality are restricted to justice as fairness and not 
all of justice but merely distributive justice. The issues raised by acquisitive justice are 
addressed by the Lockean proviso. By then, Gauthier clearly spells out that our 
“framework of moral concepts is outmoded”65. What is just is what we have rationally 
agreed to and what is just is moral. Distributive justice (i.e. constraints on preferences 
justified by an appeal to preferences) having been securely established within the realm 
rational choice can be removed from the area of speculative enquiry and the “age-old 
philosophical problems about the rationality of morality are solved for the case of
62 ‘Justice and Natural Endowment’ p 151
63 A Theory of Justice, p 15
64 See ‘Bargaining Our Way Into Morality : A Do-It Yourself Primer’
65 ‘Bargaining Our Way Into Morality : A Do-It Yourself Primer’ p!5
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distributive justice”66... However external constraints on preferences which cannot be 
justified by an appeal to preference itself remains within the area of speculative enquiry 
and the philosophical problems posed by this field of morality remain unsolved. The 
field covered by morality is reduced to the boundaries of distributive justice. This leads 
Gauthier to a double conclusion: the optimistic conclusion is that the part of traditional 
morality that concerns distributive justice is now grounded on a strictly rational footing; 
the pessimistic conclusion is that an important part of the remainder of traditional 
morality cannot be placed on a similarly rational footing. “Having abandoned all 
religious or metaphysical props for morality, we are left with no justification for 
principles some of which, at least, we are unwilling to abandon.”67
Gauthier wants to correct Rawls’s framework. He has to ensure that what the parties to 
the ‘covenant’ agree to in the state of nature is rational and will remain rational for each
Aftparty once in society. Gauthier rejects Harsanyi’s ethical theory for similar reasons. 
Indeed, in Harsanyi’s theory, an individual not only does not know who he will be but 
also who he is. If an individual does not know who he is he is unable to express any 
preferences, he does not have a single unified standpoint from which to establish a 
preference ordering 69 Besides, the principle chosen is beneficial to society as a whole 
but can be detrimental to some. If the actual outcome proves unfortunate to someone, on 
which rational ground should he adhere to this principle if non-adherence would allow 
him greater expected utility? Fairness and justice are dependent on the rationality of the 
agreement ex-ante. Therefore, the agreement cannot be chosen from behind a veil of 
ignorance but chosen by individuals in full knowledge of their position and initial 
endowment.
Gauthier’s bargaining theory
When Gauthier was introduced to game theory, he rapidly realised the potential of 
bargaining theory: Hobbes’ agreement had no specified content; bargaining theory
66 ‘Bargaining Our Way Into Morality : A Do-It Yourself Primer’, pl6
67 ‘Bargaining Our Way Into Morality : A Do-It Yourself Primer’, p25
68 See Appendix section 2, c.
69 ‘Given that one has no knowledge of one’s own identity, one can function as an arbitrator selecting an 
outcome that is a fair compromise among the preferences of the individuals involved. But without 
preferences of one’s own, one cannot act as an individual chooser... Harsanyi’s argument fails, because it 
ensures impartiality in choice only by violating individuality.’ ‘On the refutation of Utilitarianism’ pl59
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provided the means to determine a unique content to the agreement.70 The parties to the 
agreement became bargainers and the making of the covenant became a bargaining 
situation where each agent defended her own interest in her own situation. The technical 
discussions on Gauthier’s bargaining theory will be developed in chapters II and HI. In 
this introductory section to his theory, we just need to know that the outcome of his 
bargaining is determined by what he calls the principle of maximin relative benefit or 
the principle of minimax relative concession. These principles are complementary. 
Voluntary agreement and distributive justice are reconciled when the maximin relative 
advantage that we can gain from an agreement is equivalent to the minimax concession 
necessary for it.
The first formulation of the maximin principle is published in 1974 in Rational 
Cooperation. In this article, Gauthier, who is in search for a solution to the prisoner’s 
dilemma, presents a theory of rational cooperation as a theory of morality and justice in 
society for rational egoists (economic men). Rational Cooperation was written in the 
same year as Justice and Natural Endowment: Toward a Critique of Rawls's 
ideological Framework. Gauthier’s maximin principle is clearly inspired both by 
Harsanyi’s general theory of rational behaviour71 and by Rawls’ lexical difference 
principle and concept of morality as justice and fairness. From 1978, scattered in several 
articles72, we can find a good sketch of his maximin. In most of these articles, he points 
out what he believes to be inadequate or wrong in Harsanyi, Arrow or Rawls prior to 
unfolding his own version. He systematically opposes his game theoretic approach to 
Harsanyi and Rawls’s decision theoretic attempt to interpreting the social contract. 
Instead of Bayesian theory, he suggests bargaining theory. Against the social contract as 
individual decision, he suggests the social contract as collective bargain.
A first approach to his maximin is via an amendment to Rawls’s principle. He 
demonstrates that by making two modifications to Rawls’s lexical difference principle 
one can find an adequate maximin rule73. The first modification is the introduction of a 
base point (the status quo). Instead of maximizing the minimum utility, we maximize
70 Nash had developed a unique solution to the bargaining problem given specific conditions and 
assumptions. For further details see the appendix section 1, b.
71 See the appendix section 2.
72 ‘Critical Notice on Harsanyi’, ‘Social Choice and Distributive Justice’, ‘The Social Contract: Individual 
Decision or Collective Bargain ?’
73 See the ‘Critical Notice on Harsanyi’
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the minimum increase in utility. The second modification is the introduction of a target 
point (represented by that outcome that maximizes one’s utility). Gauthier suggests 
expressing the improvement of an individual’s utility in relation to the status quo as a 
proportion of the improvement he would receive from his target, in relation to the status 
quo. Instead of maximizing the minimum increase in utility, we maximize the minimum 
proportionate increase.
Another approach is by generalisation of what he suggested in Rational cooperation.
The bargaining position is characterized as follows. “We assign an expected utility for
each party to the social contract to the state of nature, as status quo, and to each possible
society, as possible bargaining outcome.”74 The method is described as follows.
“We now select a rational individual at random, and attempt to present an argument that 
would convince him to agree to the adoption of any member of a particular set of 
principles for cooperative action. A similar argument must be equally convincing to any 
other rational person. Therefore the argument means that it is possible to correlate with 
each party to the social contract, a set of principles for cooperative action, any member 
of which the particular party would rationally agree to adopt. We then consider the 
intersection of these sets’ to obtain the content of the social contract”.75
An individual chosen at random would choose the maximin relative benefit. This 
introduction to Gauthier’s bargaining framework calls for some comment.
Firstly, one can note that Gauthier removes the veil of ignorance. Like the Hobbesian 
agents, Gauthier’s choosers are individuals in full knowledge of their present and future 
situation. This means that what they rationally agree to in the state of nature will remain 
rationally agreeable in social interactions. The content of the social contract hereby 
derived is rational from every single standpoint whether in the hypothetical original 
position or retrospectively once in society.
Secondly, Gauthier imports the tools of bargaining theory into a contractarian 
framework. This import causes two sorts of problem. From a game theoretic point of 
view, Gauthier has to make some changes to the original orthodox bargaining theory. 
For example, as illustrated in the quote above, he assumes equal rationality of the 
bargainers. We will see in chapter III, that this change and others are major enough to 
alter the use of bargaining theory and threaten the legitimacy of his borrowing. From a
74 ‘The Social Contract: Individual Decision or Collective Bargain?’, p56
75 ‘The Social Contract: Individual Decision or Collective Bargain?’, p56
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philosophical point of view, Gauthier’s adoption of a bargaining procedure means that 
the agents such as children or disabled who are not or cannot participate in the 
production of the cooperative surplus are excluded from the bargaining process and 
therefore excluded from the agreement. This added restriction to his field of morality 
has been considered by many as unacceptable.
More importantly, Gauthier creates the maximin before the minimax. The first version 
of the minimax seems to appear in 1979. Together, they are the two faces of the same 
coin but, as shall be explained later, the maximin represents the moral side whereas the 
minimax represents the rational side of the coin. Once again Gauthier is initially 
influenced by Rawls and Harsanyi’s ethical approach. In Morals by Agreement, he will 
insist on the rationality of his solution presenting the minimax first and then reconciling 
rationality with morality by showing that the other face of the minimax is no other than 
the maximin.
We have now completed step two of the social contract. Parties to the social contract 
have chosen in a well-characterised position the cooperative principles they agree upon. 
The reasons to enter the agreement are rational whether from the state of nature or 
within society. But will they be sufficient to keep the agreement? We have now to turn 
to step three to address this issue.
76 It appears in ‘Bargaining Our Way Into Morality: A Do-It Yourself Primer’. As we saw above, in this 
article, Gauthier considerably reduces the field of morality to distributive justice. However in doing so, he 
is able to put morality on a rational ground through the minimax concession principle. The starting point 
this time is not what is mutually advantageous but rather what is mutually disadvantageous such as negative 
externalities. Parties to the bargain in this case realise that they have to compromise and make some 
concessions.
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Section 3: Keeping the covenant
It is obvious that to enter into a social contract is only the first step towards social peace, 
property or prosperity. If the contracting parties don’t keep the agreement once in 
society the contract is void, hence Hobbes’ third law of nature. In this section, we will 
first introduce Hobbes’ Fool’s challenge prior to reviewing Gauthier’s solution to it. In 
the introduction, we highlighted Gauthier’s evolution in his interpretation of Hobbes. 
We shall understand the reason for this evolution in this section.
Hobbes’ Fool: the problem of keeping the covenant and enforcement system.
In a very famous section, Hobbes develops an imaginary Fool’s challenge.
“The Fool has said in his heart, there is no such thing as justice... keep, or not keep 
covenants, was not against reason, when it conduced to one’s benefit. He does not 
therein deny, that there be covenants; and that they are sometimes broken sometimes 
kept; and that such breach of them may be called injustice... ; but he questions, whether 
injustice .. may not sometimes stand with that reason, which dictates to every man his 
own good; and particularly then, when it conduces to such a benefit, as shall put a man 
in a condition, to neglect not only the dispraise, and revilings, but also the power of 
other men”.77
The Fool in question is not so foolish. Why should I keep a covenant when the benefit 
from breaking it can be so great that I can afford to neglect the impact of the breach not 
only on my reputation but also on the consequences for others? What about cases where 
it is more rational to break the covenant than to keep it? These types of cases are easy to 
imagine. The most common occurs when contractarian parties don’t have to perform 
their obligations simultaneously. If one performs first, what incentive has the other party 
to perform next if the benefits from not performing are greater than the benefits from 
performing?
One has to be careful about the exact boundaries of the challenge. The Fool does not 
claim that it is not rational to enter into an agreement. On the contrary, it is in his best 
interest to commit himself to a mutually advantageous agreement and then to break it
77 Leviathan, chapter 15, p 538
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when everybody else keep the agreement. The Fool claims that to do so is probably 
unjust but a lot more beneficial and therefore rational.
Gauthier identifies a two-level problem: Firstly, at a practical level, there is a security 
problem. Men need to adhere to the covenants made. The laying down of rights creates 
obligations that are mere words until actions are taken upon them. Secondly, at a 
material level, there is a motivation problem. Men need sufficient motivation to keep 
the covenants that they had sufficient motivation to undertake. But in Hobbes’s system, 
motivation and reason are linked.
What does Hobbes reply to the Fool? Firsdy, he argues that one cannot always foresee 
all the consequences of ones choice and there is a part of uncertainty even in the most 
foreseeable event. Secondly, he claims that no man can survive on his own in the state 
of war. If one decides to betray the others in an agreement and benefit from their help 
and protection without returning the favour, he can either be excluded from the society 
in question (most likely outcome) or deceive them and be accepted in error (unlikely 
outcome). Whatever the outcome, it is neither prudent nor rational to betray: on the one 
hand, to be excluded is not beneficial since one cannot survive on ones own. On the 
other hand, when making the decision to betray, one cannot reckon upon being able to 
deceive. “Hobbes’s argument is, then, that violation of covenant cannot be expected to
751be advantageous, although it may actually be advantageous” .
According to Gauthier, the motivation problem is partly addressed by the reply to the 
Fool, / /’the agents reason properly, they will realise that adherence to the covenants is 
expected to conduce to preservation. But misleading passions or erroneous reasoning 
leads men astray. Therefore, the solution to the motivation problem does not solve the 
security problem, hence the need for a sovereign. A mere promise or an agreement 
based solely on words is not sufficient to guarantee that people will keep their 
agreement. The covenant would be void. ‘For he that performs first, has no assurance 
the other will perform after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men’s 
ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the fear of some coercive
7 0power’ . Therefore, ‘before the names of just, and unjust can have place, there must be
78 The Logic of Leviathan p 84-5.
79 Leviathan, chapter 14, p 536
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some coercive power, to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by 
the terror of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their 
covenant’.80
Hobbes’s moral theory stands only if one can accept that reason is at the root of 
obligation. One can agree with Gauthier in linking motivation with reason. So the 
central question to address is: do I act upon the obligation I undertook because I have 
reason/motivation to do so or because I fear the coercive power? We saw that the 
solution to the motivation problem rested on the reply to the Fool. So the next question 
is: is the reply to the Fool really convincing? Yes only if one accepts that the Fool is 
unlikely to deceive others. However, the bigger the society the less likely a betrayal will 
be noticed. In weighing cost against benefit, the supposed Fool can still be prepared to 
take a small risk for a greater benefit. Why should we behave justly, when we know (or 
there is a strong probability) of behaving unjustly without being noticed and punished? 
So the motivation problem is not really solved by this reply. Hobbes’ moral system is at 
stake.
Gauthier’s answer to the Fool and constrained maximization
Gauthier identifies rationality with utility maximization. However, individual utility- 
maximization does not always bring about the optimal outcome. In Reason and 
Maximization published in 1974, he tackles this central problem that will lead to his 
answer to the Fool. Let us follow the articulation of his argument.
He describes the problem as follows: what is rational for one person is rational for every 
person. Every person must judge each person rational to maximize his own utility. If 
this is the case, then the policy of individual utility maximization must afford every 
person maximum compossible utility (i.e. the greatest utility each can receive, given the 
utilities received by the others). But the prisoner dilemma shows that individual utility 
maximization does not always yield an optimal outcome. Therefore every person does 
not correctly judge each person rational to maximize his own utility and so each does 
not correctly judge himself rational to maximize his own utility.
80 Leviathan, chapter 15, p 538
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To this objection Gauthier replies that the rationality of the agent is determined by 
assessing his intended actions in relation to his point o f view. If person A is to assess the 
rationality of person B, then it is the relation of B’s action to B’s utility and not the 
relation of B’s action to A’s utility which is relevant. The argument fails to take the 
position of the agent. “A’s maximum compossible utility is not the relevant criteria for
0 1
assessing the rationality of the actions of persons other than himself.” Gauthier 
concludes that
“the straightforward identification of rationality with the aim of individual utility 
maximization, although not inconsistent, is inadequate, because it denies the possibility 
of agreements which require one or more of the parties to refrain from the maximization 
of individual utility, yet secure to each of the parties greater utility than is possible 
without such agreement. This inadequacy does not however, show that rationality is not 
connected with maximizing activity”.82
The key to the problem lies in the distinction between independent actions (in state of 
nature) and interdependent actions (in civil society): “Independent rational persons will 
each separately adopt the same manner of action. Interdependent persons will 
collectively adopt a common manner of action.” ... “An agreed way of acting is rational 
if it leads to an outcome which is optimal so far as the parties to the agreement are 
concerned”.83 He then identifies two conditions:
1. Condition for independent action or condition o f straightforward maximization: “a 
person acting independently acts rationally only if the expected outcome of his action 
affords him a utility at least as great as that of the expected outcome of any action 
possible for him in the situation”.
2. Condition for interdependent actions or condition of constrained maximization: “a 
person acting interdependendy acts rationally only if the expected outcome of his action 
affords each person with whom his action is interdependent a utility such that there is no 
combination of possible actions, one for each person acting independently, with an 
expected outcome which affords each person other than himself at least as great utility, 
and himself a greater utility.”84 The policy derived from this condition is clearly
81 ‘Reason and Maximization’, p 423
82 ‘Reason and Maximization’, p 427
83 ‘Reason and Maximization’, p 424-5
84 ‘Reason and Maximization’, p 427
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intended to maximize the agent’s overall expected utility. It enables him to participate 
in agreements intended to secure optimal outcomes, when maximizing actions 
performed in the absence of agreement would lead to non-optimal outcomes.
Once in society, constrained maximization takes over from plain straightforward 
maximization. Both the rational policy of interdependent action (individual utility 
maximization) and the rational policy of interdependent action (agreed optimisation) 
satisfy the condition of constrained maximization that best expresses the identification 
of rational activity with maximizing activity.
The concept of a change of rationality once in society is not completely new. Rawls had 
touched on it. Indeed, in his theory, each individual pursues her own good i.e. a long 
term rational plan of life. Rawls notes:
“The motivation of the parties in the original position does not determine directly the 
motivation of people in a just society. For in the latter case, we assume that its members 
grow up and live under a just basic structure, as the two principles require; and then we 
try to work out what kind of conception of the good and moral sentiments people would 
acquire.” 85
Because the concept of right is anterior to the good once in society, the good is 
‘constrained’ by it.
Gauthier develops on the theme: Can we really choose our conception of rationality? 
Yes, he replies, conceptions of rationality are not fixed in human nature, but rather the 
products of human socialization. “Far from supposing that the choice of a conception of 
rationality is unintelligible, I want to argue that the capacity to make such a choice is 
itself a necessary part of full rationality”86. And of course, if a person was to choose 
rationally his conception of rationality he would choose the conception of constrained 
maximization... even the economic man would.
The last touch to his new concept of morality as described in step 2 is brought about by 
this definition of rationality as constrained maximization. Morality is rational although 
not identified with mere prudence.
85 A Theory of Justice, p 128.
86 ‘Reason and Maximization’, p 431
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“The moral man is no less concerned with his own well-being than is the prudent man, 
but he recognises that an exclusive attention to that well-being would prevent him from 
participation in mutually beneficial agreements... the prudent man considers it rational 
to become moral, but not rational to be moral. On prudential grounds he can justify the 
adoption of moral, rather than prudential grounds of action, but only if he does adopt 
moral grounds, and so becomes a moral man, can he justify a moral, rather than a 
prudential, policy of action.”87
We saw above that morality was rationally derived and we see now that it is rationally 
maintained.
At this stage, Gauthier is still in his Logic o f Leviathan framework and is convinced that 
Hobbes missed the point:
“In philosophical literature, the classic example of the man who is bound by his 
conception of reason is the Hobbesian man, the self-maintaining engine... Men 
recognise the rationality of entering society, but force, not reason is required to keep 
them in there ... Hobbesian man is unable to internalize the social requirement that he 
subordinate his direct pursuit of survival and well-being to the agreed pursuit of optimal 
outcomes which best ensure the survival and well-being of each person. Thus in our 
terms Hobbesian man actually remains in the state of nature; the civil power, the 
sovereign, can effect only the appearance of civil society, of interdependent action. The 
real difference between the state of nature and civil society must be a difference in man, 
and not merely in the external relations of men.”88
The missing piece is a moral background.
We know from step 2 that, in the early 70’s, a change is being processed in Gauthier’s 
moral philosophy. His reconciliation with Hobbes’s moral theory owes as much to his 
restrictive concept of morality as to his concept of rationality as constrained 
maximization. We have to wait until 1977 for Gauthier to read in Hobbes this dual 
rationality. Once more, let us follow him in The Social Contract as Ideology.
A dual rationality in Hobbes*s philosophy
Gauthier starts by claiming that for Hobbes “reason does not in itself determine a 
system of rights and laws which relate men one to another in any way other than the 
natural relation of hostility. The ‘rational’ order corresponding to the unlimited right of
87 ‘Reason and Maximization’, p 432-3
88 ‘Reason and Maximization’, p 431
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nature is the condition of war of every man with every man.”89 In other words, 
rationality is individual, instrumental and straightforward. But equipped with this form 
of rationality, men have no weapon to resolve their conflicts once in society. Hobbes 
needs to resort to an Arbitrator, a Judge of what ‘right reason’ should be, distinct and 
above individual self-interests.
If rationality is to be identified with utility maximization, we now face a new problem. 
Indeed, society must perform the functions of coordination, bargaining and constraint. 
Coordination and bargaining are compatible with maximization in a way that constraint 
is not. Internal constraint (constraint of conscience) especially poses the problem of 
contradicting the requirements of reason. Gauthier claims that such a contradiction can 
be solved by no means other than a distinction between natural and conventional reason 
as suggested in his Reason and Maximization.
Gauthier then quotes Hobbes:
‘And when men that think themselves wiser than all others clamor and demand right 
Reason for judge; yet seek no more, but that things should be determined, by no other 
men's reason then their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men as it is in play after 
trump is turned, to use for trump on every occasion, that suite whereof they have most 
in their hand’.
Gauthier interprets this passage as follows:
‘Trump is established by the social contract, as that convention required to achieve an 
optimal state of affairs, better for each than the natural outcome. But each man, guided 
by his own reason, uses for trump his own interest. And this is intolerable, for its 
undercuts the contract and makes society impossible.’90
In other words, Hobbes recognises the need for a conventional standard of right reason 
but he fails to establish this standard adhering to his individualist view. In the state of 
nature, this view is true “but as Hobbes himself recognizes, this is exactly what is 
intolerable in society or, indeed, intolerable if there is to be any society.”91
A year later, Gauthier writes his Thomas Hobbes: Moral Theorist. In this article, 
Gauthier is then convinced that Hobbes has explicitly distinguished between right and 
conventional reason and has therefore established a moral theory. Gauthier distinguishes
89 ‘The Social Contract as Ideology’, p 151
90 ‘The Social Contract as Ideology’, p 155
91 ‘The Social Contract as Ideology’, p 155
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between reason and motivation. A covenant is rationally stable if each person has 
reason to adhere to it, provided others do. A covenant is motivationally stable if each is 
moved to adhere to it, provided others do. He confirms that in order to be motivationally 
stable Hobbes has to have recourse to a coercive power. The motivational problem 
cannot be solved on merely prudential grounds. But the rational problem can be solved 
using the concept of right reason.
In the state of nature, each man takes his own reason for right reason and can consider 
acting in accordance with his own reason as right. This natural reason enables men to 
achieve their primary end i.e. self-preservation and leads them to lay down their right of 
nature. But as they lay down their right of nature they also lay down this very natural 
reason as their aim switches from self-preservation to peace i.e. from individual to 
mutual advantage. A new conventional reason then supersedes natural reason. Since 
right reason is individually devised, it is no longer a reliable tool to harmonise all 
individual behaviours towards mutual advantage. Therefore, Hobbes needs to introduce 
an arbitrator (the sovereign) to decide on the common right reason, the conventional 
reason. Each has ground to accept it as long as it is common knowledge that most 
persons accept it and expect others to adhere to it. At last the Fool has his reply... says 
Gauthier. This Fool was using his natural reason within conventional boundaries when 
he should have laid it down with his right of nature. In 1982, Gauthier adds to this 
demonstration that the connection between right and reason is central to Hobbes’s 
thought and that the Fool, in appealing to natural reason, fails to appreciate this tight 
conceptual connection92.
What have we achieved and on what grounds does Hobbes’s moral theory rest? The 
grounds are thin but here they are. Gauthier claims that Hobbes’s morality arises with 
the laws of nature which establish a “uniquely dominant set of conventions for men who 
seeking preservation must seek peace”93. These laws restrict men’s behaviour. 
Therefore Hobbes’s morality is a set of conventions constraining each man’s 
maximizing activity and distinguishing right from wrong. This concept of morality 
could be described as moral conventionalism but it is severely challenged by the Fool. 
Indeed, if morality is to be a rational and conventional constraint on natural behaviour,
92 ‘Three Against Justice’, in Moral Dealing, p 143
93 ‘Thomas Hobbes : Moral Theorist’, p 552
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then it must be rationally stable. Since reason means maximisation of advantage, 
rationally stable means “most advantageous for each to follow, provided others do”. But 
then rational and conventional morality cannot be considered as a constraint on one’s 
behaviour. And if morality becomes a constraint, it is then irrational.
The solution to this dilemma is in the double change suggested above a) of end from 
self-preservation to peace and b) of reason from individual to conventional. In this 
context the second law of nature can be rephrased:
“As long as each person appeals solely to his natural reason, there can be no security to 
any man of living out the time that nature ordinarily allows. Thus a man must be willing 
when others are so too, as far as he shall think it necessary for peace, to lay down 
natural reason, and be contented with a standard of reason which allows him so much 
liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself’94.
The convention is now rationally stable.
After Morals by Agreement, Gauthier will change his interpretation on Hobbes on a 
further point. He will claim that it is possible for a Hobbesian agent to commit herself 
on non-prudential grounds. In the Logic o f Leviathan, following his initial belief as 
described in Practical Reasoning, Gauthier considers it impossible for a Hobbesian 
agent to commit himself, even in his own interest, to perform actions that would not be 
in his interest, at the time o f performance. He argues then that there is no room in 
Hobbes’s theory for non-prudential ground for obligation. In 1988, he is no longer so 
sure that the problem of commitment is clear to Hobbes.
“I now believe that the Hobbesian text gives no real guidance on this matter. A person’s 
interest must enter at some point into an explanation of each of his voluntary actions; a 
commitment against interest, to perform an action against interest, would be 
incompatible with Hobbes’s psychology. But this leaves room for a commitment based 
on interest. Whether Hobbes would have accepted it we cannot say, but it opens the 
door to a much more interesting and defensible interpretation of a large part of his moral 
and political philosophy”95.
We shall see how in chapter VII.
94 ‘Thomas Hobbes : Moral Theorist’, p 557
95 ‘Hobbes’s Social Contract’, p 79.
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Conclusion
The present chapter has sketched an overview of Gauthier’s work before Morals by 
Agreement. In doing so, my purpose was three-fold.
Firstly I intended to show how the project of his contractarian moral theory took form. 
In particular I felt it was important to highlight the emergence of his concept of a dual 
rationality so central to his theory. Gauthier is convinced that men, through reason, can 
change their instrumental reasoning. This change of rationality sustains the moral 
answer he wants to give to the Fool.
Secondly, this chapter intended to demonstrate that the Hobbesian background of the 
author influenced his research just as his research influenced his interpretation of 
Hobbes. Gauthier abandoned Hobbes’s state of nature in favour of a Lockean one, he 
changed the boundaries of morality, he redefined the principle of the social contract and 
he distinguished two concepts of rationality but he retained Hobbes’s central framework 
and rational morality. Gauthier gathered together all the main changes in the moral and 
political philosophy of his time to amend and improve on The Leviathan.
The third goal of this chapter was to introduce the future core conceptions of Morals by 
Agreement within their context. This book is not only the first achieved version of a 
contractarian moral theory, it also provides a good picture of the state of moral and 
political philosophy in the second half of the 20th century.
The major concepts that constitute Morals by Agreement have now been presented, we 
are at the beginning of the 80’s and Gauthier is going to put together all the pieces of the 
jigsaw so that they become a theory.
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Annex
Reason and practical reasoning.
The purpose of this annex is not to summarise Gauthier’s thesis but to provide an 
overview of his original project since it will guide his future research. Indeed, Gauthier 
wants to merge prudential and moral reasoning and he believes that practical reasoning 
rather than deliberation can bring his project to completion. Even if, in my opinion, this 
first attempt is not successful, it highlights his ambition and original achievements. We 
shall first give some of his definitions prior to developing the core of his argument.
Some definitions and concepts
A practical problem is a problem about what to do. It is context dependent. A practical 
question is the verbal formulation of a practical problem. A solution is an action or set 
of actions performed by the person in the situation specified in the problem. A 
resolution is a decision taken by the person concerning what to do in the situation. An 
answer to the practical question is a judgement about what to do in the situation or an 
injunction to do something96.
A practical judgement sets out the answer to a practical question in full detail. It is a 
conclusion on what we ought to do, reasoning from premises specifying the situation in 
which we act and our reasons for acting. It is usually formulated using the words 
‘ought’, ‘should’ or ‘best’. For purpose of simplification, Gauthier agrees that practical 
judgments will take the standard ‘ought’ form97.
Decision and judgement can go in different direction. I can judge an action best for me 
and yet decide to follow another course of actions. Similarly, ‘I ought to do x’ does not 
equate ‘I shall do x’.
96 Practical Reasoning, p 5
97 Although the use of ought is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of a practical judgement.
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Going further, Gauthier distinguishes between reasons and motives. Reasons are the 
grounds for practical judgement whereas motives determine decisions. Practical 
judgment rests on weighing reasons for acting in the situation specified in the problem. 
The action one ‘ought’ to perform is the one supported by the weightiest reasons. 
Motives do not necessarily correspond to reasons. A rational action is an action 
governed by reasons i.e. an action resting on motives that corresponds to reasons.
Gauthier then introduces a distinction between prudential and moral practical 
judgments. You ought to do x can be interpreted in two ways: it could mean ‘it is your 
duty to do x’ or ‘it is in your interest to do x’. In the case of duty the action is wanted 
for itself, in the case of best interest it is necessary as a means to an end. Gauthier will 
call the former ‘moral judgment’ and the latter ‘prudential judgment’. He acknowledges 
that the distinction is not always easy to establish and he gives examples of conflicting 
or ambiguous practical judgments. Nevertheless, he settles for the following rough 
guideline to separate the two:
“a practical judgment which has a moral force is based on considerations independent 
of the will (purposes, aims, desires) of the prospective agent, and dependent solely on 
the intrinsic nature of the act itself, whereas a practical judgment which has a prudential 
force is based on considerations dependent on the will” 8.
Practical reasoning
Gauthier then proceeds to develop another distinction between deliberation and practical 
reasoning. Deliberation is a psychological process by which a person comes to resolve a 
problem whereas practical reasoning is a formal logical argument. The outcome of 
deliberation is a reasoned action i.e. an action for which one can provide a reason. But a 
reasoned action is not necessarily a reasons/e action; the reason provided can be the 
wrong reason because the agent ‘may refuse to consider important features of the 
situation in which he acts’ or he ‘may ignore some of the consequences which his action 
will have’99. Reciprocally a reason able action needs not be reasoned. One can act on an 
impulse without prior reasoning and yet do the right action.
98 Practical Reasoning p 20.
99 Practical Reasoning p27.
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Practical reasoning on the other hand provides an explanation for the action as well as a 
justification. In other words the reasons for acting are also the reasons why the agent 
acts. “If his reasons are not the reasons, or good reasons, for acting, no justification -  or 
an insufficient justification - is provided”100. Does it make actions derived through 
practical reasoning reasonable?
If practical reasoning is a formal logical argument then, Gauthier argues, the major 
premise must characterise the ‘wants’ of the agent. The wants should be understood as 
the realisation of states of affairs. They encompass “the possession of some object by 
the agent, the enjoyment of some experience by him, the attainment of some position or 
standard, or even the realisation of some situation not connected to him at all”101. These 
wants constitute the ‘practical basis’. At least one constituent of the agent’s practical 
basis must ground a practical premise. Such a premise has a practical force. At least one 
premise with practical force is necessary to any practical reasoning. Practical reasoning 
is about what we want consciously and on reflection.
An agent’s wants may have conflicting objects that no state of affairs will satisfy 
simultaneously. In such a situation, the agent would have to weigh his wants and choose 
the one with the greatest practical force in order to maximise his satisfaction. In order to 
achieve this weighing exercise, one has to introduce comparative premises relating the 
desirability of the objects of the various wants and draw a conclusion regarding the most 
desirable state of affairs. Gauthier also suggests introducing future (foreseeable) wants 
in the major premises when weighing various objects and setting the main objective. 
Although they cannot impel one to act now, they can determine reasons for one to act 
now. Failure to take into account future wants would impede on the prudential ground 
of the practical reasoning.
But a central question remains: how are we to take into account the wants of others? 
The wants of others are not my wants and therefore cannot be grounds for my actions. If 
the wants of others are to provide me with reasons for acting, they have to be included 
in my wants. This is made possible only through one very simple scheme: not all my 
wants are dependent on me only. Some of my wants require the assistance of others. If I
100 Practical Reasoning p27
101 Practical reasoning p 30
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want them to assist me in my wants, I must act in such a way that they are willing to do 
so. If I assist them in their wants they will assist me in my wants. Therefore, the wants 
of others have to be included in my wants.
Gauthier is aware of the complexity of such a scheme. The wants of others do not 
necessarily enter our wants so straightforwardly. It makes sense to me to help my 
neighbour today knowing that she might help me tomorrow in return. But why should I 
help a blind person to cross the road? The chances of this person being in a position to 
‘repay’ me tomorrow are rather slim not to say non-existent. Some of our wants rest on 
principles, obligation, duties, laws or customs. We need now to turn to moral practical 
reasoning to see his answer.
Let us recapitulate: prudential practical reasoning can be described as follows.
“A person is confronted with a practical problem. From his practical basis, which 
comprises his wants (present and future), he selects those whose objects may in some 
way bear on his problem. He then formulates a set of statements characterising these 
objects as desirable to him, and comparing them in terms of this desirability. Taking 
further statements about his capacities and experiences, in so far as they may bear on the 
problem, about the situation he must act, and the consequences of actions possible in 
that situation, he may infer an answer to his problem, a judgment of what he ought to 
do”102.
Practical conclusions are formulated by an imperative ‘I ought to do x \  Imperatives 
may take many forms. They are not necessarily intended as commands. Rather they can 
take the form of advice, instruction or request.
Core of his argument.
The next step is the core of his argument since Gauthier attempts to demonstrate that all 
practical reasoning takes the same form whether prudential or moral. Moral practical 
judgments are derived using the same type of inferences as the ones used in prudential 
judgments. However, the basis of practical reasoning has to be enlarged. How?
The basis of the practical reasoning of any agent must include all wants of all persons. 
Gauthier almost immediately specifies that such an extension is not as large as it seems
102 Practical Reasoning p 80.
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since it is reduced by the condition of practicability i.e. the condition according to which 
it must be humanly possible to infer the conclusion from the premises. Therefore only 
1) the wants relevant to the situation and 2) the wants of the beings whose points of 
view are to be considered in determining what one ought to do are taken into account.
Gauthier believes that unless ‘a consideration is capable of moving some person directly 
to deliberate action -  unless it is an object of his wants -  it cannot serve anyone as a 
genuine reason for acting. My reasons for acting need not move me to action directly -  
but they must move someone, at some time’103. This conclusion can be interpreted as 
follows: 1) principles, obligations and duties must be included in my wants, or said 
differently again, they must be rationally derived; 2) some reasons for acting are 
potentially common to all. They are not specific to me.
This new approach to moral practical reasoning seems to blur the distinction that 
Gauthier originally made between prudential and moral judgments by giving a central 
role to the agents’ will. However, we can recognise here what will become one of his 
main argument: instrumental reason is about the realisation of a state of affair that is 
rational for any agent to want to realise.
Gauthier then details his treatment of principles, duties and obligations.
As far as principles are concerned, Gauthier defines them as general practical judgments 
i.e. they are derived through anterior practical reasoning. They are sufficient to be 
reasons for acting and they can serve as the basis for practical reasoning. However they 
have to be reviewed according to the requirements of the situation. In particular, if two 
principles conflict, rational deliberation is required to sort out which principle would be 
the best reason for acting in the situation.
As far as obligations and duties are concerned, Gauthier follows G.E.M. Anscombe in 
reminding us that they are nothing else than survivals from the law conception of ethics, 
dating from the secularisation of Christian ethics. This forgotten historical origin has 
misled moral philosophers over the centuries. As we shall see, Gauthier prefers to 
follow Hobbes in his theory of obligation. He considers obligation as binding for
103 Practical Reasoning p 94.
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prudential purposes. We have the choice but we decide to bind ourselves because it is in 
our interest to do so. But is the undertaking of an obligation on a prudential basis 
sufficient to ground performance of the action to which one obliges oneself ? This 
question leads us directly onto Gauthier’s work on Hobbes.
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CHAPTER H: MORALS BY AGREEMENT
In this chapter I attempt to present Gauthier’s masterpiece. I follow his steps as 
faithfully as possible and try to understand the theory as a whole. This book is dense 
enough to be interpreted in many different ways. I have decided to focus more 
exclusively on the very core of the theory i.e. the link between rationality and morality. 
In this chapter, I try as much as possible to give full voice to its author. I will turn to 
criticisms in the next chapter. There are places where some comments could be made 
but because they do not impede on the logic, coherence or clarity of his argument, I 
have chosen not to mention them and break the flow of the presentation.
In Morals by Agreement, David Gauthier defines moral principles as types of rational 
principles for making choices or decisions among possible actions that constrain the 
actor to pursue his own interest in an impartial way. His main purpose is to prove that 
moral duties are rationally grounded and that although morality has the appearance of a 
constraint on the pursuit of individual interests, its acceptance is truly advantageous.
Morals by Agreement offers a contractarian approach based on the core idea that once 
an individual is part of a group (or structure) his personal interest is likely to interact 
with the others’. An individual best interest becomes then connected with social 
welfare. Moral rules are those set of rational rules regulating an individual’s personal 
interest when it is affected or affecting other individuals’ personal interest. “A society 
could not command the willing allegiance of a rational person if, without appealing to 
her feelings for others, it afforded her no expectation of net benefit”104.
Gauthier’s purpose is therefore two-fold: firstly, it is to show why it is rational for 
people in a society to voluntarily agree ex-ante on a set of impartial moral rules and, 
secondly, it is to find the conditions that would guarantee that people do comply ex-post 
with the set of rules agreed upon. To this end he introduces five core conceptions that 
ensure the coherence of his theory
104 Morals by Agreement p 11
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1- Morally free zone. A morally free zone is a context within which the constraints of 
morality would have no place. It is usually assimilated to the idealized perfectly 
competitive market. There is no place, rationally, for constraints since mutual advantage 
is assured by the activity of each individual in pursuit of his own interest. There is no 
place, morally, for constraints due to the impartiality of the market’s operations. People 
only need to pursue their personal interest to participate effectively in a venture for 
mutual advantage. However, the market would be a morally free zone only if it existed 
in its ideal form. But this ideal is not realisable since it rests on the assumptions of free 
activity, private ownership, private good and no externalities.
2- Minimax relative concession or maximin relative benefit. Where mutual benefit 
requires individual constraint, reconciliation is obtained through a rational agreement. 
The outcome of this agreement has to be mutually advantageous. Gauthier appeals then 
to the theory of rational bargaining in order to establish sufficient conditions for a 
mutually advantageous outcome. He introduces a measure of each person’s stake in the 
bargain. The principle of minimax relative concession is the requirement that the 
greatest concession, measured as a proportion of the conceder’s stake be as small as 
possible. The principle of maximin relative benefit requires that the least relative 
benefit, measured as a proportion of one’s stake, be as great as possible. Individuals 
bargain (each knowing their situation in society) until a rational / fair agreement (i.e. 
common strategy) is reached; this agreement should comply with the principle of 
minimax relative concession.
3- Constrained maximization. The rationality of compliance ex-post to rules agreed ex- 
ante is not shown yet. Hence the necessity of introducing the third core notion of 
constrained maximization. A constrained maximiser is a person who is disposed to 
comply with mutually advantageous moral constraints provided she expects similar 
compliance from others. What if the others do not comply? Gauthier then attempt to 
show that under certain conditions, the net advantage that constrained maximisers gain 
from co-operation exceeds the exploitative benefits that other may expect when 
straightforward maximizing. Under these conditions, it is then rational to maximize in a 
constrained fashion. The essential point here is that constrained maximisers (CM) have 
to learn to spot the straightforward maximisers (SM) in order to exclude them from 
agreements. In order to accommodate this need, Gauthier introduces the assumption of
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translucency (CM and SM have reasonable skills to spot each others). Under this 
assumption the CM have a good chance of cooperating between themselves and 
avoiding exploitation from the SM.
4- Proviso regarding the initial bargaining position. In order to ensure that an 
individual is rationally willing to enter into an agreement we have to look at his initial 
bargaining position. Gauthier thus introduces a constraint on the initial bargaining 
position that prohibits bettering one’s position through interaction that worsens the 
position of another. Gauthier also clarifies a point: “our theory denies any place to 
rational constraint, and so to morality, outside the context of mutual benefit. A 
contractarian account of morals has no place for duties that are strictly redistributive in 
their effects, transferring but not increasing benefits, or duties that do not assume 
reciprocity from other persons”105. In other words, the initial endowment has to be fair 
in order for bargaining to be fair. Individual and Property rights are the outcome of the 
proviso not of the agreement. People arrive at the negotiation table with their rights.
5- Archimedean point. Now that all the conditions are set to ensure the rationality of 
agreeing ex-ante on a set of rules and complying ex-post to the rules agreed, we need to 
know how to choose. The missing piece of Gauthier’s jigsaw is then the Archimedean 
point i.e. the point from which an individual can choose impartially and therefore 
morally on which rules to agree to. Although the individual has to choose impartially, so 
without knowing his social position, he knows that he will still pursue his personal best 
interest. Any individual best interest then becomes the common interest in cooperation. 
Unsurprisingly, anybody at the Archimedean point would choose the three principles 
unveiled above: 1) the proviso; 2) the market; 3) the minimax relative concession.
How do all these conceptions work together to form a theory? The first (the market as a 
morally free zone) and the last (the Archimedean point) are stand alone conceptions 
which play two different roles. The market highlights the role of impartiality and 
morality in the theory whereas the Archimedean point provides the outlook of an 
impartial actor on the whole.
105 Morals by Agreement p i6
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Within the three core conceptions left, Gauthier distinguishes between the one that 
secure the rationality of making the agreement, namely the minimax principle and the 
ones that secure the rationality of keeping the agreement i.e. constrained maximisation 
and the proviso. Firstly, rational individuals defending their best interest and using 
common bargaining rules agree on a mutually advantageous moral principle. It is then 
indispensable that the agreement so reached be binding. To be so, Gauthier argues that 
the agreement must be rational to each agent once in social interactions and 
(procedurally) fair from the initial position onward. Gauthier claims that it is rational for 
individuals, once in social interactions, to change their rational disposition and constrain 
their utility maximisation when such a change is to their overall advantage. He also 
claims that rational individuals would agree to a rectification of the initial position 
through the proviso to obtain a fair procedure and therefore secure the compliance of all 
(or most) the agents to the agreement.
In this chapter, we shall first introduce the issues at stake and the angle from which 
Gauthier approaches his task. We will then present in a second section his theory as a 
whole. Each core conception will be developed and connected to the others. We shall 
then conclude on Gauthier’s achievement and his vision of a moral society.
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Section I: Issues at stake
In this section we shall highlight the core topics of the book and pose the problems that 
Morals by Agreement endeavours to solve. We shall first introduce the challenges raised 
by Gauthier’s conception of justice prior to presenting Gauthier’s conception of 
rationality as utility maximization and the difficulties posed by such a conception in 
strategic situations.
Justice as fairness
Two conceptions o f justice
Brian Barry in a Treatise on Social Justice106 distinguishes between two conceptions of 
justice: ‘justice as impartiality’ and ‘justice as mutual advantage’. Both conceptions of 
justice have in common that they
• spring from conflict of interests between different people
• are the fruit of a rational agreement and
• represent justice as fairness.
In ‘justice as mutual advantage’, justice is “simply rational prudence pursued in 
contexts where the cooperation of other people is a condition of our being able to get 
what we want. Justice is the name we give to the constraints on themselves that rational 
self-interested people would agree to as the minimum price that has to be paid in order 
to obtain the cooperation of others.”107 Justice as mutual advantage is usually developed 
within the framework of bargaining theories. Justice is understood as the outcome of 
rational bargaining and reflects the bargaining power of the parties involved. The best 
representatives of such an approach are obviously Hobbes and his most recent follower, 
Gauthier. Barry presents this conception of justice as a ‘two-stage theory’. In the first 
stage, the philosopher decides on a starting point representing the non agreement 
outcome (or ‘baseline’). In a second stage, he suggests a formula that will take the
106 Theories of Justice
107 Theories of Justice p 6-7
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bargainers from this ‘state of nature’ to an optimal outcome. Nash and Braithwaite are
1 ORknown for attempting such theories before Gauthier.
In ‘justice as impartiality’, it is assumed that there exist independent reasons to behave 
justly that have nothing to do with the pursuit of self-interest. Holders of such theories 
must then explain the appeal to justice. According to this approach, “justice should be 
the content of an agreement that would be reached by rational people under conditions 
that do not allow for bargaining power to be translated into advantage.”109 Parties to the 
agreement do not attempt to look at things from their own point of view but seek to 
reach an agreement acceptable from all point of views. The reader would have 
recognised the Kantian approach in this conception of justice. Barry identifies this 
approach with the ‘original position theories’. In other words, the parties to the 
agreement are placed in an original position, not knowing who they are or will be and 
they have to decide on a fair agreement. The most well known modem philosophers 
who have worked their way down this approach are Harsanyi and Rawls110.
In other to understand and appreciate Gauthier’s achievement, it seems interesting to 
focus now on the reasons to reject ‘two-stages theories’. Barry presents a strong case 
against these bargaining theories. In substance he brings to the fore the following 
arguments.
• Fairness o f the outcome: the justice so obtained is loaded by the bargaining powers of 
the parties to the agreement. If justice is to be understood as fairness, then the outcome 
is unlikely to agree with our intuitive notion of fairness since it would be to the favour 
of the parties with the greatest bargaining power or with the strongest ‘threat 
advantage’.
• Danger o f deadlocks: Bargaining can be a long, costly process and could end up in a 
deadlock if the parties fail to reach an agreement. Failure to reach an agreement would 
obviously occur if some or all the parties were not willing to make sufficient 
concessions. In case of deadlocks, players can fail to improve over their respective 
status quo (or non-agreement point).
108 See the appendix section lb for Nash solution.
109 Theories of Justice p 7
110 See the appendix sections 2c and 3a.
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• Danger o f threats: the parties can make threats that would be costly and counter­
productive to enforce. In such cases, not only would the parties fail to improve but they 
would also worsen their situation over the non-agreement point. Yet, it can be rational 
in bargaining to carry out a threat in order to be ‘taken seriously’ on a next bargaining 
round i.e. reinforce a ‘threat advantage’ (obviously, this is true only if there is a next 
round).
One way to bring in impartiality and avoid deadlocks in bargaining would be to have 
recourse to an impartial arbitrator. However, Barry argues quite convincingly that 
arbitration outcomes simulate bargaining ones. The arbitrator, although impartial, takes 
into account the rational claims and positions of the parties. He is therefore lead to 
similar solutions that the parties would have reached had they sat at a bargaining table.
The argument about the (un)faimess of the outcome is important enough to justify a 
little detour. Braithwaite was inspired by Nash’s bargaining theory but felt 
uncomfortable with the suggested solution that he found contrary to his intuitive notion 
of fairness. Indeed, Nash takes the parties’ initial endowments as given and specifies a 
solution that improves on the non-agreement point (what the outcome would be if no 
agreement is reached) and does so in proportion to each parties’ bargaining power.111
Braithwaite gave a problematic example112: Luke is a pianist and Matthew is a 
trumpeter. A flimsy wall separates their two flats and they have the same one hour a day 
to practice their respective instrument. When they both practice, it is a real cacophony 
and they obviously each prefer to practice solo. The Pareto frontier is between their 
respective maximum claims, i.e. each practising solo seven days a week. What would be 
a fair division of the practising time between the two musicians?
In this example there is no built-in non-agreement point. There is no status-quo or 
obvious starting point. Braithwaite therefore suggests basing the non-agreement point 
on ‘optimal threats’, like Nash would have done. These optimal threats are given by the 
respective preferences of the players. In our story, both musicians prefer to practise solo
111 See the appendix, section 1, b for further details.
112 Theory of Games as Tool for the Moral Philosopher.
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but Matthew’s second best is cacophony whereas Luke’s second best is silence. Luke 
prefers not to practice than to practice at the same time as Matthew. Matthew has 
therefore a clear advantage over Luke, he has a ‘threat advantage’ that defines the non­
agreement point.
Nash’s solution113 allocates nine tenths of the solo playing time to Matthew. Matthew 
plays nine evenings solo for one evening solo for Luke114. How can we assess the 
‘fairness’ of such a division? Or rather what do we assess: the fairness of the procedure 
or the fairness of the outcome? Due to his preferences, Matthew has an advantage over 
Luke. This advantage has to be reflected in the solution otherwise Matthew would have 
no interest in sitting at the bargaining table. Matthew has to gain over the non­
agreement point in order to agree to an outcome. Said otherwise, the outcome has to 
take into account his advantage over Luke. It would not be rational for Matthew to 
disregard his advantage when bargaining. But it would not be ‘fair’ either. If we want 
the bargaining to be fair, each player must gain from it over what the non-agreement 
point would bring her. The fairness of the outcome is then derived from the fairness of 
the bargaining procedure. We return to our initial question: what do we assess: the 
fairness of the procedure or the fairness of the outcome, independently of the process it 
comes from? Do we judge the outcome in the abstract or as a result of a bargaining 
process? 115. As we shall see, Gauthier dedicates a lot of attention to this issue. Indeed, 
he considers that compliance with the agreed outcome of bargaining is necessarily 
threatened if the bargaining process is not fair.
As an introduction to Gauthier’s conception of justice we shall provide below his 
definition of justice. We shall see that it leaves us with more questions than answers 
with regard to the issues raised above.
113 See appendix section lb.According to Nash, the solution on the Pareto frontier (between the two 
maximum claims) is where the product of both players’ utilities is maximal. For a full demonstration of the
Nash solution to Braithwaite’s example see Barry’s Theories of Justice p 33-36.
114 Braithwaite suggested a formula bringing about a less ‘extreme’ solution (27 evenings of solo practice 
to Matthew against 16 to Luke).
115This debate echoes the debate raised between Luce & Raiffa and Harsanyi between arbitration and 
bargaining models. See appendix sections lb and 2b.
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Gauthier’s conception o f justice-A  definition.
“Justice is the disposition not to take advantage of one’s fellows, not to seek free goods 
or to impose uncompensated costs, provided that one supposes others similarly 
disposed... We may identify justice with the rational disposition to cooperative 
behaviour.”116
• Justice is defined as a disposition. This is a central novelty of Gauthier’s theory117 and it 
is also the link between all its core conceptions. To be disposed to do something is to 
acquire the willingness to carry out a plan. A  disposition acts as a frame of the mind and 
therefore as a frame of behaviour. The advantage of a disposition is that it carries 
through, from making an agreement to keeping it. The most natural question that comes 
to mind is: how is this disposition acquired (naturally or otherwise)?
• Justice is initially a disposition not to do a certain number of things. It therefore acts as a 
constraint on one’s behaviour. We will see that in the market being a morally free zone, 
individuals are free to maximize their utility. Justice appears as a restriction on this 
freedom. Justice arises because of the existence of free riding and externalities i.e. it 
owes its existence to market failure. Once again, if justice is a constraint, what is the 
root of this constraint?
• There is one qualification / condition to the disposition: one must suppose that the 
others are likely disposed. One does not need to know whether the others are similarly 
disposed or not, one just needs to suppose they are. This distinction reveals the strategic 
aspect of justice; justice arises in interaction between individuals where there is 
uncertainty about others. Justice is therefore a social disposition.
• Justice is then identified with a disposition to cooperate. Cooperation seems to be the 
product of practical rationality but it also gives a positive side to justice. We saw above 
that justice is a constraint on behaviour, we learn now that the constraint has a purpose 
and the purpose is to frame behaviour in view to cooperate. Cooperation seems to be the 
link between practical rationality and justice.
116 Morals By Agreement, p 113
117 It is also a feature central to Me McClennen’s approach. See ‘Pragmatic Rationality and Rules’ for 
example.
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Gauthier’s definition of justice leaves us with enough questions to answer. But more 
difficulties arise when we turn to his conception of practical rationality. After detailing 
Gauthier’s conception of rationality we shall consider the problem posed in strategic 
situations.
Rationality and utility maximization -  Preference, utility and value
Chocolate cake or fruit salad?
Nicole and Andrew are on a date in a restaurant. The dessert menu comes. Nicole 
immediately spots ‘Suicide by chocolate’, a chocolate cake to die for. Nicole adores 
chocolate cakes. However, she believes that Andrew prefers slim girls with healthy 
eating habits. She likes Andrew very much and she really would like him to call her 
back for another date. So (reluctantly!) she chooses the fruit salad.
Nicole’s choice definitely does not reflect her preferences since she would have strongly 
preferred to enjoy a delicious chocolate cake rather than a boring fruit salad. Nicole’s 
choice only reflects her preference for a state o f affairs in which she chooses a fruit 
salad and her chance of Andrew calling her back is high to a state of affair in which she 
chooses the chocolate cake and the probability of Andrew calling her back is low. In 
other words, she values the fruit salad (and a possible relationship with Andrew) more 
than the chocolate cake (and probably no Andrew).
Michelle, in an identical situation a few weeks later, chooses the chocolate cake. We 
don’t know Michelle’s explanation for her choice but we can suggest the following: 
Explanation 1: Michelle holds different beliefs than Nicole’s about Andrew’s girl 
preferences. She is convinced that he prefers girls who know how to live and enjoy their 
food;
Explanation 2: She has no information at all about Andrew’s preferences. She therefore 
feels no constraint on her choice of dessert and chooses the one she actually most 
prefers;
Explanation 3: After consideration, Michelle decides that, although she really likes 
Andrew and she believes he likes slim healthy girls, the immediate enjoyment of the
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chocolate cake is worth more than a fruit salad and a higher probability of a relationship 
with Andrew.
Explanation 4: Michelle considers that she has to reveal her true preferences to Andrew 
straight away and let him decide to choose her as she is or to look elsewhere for a girl 
that would better suit his tastes.
Explanation 5: Michelle has already made her mind up that Andrew was not for her and 
that she may as well enjoy the dessert she most prefers since she no longer has anything 
to lose.
Parametric situations: preferences and values
Gauthier endorses the concept of rationality as utility maximization so popular in 
modem social and political philosophy. What is rational for an individual is what 
maximizes her utility, her utility being a measure (not an explanation) of her strength of 
preference. As such utility is also equated to value, to subjective and relative value. 
However, Gauthier is careful to specify that the equation between value and preference 
holds only for coherent and considered preferences.
Gauthier follows Harsanyi’s treatment of utility maximization in parametric 
situations118. He distinguishes between conditions of certainty, risk and uncertainty. In 
conditions of certainty, preferences are ordinal, coherence in preference means 
completeness and transitivity. Under risk and uncertainty, preferences are cardinal, 
individuals maximize their expected utilities, using objective probabilities under risk 
and subjective probabilities under uncertainty. On top of completeness and transitivity, 
coherence of preferences means also independence and monotonicity.
It is irrational to express a preference (attitude) for blue and to choose (behaviour) red. 
To have considered preferences is to identify or coordinate attitude and behaviour. 
However, consideration goes further than this initial coherence and rationality. When 
choosing, one has to reveal a preference for a state of affair rather than for an object of 
choice, taking into account one’s level of information about the situation and one’s 
beliefs at the time of decision. If when choosing, an individual has a false belief or the 
wrong information, it is unfortunate but it is not a case of irrationality. The various
118 See the appendix, sections la and 2a.
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cases in the above example illustrate the concept of considered preferences adopted by 
Gauthier.
A difference in belief can alter the value of the object of choice and therefore the choice 
made. Nicole chose the fruit salad because she thought that Andrew prefers girls with 
healthy eating habits whereas Michelle in explanation 1 chose the chocolate cake 
because she held the opposite belief. Explanation 2 of Michelle’s choice shows that the 
same holds for a relevant difference in the level or nature of information held by the 
decision maker.
In explanation 3 of Michelle’s choice, we can imagine that Michelle later regrets her 
decision when she is waiting in vain for Andrew’s call. However, it does not make her 
choice irrational during the date since she made it after consideration of all the relevant 
data. She preferred then the chocolate cake to the fruit salad even taking into account 
her beliefs about Andrew.
In both Nicole and Michelle’s cases, the choice doesn’t depend on the intrinsic value of 
the dessert. Neither seems to take into account the value of ingredients and labour 
expanded or the price of the actual dessert. The absolute value of the dessert is not taken 
into account either; Nicole does not choose the fruit salad because fruits are better for 
her health than chocolate, or at least not directly. Gauthier’s conception of value is 
subjective and relative: subjective since subject to the rational assessment of the valuer 
and relative since dependent on his individual circumstances.
The value of the dessert depends on the valuer. In Michelle’s explanation 3, she is in the 
same situation as Nicole a few weeks earlier, with the same level of information and the 
same belief. Yet she makes a different choice based on her own rational assessment of 
the situation. Unlike Nicole, she prefers (or values more) the immediate enjoyment of 
the cake than a higher probability of a relationship with Andrew.
The value of the dessert depends also on the state o f affair (or outcome) the valuer 
wants to bring about through her choice. In explanation 5 of Michelle’s choice, she is 
seeking a different outcome than Nicole since she is not interested in a relationship with 
Andrew. Her choice of dessert is different because the goal or outcome sought is
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different. The choice is explained by the chooser’s individual preference for a state of 
affair attached to the object of choice. Value is then a measure o f considered preference 
for a state of affair.
Value is a measure of coherent and considered preference and, as such, can be equated 
with utility. To be rational is to maximize one’s utility. In order to generalise such a 
statement, we have to extend it to strategic situations, in interaction, when the others’ 
behaviour are not given. Two issues are at stake. Firstly, can we generalise the concept 
of value described above? Can we still say in interaction that value and utility are a 
measure of considered and coherent preferences? And if yes which conditions are 
required? Secondly, can we still equate rationality with utility maximisation in strategic 
situation? And if yes what does it mean and what does it imply?
Strategic situations
The equation of value with utility and therefore the identification of rationality with 
utility maximization are rather straightforward in parametric situations, but a lot less 
clear in strategic situations. The prisoner dilemma119 is probably the most famous 
illustration of the contradictory consequences of straightforward maximisation. Gauthier 
describes the traditional ideal strategic case as follows:
“everyone knows that everyone knows them. But then each person’s reasoning from 
these data to his own expectations and choices must be accessible to every other person. 
In effect individual choice must emerge from a common reasoning. Each person must 
view strategic choice both as a response to the choices of his fellows and as being 
responded to by those choices... Our sole departure from the fully ideal case will be to 
make it subjective.”120
Gauthier then identifies three conditions on strategically rational choice:
“A: Each person’s choice must be a rational response to the choices she expects the 
others to make.
119 The police catch two thieves Jane and Jerry They are suspected of two offences but there is no proof for 
the most serious offence of the two. The police forbids communication between them and decides to give 
each of them separately the following choice: 1) he confesses the murder: if she does not confess then he 
gets away with one year for his cooperation with the police and she will be locked for ten years for the 
serious offence; if she does confess they both go to jail for five years; 2) he does not confess: if she does, 
she gets away with one year and he is locked in for ten; if she does not confess, they each spend two years 
in jail for the minor offence. If they are pure utility maximisers, they will both choose to confess, which 
will obviously lead them to their worst outcome.
120 Morals by Agreement, p 60-61.
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B: Each person must expect every other person’s choice to satisfy condition A.
C: Each person must believe her choice and expectations to be reflected in the 
expectations of every other person.”121
Most of Gauthier’s theory will be to explain the concept of rational response referred to 
in condition A and to find an adequate formulation of this condition. It is now time to 
present the theory as a whole.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------  i
121 Morals by Agreement, p 61
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Section 2: The theory as a whole
Core conception 1: market as a morally free zone
A conception o f morality
Gauthier’s assessment of the market enables us to better understand his conception of 
morality and the role morality should have in society. Indeed the first core conception of 
his theory is to describe what a morally free zone could be. He conceives morality as 
“an impartial constraint on the direct pursuit of individual utility”122. He claims that 
morality is not needed wherever equilibrium and optimum coincide, i.e., wherever 
pursuit of individual gain coincides with mutual advantage without the agents intending 
to bring about this mutual advantage or without the agent constraining his utility 
maximization. Gauthier’s argument is then two fold: firstly, the perfectly competitive 
market would be the ideal candidate for such a morally free zone; secondly, there is no 
such thing as a perfectly competitive market in real life. In the light of this two-fold 
demonstration, we should be able to draw a fuller picture of Gauthier’s conception of 
morality.
To understand his demonstration we have to review what he identifies as being the 
underlying conditions of the market:
• The agents choose in a parametric environment. In other words the others’ 
behaviours (or utility functions) are considered as given.
• The agents choose under conditions of certainty: the utility and production functions 
are given and therefore consumption and production fix the price to everybody’s full 
knowledge.
• There is private consumption of products and factors of production. This in turn 
implies that:
Individual factor endowment are given and 
There is free individual market activity
• There is private ownership. With this condition, Gauthier also assumes that agents 
are mutually unconcerned about each other.
• There are no externalities whether positive or negative.
122 Morals by Agreement p 95
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First leg o f the demonstration
Gauthier first endeavours to demonstrate that, should these conditions be realised, the 
market would be a morally free zone. He first notes that free activity under certainty 
guarantees an equilibrium. Indeed, if one knows what the price of the good is or what 
service someone sells, how much her competitors can produce of it and how much 
consumers wants to consume, it is a mere calculation problem to know how much she 
should produce if she is rational (i.e. if she is a straightforward utility maximiser). 
Similarly, he notes that perfect competition123 guarantees the coincidence of the 
optimum with the equilibrium so obtained. No one can be made better off unless 
someone else was made worse off.
That being noted he moves on to ask the following question: if morality is conceived as 
“an impartial constraint on the direct pursuit of individual utility”, then “do the market 
interactions exhibit any form of partiality”? Does the market affect the agents in a 
differential way? His demonstration rests on three points: 1) free activity ensures that no 
one produces too much or is limited in his production. Any corrective device would 
bring partiality where it is not needed; 2) “The absence of externalities ensures that no 
one is affected whether beneficially or harmfully by any market activity to which she 
has not chosen to be party”.124 Impartiality is guaranteed by the equation of income with 
marginal contribution; 3) the optimality of the outcome implies that any move from it 
would make some better off at the expense of others.
Having demonstrated that at least three conditions of the market prevent partiality from 
polluting its functioning, he then concludes that the market is a morally free zone. Let 
us stop a moment and try to understand the role of impartiality in Gauthier’s conception 
of morality.
He seems to equate morality with impartiality: a morally free zone is a zone where there 
is no partiality. So we first need to clarify the relation between morality and 
impartiality. The following quote should help us through this task: “We ask whether the
123 One condition of perfect competition is that no one is able to affect market prices on her own.
124 Morals by Agreement p 96
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operation of the market exhibits any form of partiality that would justify from a moral 
standpoint the constraint needed to overcome it. Since we have already defended the 
claim that the market interaction is rational, were we to find it to be partial, we would 
have established at least a prima- facie conflict between moral and rational 
requirements. We shall deny that there is such conflict.”125
In this quote he really seems to use morality and impartiality interchangeably: there is 
no morality without impartiality and wherever there is partiality there is a moral 
requirement to impose constraints in order to re-establish impartiality. So what is 
impartiality?
Let us come back to his demonstration to draw a picture of his conception of 
impartiality: 1) Free activity means that each individual is free to produce or consume as 
if she was a Robinson Crusoe on her island. There is no attention paid to any special 
capacities or circumstances. 2) The absence of externalities means that incomes are 
equal to respective marginal contributions, i.e. distribution depends solely on 
contribution and on no other particular factors. 3) Optimality means that no individuals 
are favoured to the detriment of others.
The concept of impartiality is still unclear. However, in these three conditions, each 
individual is assumed to be rational i.e. is responsible for looking after his own best 
interest. Impartiality only means that the best interest of some is not valued more than 
the best interest of others. Rationality and impartiality must cohabit. The three 
conditions above guarantee that, in market interactions, individual rationality (i.e. 
straightforward utility maximization) is compatible with impartiality.
The concept of morality is now clearer. Morality comes in the picture wherever 
straightforward utility maximisation impedes on impartiality i.e. wherever there is 
simultaneously individual rationality and partiality in interactions. There is no need for 
morality where impartiality prevails. Where there is no impartiality, morality comes in 
order to re-establish it. Morality is the artificial establishment of impartiality. This form 
of impartiality is artificial because it is not naturally compatible with individual 
straightforward utility maximization and because it derives from constraints on
125 Morals by Agreement p 95
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individuals’ behaviour. In order to have become aware of the need for constraints and to 
discover what these constraints should be, individuals must have undertaken a change, a 
rational change. Could this change be from the natural rationality known as 
straightforward utility maximization to an ‘artificial’ form of rationality? We need to 
turn now to the rest of his demonstration to answer this question.
Second leg o f the demonstration
In the second fold of his demonstration, Gauthier assesses the realism of each market 
condition listed above. He first notes that the market is unlikely to ever exemplify 
parametric situations under certainty. However, his most urgent concerns are about the 
conditions of private ownership and private consumption.
Firstly, it seems rather ‘unfair’ to consider the individual factor endowments as given. 
Indeed, the share of the outcome that each individual receives depends on his 
contribution but, in turn, his contribution depends on the factors he possesses and 
therefore on his endowment. To consider this endowment as given is therefore in itself a 
distortion.
Secondly, to assume that there is free individual activity is arbitrary for at least three 
reasons: 1) the overall productive capacity of a society is limited by the capacities of its 
members; 2) substitutability of capacities between agents can be a restriction; 3) some 
capacities do not necessarily meet a demand.
Last but not least, the existence of externalities upsets the matching between supply and 
demand. To assume that the consumption of one good by an individual precludes its 
consumption by another amounts to disregarding the existence of free goods (like air 
and water) and of public goods (like roads or street lights). A free rider is an individual 
who benefits from a good without contributing to its cost. A parasite is an individual 
who displaces the cost of his use of a good on to others. Gauthier’s theory is also built 
up around the need to agree on how to share the costs and benefits of public goods. The 
problem posed by the existence of externalities is one of his central concerns.
126 This concern echoes Buchanan’s. See appendix 1 Section 3b.
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What about the condition of mutual unconcern? Are we really the monstrous and selfish 
individuals depicted by the advocates of laissez-faire? Gauthier’s argument is that our 
concern for others is necessarily restricted to the people close to us. Social interactions 
cannot depend on such a restricted field of bonds. The assumption of mutual unconcern 
is therefore not only realistic but also necessary. This assumption also suits Gauthier’s 
theory perfectly because mutual unconcern is a condition for impartiality and because it 
does not preclude particular relationships based on trust and mutual advantage to 
flourish on a voluntary basis.
Prior to moving on to his next core conception, we need to complete our picture of 
Gauthier’s conception of morality. We saw above that morality was a form of artificial 
impartiality and we wondered if it was based on a change of rationality. In finding the 
root of morality, we should address this last issue.
Let us start with this first quote:
“morality has no application to market interaction under the conditions of perfect 
competition. Choice is neither morally right nor wrong, because the coincidence of 
utility maximization in free interaction removes both need and rationale for the 
constraints that morality provides ...Moral constraints arise only in the gap created by 
the conflict between the two rationality properties, when mutual benefit is not assured 
by the pursuit of individual gain. We assess outcomes as right or wrong when, but only 
when, maximizing one’s utility given the actions of the others would fail to maximize it 
given the utilities of others.”12
Here is our answer: the rationality of morality is based on ‘mutual advantage’ rather 
than on pursuit of individual gain. Partiality occurs when there is conflict between the 
rationality required to pursue one’s individual gain and the one required to bring about 
mutual advantage. The reconciliation between these two types of rationalities then 
requires impartial constraints on individuals’ utility maximization. Morality arises from 
the emergence of partiality and from the conflict between these two forms of 
rationalities.
What about justice? When introducing his conception of the market as a morally free 
zone, Gauthier refers to Smith’s ‘invisible hand’128 and he quotes Smith: “a man is free 
as long as he does not violate the laws of justice”. Gauthier then continues:
127 Morals by Agreement p 93
128 A. Smith The wealth of Nations
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“But justice as the reader may recall, is conspicuously absent from Thomas Hobbes’s 
account of the natural condition of mankind.... The absence of force and fraud is 
essential to the workings of the market. Before Smith’s invisible hand can do its work, 
Hobbes’s war of every man against every man must first be exorcised. And this, as we 
shall see means that the ideal of free interactions which Smith celebrates is not natural 
but artificial, arising, for rational persons, only within a framework of agreed 
constraints. In understanding the perfect market as a morally free zone we shall be led 
back to its underlying, antecedent morality.”129
1 ?/)Morality, as constraints on behaviour, applies to choices, actions and persons . 
Morality arises with a change in individuals’ disposition. Individuals must acquire an 
artificial virtue that enables them to make the right choice and perform the right action 
to bring about the right outcome. Justice emerges when agents have acquired this 
artificial virtue. Justice and morality arise hand in hand as individuals reconcile the 
incompatible rationalities intrinsic to the state of nature. Justice and morality appear 
when individuals decide to agree. In other words, justice emerges when individuals 
realise that two rationales are in a disadvantageous competition and there is a need to 
reconcile them. As soon as individuals understand that, in their own best interest, they 
need to impose upon themselves some constraints in order to rectify the disadvantage 
caused by the pursuit of individual gain, they simultaneously acquire a disposition to 
abide by such constraints; they consciously decide on a change of rational approach or 
rather of rational disposition. We saw in the previous chapter that such a change of 
rationality was perfectly reasonable and acceptable in Gauthier’s world. We see know 
how it is a necessary condition to cooperation.
The circumstances of justice
What Gauthier calls the circumstances of justice are “those features of the human 
situation that give rise to co-operation”.131 Co-operation arises from our ‘awareness’ of 
those features. So what are they?
129 Morals by Agreement p 85. As we shall see in Chapter HI, the last sentence of this quote has been rather 
confusing to most commentators.
130 This interpretation is confirmed by the following quote amongst others : ‘Morality is concerned with 
actors, persons considered as doing and choosing, and as implicated in the consequences of their deeds and 
choices.’ Morals by Agreement, p 235
131 Morals By Agreement, p 116
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• The first circumstance of justice is the awareness of self-bias in our character. Mutual 
unconcern is an extreme version of this condition. We cannot rely on any natural fellow 
feelings. Voluntary co-operation brings about another form of concern for each other
• The second condition is the presence of externalities. Because of externalities, the 
market equilibrium fails to be an optimum. The existence of free and public goods 
combined with utility maximization brings about a situation as described in the 
prisoners’ dilemma and also the existence of free riders and parasites.
• The third condition is the awareness of scarcity of goods. On this point Gauthier 
differs from Hobbes. In Hobbes’s world, goods are scarce but available in fixed 
quantities, hence the state of war intrinsic to the state of nature. For Hobbes, we are 
aware of each other as competitors, and we agree to cooperate in order to avoid 
destructive conflict. Gauthier prefers Hume’s vision of the state of nature where goods 
are available in variable quantities depending on the production. Therefore, in Hume’s 
world, we are aware of each other as co-operators in productive activity i.e. we see each 
other as ‘potential sources of mutual benefit’.132 Because we become aware of each 
other as co-operators, we are led to agree, not to avoid conflict, but to seek mutual 
advantage.
But Gauthier insists: the most important features are the awareness of externalities in 
our environment and awareness of self-bias in our character. Why? The answer is now 
obvious: the presence of externalities highlights the disadvantageous competition of the 
two forms of rationalities mentioned above between the pursuit of self-interest and the 
pursuit of mutual advantage. Because the natural tendency to be self-biased dominates 
our nature, it is predictable that we would be free riders and parasites in natural 
interactions. Such generalised behaviour would preclude the emergence of 
indispensable public goods. In order to be able to create such goods and benefit from 
them, individuals have to cooperate. Co-operation is then introduced as the rational 
response to market failure. It is interesting to note that in the rest of the book Gauthier 
systematically opposes ‘natural and market’ to ‘co-operative’ interactions. Natural and 
market are always used together. Co-operation is then an ‘artificial rectification’ of 
these ‘natural’ conditions.
132 Morals By Agreem ent, p 115
78
Core conception 2: the principle of minimax relative concession
Internal rationality and choice of a joint strategy
We saw above that the change from natural and market conditions to co-operative 
interactions, the change from natural to artificial impartiality comes with a change of 
rationality: the original one is based on pursuit of individual gain whereas the social one 
is based on the pursuit of mutual advantage.
Gauthier now introduces a new distinction between external and internal rationality.
Internal rationality concerns the rationality of agreement, the rationality of choosing a
joint strategy. The problem of making a rational cooperative choice is solved by finding
a principle that rationalizes the agreement “the way the principle of expected utility-
1maximisation rationalizes individual choice” . On the other hand, external rationality 
no longer concerns the choice of a joint strategy but the rationality of keeping an 
agreement. External rationality is therefore concerned with the initial bargaining 
position that is fixed in such a way that it is rational to enter the agreement, to agree on 
a joint strategy and to act on the agreement ex-post. It is also concerned with the 
rationality of keeping the agreement once in co-operative interactions.
How are we to understand this distinction? Are we talking about two different forms of 
rationality? Are we talking about the rationality of a process or of individuals? We need 
first to establish that the concept of rationality applies to individuals. Individuals are 
rational or irrational. To say that a process or a strategy is rational is to say that a 
rational individual assessing it would find it acceptable from her perspective. 
Rationality is always a human feature. Now the distinction that Gauthier establishes 
seems to concern what is to be assessed. In the case of internal rationality what is 
assessed is the rationality of the choice made by parties to bargaining whereas in the 
case of external rationality what is assessed is the rationality of entering and keeping 
such a choice.
133 Morals By Agreement, p 118
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The most logical question that comes to mind is then: why do we need to distinguish the 
two? If the assessments are performed by the same individuals why do we need to 
distinguish the rationality according to what is to be assessed? Are the internal and 
external rationalities different and if yes what is different? Do the individuals doing the 
assessing undertake the change of rationality mentioned in core conception 1? If yes 
then we have a chronological problem. Indeed, the external rationality applies to the 
initial bargaining position, then the internal rationality applies to making the agreement 
and then the external rationality again applies to keeping the agreement. These 
rationality swings would be rather difficult to fit with reality. We need to follow 
Gauthier’s steps before we can address these issues and answer these questions.
We saw in core conception 1 that in natural and market conditions, the existence of 
externalities leads the agent to want co-operation. “In order to take effective account of 
externalities, each person must choose her strategy to bring about a particular outcome 
determined by prior agreement. This agreement, if rational, will ensure optimality”. 
Gauthier insists, this agreement might be implicit but it is not a mere fiction since “it 
gives rise to a new mode of interaction, which we identify with co-operation.”134 
Through co-operation the agents can generate a co-operative surplus that would not be 
available otherwise. What individuals bargain over is the distribution of costs and 
benefits of this future co-operative surplus. The co-operative surplus represents the 
difference between the outcome of co-operation and the outcome of the initial 
bargaining position. The procedure of bargaining is then divided into two stages. In 
stage one, each party makes a claim and in stage two, some parties offer a concession by 
making a lower claim. The process continues until the parties agree on a mutually 
compatible outcome.
In this sub-section, we will develop core conception 2 in several stages. First we will 
dwell on Gauthier’s conception of (internal) rationality in bargaining. Second, we will 
develop the minimax principle. Third we will try to understand his reconciliation of 
rationality and morality (or impartiality) prior to concluding on his approach about 
justice and bargaining. In this last part we will see how Gauthier addressed the issues 
raised by Barry against justice by mutual advantage.
134 Morals By Agreement, p 117
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The internal rationality o f co-operation
Gauthier is extremely careful to set the boundaries of his bargainers’ rationality: They 
are straightforward maximisers i.e. they try to maximise their utility given their 
expectations of the others’ behaviour. However, his bargainers are straightforward 
maximisers in the context of co-operation, therefore their rationality is more 
sophisticated than the standard one. It is important that Gauthier derives the principle of 
co-operation from straightforward maximisation. Only then can he demonstrate that the 
principles so arrived at are also moral. If he had to rely on any other form of rationality 
to derive the co-operative principles, it would weaken his argument: morality would no 
longer be a by-product of practical rationality alone.
Gauthier combines three assumptions to develop his sophisticated conception of 
rationality.
• First Assumption (equal rationality): as we saw before the bargainers are rational and 
they assume the other parties to be likewise. This condition strongly echoes Harsanyi’s 
principle of mutual expected rationality135. But where Harsanyi used it to develop on the 
similarity of subjective probabilities, Gauthier develops it to assume similarity and 
reciprocity of reasoning. No party would expect the others to accept what she would not 
accept herself.
• Second assumption (will to cooperate): bargainers are aware that co-operation allows 
them access to a co-operative surplus that would not be available otherwise. The parties 
are interested in co-operation in order to benefit from a surplus that would not exist 
without it. They are therefore interested in co-operation as an integral part of their best 
interest. Gauthier subtly substitutes the pursuit of individual gain with the pursuit of 
mutual advantage. The two goals become one and same in Gauthier’s approach.
• Third assumption (full information): as mentioned in section 1, the parties are fully 
informed and they know the true preferences and the utilities of the others. There is
135 See the Appendix section 2 b
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therefore no room for bluffing and other distortions of preferences to gain bargaining 
power.
So now how does Gauthier combine these three assumptions to improve on the
traditional conception of straightforward maximisation? Easily: co-operation being in
our best interest, it is rational to pursue it. Since we assume the others to be similarly
rational, we also each assume that the others pursue co-operation the way we do. When
defending the conditions on rational bargaining, Gauthier argues:
“The rationale for these conditions turns on the benefit each person seeks to realise from 
the cooperative surplus. Each can increase his utility by cooperating; hence as a utility- 
maximiser each must find it rational to cooperate. And each recognises that everyone 
else must find it rational to co-operate.”136
Gauthier seems to take this rationale as obvious. He therefore considers as irrational to 
do any of the following.
1. To put co-operation in jeopardy Deadlocks are counterproductive since they stop co­
operation. Each party is discouraged from abusive claims. Anyway, from the first 
condition of ‘symmetrical rationality’, it is irrational to expect from the other parties 
concessions bigger than the ones we would be prepared to accept in their positions.
2. To be excluded from co-operation. Once again no co-operation means no share of the 
surplus. As rational individuals, we would not accept having to give a share of the 
surplus to someone who has not contributed to it. Similarly, we can not expect others to 
give us a share of the surplus when we have not contributed to it.
3. To drive away others from the bargaining table. Co-operation, by definition being a 
mutual project, is dependent on the contribution of all. It is not in our interest to 
discourage other parties from participating in it.
4. To make threats. A threat is counterproductive and therefore it would not be rational to 
carry it out. Since the others are rational and fully informed, they know that to carry out 
a threat is irrational and therefore, they would not believe us were we to make one. 
Since it is irrational to carry out a threat, it is irrational to make one.
136 Morals by Agreement, p 143.
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A ‘rational’ claim is therefore such that:
• Each party must claim the co-operative surplus that affords him maximum utility;
• nobody can claim a share of the surplus that he has not contributed to create,
• nobody can claim a share bigger than that it is possible for him to receive
The ‘sophisticated’ rationality of the bargainers is somewhat refrained not to say 
‘constrained’. They are unusually reasonable for straightforward maximisers. I intend to 
come back to this conception of rationality in chapter IV but we shall make a few 
comments here.
Firstly the second assumption is rather controversial. Even in the bargaining position, 
there are situations where the pursuit of best interest does clash with the pursuit of 
mutual advantage. This simplification overlooks some complex issues. This second 
condition also seems to rely on another subtle assumption: that all parties want and need 
co-operation equally as much. However, some could have more to lose from co­
operation than others, despite the existence of a co-operative surplus. The minimax 
principle does not necessarily take into account such discrepancies between the parties.
Secondly, Gauthier assumes that the parties are fully informed and therefore that no 
party can bluff or distort her preferences in order to improve her position in bargaining. 
This assumption is not only very strong but it has also the disadvantage of undermining 
the strategic aspect of bargaining. The same applies to the possibility of making threats 
or of benefiting from a threat advantage. Besides, Gauthier has not proven that if it is 
irrational to carry out a threat, it follows that it is irrational to make a threat.
But let us continue. Which conditions of co-operative choice would these rational 
bargainers consider as acceptable?
• The first condition concerns the initial bargaining position. We know that the discussion 
about the initial bargaining position is postponed to much later. For the moment, we 
must only keep in mind that it cannot be identified with the non-co-operative outcome 
since such an outcome could have been obtained through force, fraud or previous free­
riding and parasitism. The initial bargaining position is such that it is rational to enter in 
co-operation and to agree on a joint strategy. The set of utilities that constitutes the
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initial bargaining position are taken as the initial endowment of the prospective co- 
operators.
• As we saw before, the second condition is that the object of rational co-operative choice 
must be an optimal outcome. If the bargainers choose independently as in natural and 
market conditions, they will choose a strategy according to what they expect the others 
to do. The outcome is then in equilibrium. If the bargainers have agreed on a common 
strategy, then they will choose within the strategy agreed the outcome that will bring 
them the best utility. The outcome is an optimum. Gauthier concludes that in co­
operation, the core rationality property is optimality.
• The third condition of rational bargaining concerns the unicity of the rational optimal 
and the active involvement of the actors in selecting this unique outcome. Gauthier 
rejects Arrow’s concept of social choice on the basis that nothing about Arrow’s 
framework secures the active involvement of individuals.
• In the same vein, Gauthier rejects the utilitarian approach as developed by Harsanyi. 
Not only does welfare maximisation rely on interpersonal comparisons but it also 
disregards the structure of interactions and gives absolutely no say to co-operators who 
are mere passive recipients of goods. The active involvement of the bargainers is an 
indispensable requirement of a bargaining theory if we want the agreement on a joint 
strategy to be voluntary. Individuals cannot be bound by an agreement not voluntarily 
contracted.
The principle o f co-operation
The object of rational co-operation must be an optimal outcome not an equilibrium. The 
co-operators agree on a joint strategy chosen through bargaining. Such a procedure 
secures the involvement of the co-operators and therefore their voluntary acceptance. It 
goes without saying that the initial endowments of the parties are not at stake and that 
no bargainer can be left at the end of bargaining with less than he had to start with. 
Bargaining is about the distribution of costs and benefits of the surplus generated 
through co-operation. It is a two stage process: first, the parties make a claim. Then in
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the second stage they offer a concession by withdrawing a portion of their original claim 
in order to reach a concession point such that all claims are compatible and the outcome 
is mutually advantageous. Bearing in mind the above conditions of rationality, we need 
now to know which concessions a rational individual would make.
Let u* be the utility afforded by an agent in the initial bargaining position, u# be the 
utility of his claim and u the utility obtained with the outcome of a joint strategy. The 
absolute magnitude of his concession is the difference between the utility of his claim 
and the utility the party obtains at the end of bargaining (u# - u). Such a measure does 
not afford any ground for comparing the range of concessions between parties. Gauthier 
therefore suggests reliance on a relative measurement of concession. In order to obtain 
it, he first introduces the absolute magnitude of a complete concession i.e. the difference 
between the utility of his claim and the utility of his original position (u# - u*). The 
relative magnitude of his concession is then the proportion that his absolute magnitude 
bears to a complete concession [(u# - u) / (u# -u*)]. The relative concession of no 
concession is zero, the relative concession of a full concession is one.
The relative magnitude of a concession is a very useful tool since it does not rely on any 
interpersonal comparisons and it is independent of the choice of the utility scale. Each 
party, being fully informed, is able to compute the relative magnitude of the others’ 
concessions and to compare them to hers.
The Zeuthen principle137 then provides a rule to decide which concession is rational and 
therefore which outcome is acceptable. According to this principle, the person with a 
lesser relative concession must concede. Applied by Gauthier to bargaining, it becomes 
the minimax relative concession: “given a range of outcomes, each of which requires 
concessions by some or all persons if it is to be selected, then an outcome be selected 
only if the greatest or maximum relative concession it requires, is as small as possible, 
or a minimum, that is, is no greater than the maximum relative concession required by
1 *35every other outcome.” Each bargainer is willing to entertain a feasible concession
137 See the appendix section 2b
138 Morals by Agreement p 137
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point139 (i.e. he is willing to make the concession it requires from her) as long as the 
others are willing to make the concessions it requires from them.
According to Gauthier, the minimax relative concession has the following merits.
• It avoids the controversial debate on interpersonal comparisons of utilities since it 
allows interpersonal comparison of the proportion of each person’s potential gain that 
he must concede instead.
• Gauthier specifies that we could mistakenly assume from the description of the 
minimax that it requires equal relative concession from the bargainers. It is not always 
the case. However, what is true is the fact that if there is an optimum requiring an equal 
concession from each bargainer, then the minimax would select it.
Gauthier is now able to spell out the Principle o f Minimax Relative Concession (the 
Principle) that provides the conditions on rational bargaining:
(1) Each party must make a rational claim
(2) Given rational claims, each party must suppose that there is a feasible concession 
point that every rational person is willing to entertain.
(3) Each party is willing to make a concession in relation to a concession point as long 
as its relative magnitude is no greater than what he supposes any rational person 
would be willing to make.
(4) No person is willing to make a concession in relation to a concession point if he is 
not required to do so by conditions (2) and (3).140
The first and third conditions of the Principle are respectively a consequence and a 
corollary of the assumption of equal rationality and the second assumption for internal 
rationality given above. According to Gauthier, the second condition follows from the 
willingness of the parties to bring about co-operation. The fourth condition is common 
sense: nobody would make an unduly big concession. It is against any form of 
rationality.
139 A feasible concession point is a concession point in the outcome space. The outcome space is a closed 
convex figure in the utility space.
140 Morals By Agreement, p 143
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Gauthier can then advance the following claims:
• Conditions (2) and (3) suffice to bring about an agreement on a feasible point. His 
demonstration is based primarily on condition (2): as long as the bargainers suppose that 
there is a feasible concession point, they are willing to reach it since they want co­
operation above all.
• The principle of minimax relative concession expresses the principle of expected 
utility maximisation in the context of bargaining. Expected utility maximisation 
rationalises individual choice, the Principle rationalises mutual choice.
• The principle of minimax relative concession determines the formal content of a 
rational bargain. It gives to each actor a strategy to choose the best utility from in co­
operative interactions.
Gauthier seems to assume that there exists a solution to the bargaining problem in each 
bargaining situation. The rational behind this assumption is again that no co-operation 
means no surplus; people are prepared to entertain rational concessions in order to 
benefit from a share of the surplus. If I can follow the rational of this explanation, I am 
not convinced that Gauthier has proven either the existence of a solution or its unicity. 
Gauthier’s demonstration of the existence of an agreement is largely dependent on the 
second condition on bargaining (the object of rational cooperative choice is an 
optimum) which itself follows from the first one on rational claims (each party must 
claim the cooperative surplus that afford her maximum utility) which itself relies on the 
second assumption of bargaining (will of the bargainers to cooperate). The existence of 
an agreement therefore depends on the sophisticated rationality of the bargainers 
carefully bounded by Gauthier. Again, I believe it worth coming back on this 
conception of rationality later in chapter IV.
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When rationality meets impartiality
Prior to developing his argument for the maximin relative benefit, some comments are 
required:
In most of Gauthier’s writings up to 1979, the making of an agreement was based on the 
maximin relative benefit principle, in reaction to Rawls’s lexical principle. He first 
developed the moral principle that he then tried to reconcile with rationality. As we 
shall see later, this approach will support his idea of Archimedean point. In Morals by 
Agreement, Gauthier changes strategy. He develops his bargaining theory, basing it on 
the Zeuthen principle, and obtains the minimax relative concession principle. He 
illustrates the rationality of the bargaining through the minimax relative concession 
principle and only then reconciles this rational approach with the impartial approach 
that leads to the maximin relative benefit principle. I believe that this change of strategy 
is meant to substantiate his theory, grounding it firmly in a theory of rationality.
As a corollary to the above comment, we know that Gauthier had his own view on 
fairness when developing his theory. Before presenting the maximin relative benefit he 
wrote that co-operation, to avoid the immoral effects of externalities, “must ensure that 
the ratio between the benefit the co-operator receives and the contribution she makes is, 
so far as possible, constant, the same for all.”141 He knows what his principle is aiming 
at and it is very much in line with his original project as described in chapter I: “we may 
suppose that the basic ethical requirement is to ensure that utilities are equitably 
distributed among all individuals.”142 However, although he knows what he is aiming at, 
he is able to base his principle on the concept o f rationality alone, without any pre­
reference to its fairness.
Gauthier specifies about impartiality: “we shall address impartiality, as we have 
addressed rationality, from the standpoint of the individual actually involved in 
bargaining.”143The joint strategy selected will be impartial if it is acceptable from every 
standpoint by every persons involved. One could say that this impartiality of the process 
is a mere consequence of the conditions of rationality imposed on the process. Indeed
141 Morals By Agreement, p 152
142 ‘Critical Notice On Harsanyi’, p 705
143 Morals by Agreement, p 151
we remember that one of these conditions was the active involvement of the bargainers 
as an indispensable requirement if the agreement on a joint strategy was to be voluntary. 
Gauthier’s bargaining theory is built around this central idea. Knowing that the 
bargainers are rational, it comes as no surprise that they find acceptable whatever they 
have voluntarily agreed to. We shall see later how he reconciles this form of impartiality 
with the impartiality of a hypothetical arbitrator exterior to the bargaining process, who 
assesses the outcome from his standpoint.
Gauthier distinguishes two types of goods.
1) In the case of single transferable good produced in fixed quantity and divisible 
among the co-operators, he demonstrates that the maximin relative concession principle 
leads to an equal distribution of the surplus. The bargainers contribute proportionally to 
their means but they benefit evenly from the surplus. However, such a distribution 
applies only if the contribution of each co-operator is indispensable to the production of 
the surplus. If a co-operator can be replaced by any (or at least one) other than this 
distribution does not apply.
We touch here on a very important point that was already mentioned before: Gauthier 
seems to assume that each bargainer is needed by and needs the others equally. Co­
operation as conceived by Gauthier is at stake in this implicit assumption for at least 
two reasons: firstly, this assumption supports the second assumption. For co-operation 
to become a priority as integral part of each party’s best interest, it has to be needed and 
wanted by all the parties roughly equally. Secondly, it also explains the uselessness of 
strategic games in bargaining. Nobody needs to strengthen her bargaining power by 
bluff or threats since everybody knows that everybody needs all the others as partners 
and wants co-operation as much as themselves. The problem is that this tacit assumption 
is rather difficult to accommodate with real case situations.
2) If co-operation does not result in a fixed quantity of a fully transferable good, then 
the share of the surplus each party can get is measured in terms of benefit. Gauthier 
specifies: “if a fair or impartial distribution of the co-operative surplus relates the
89
benefit each person receives to the contribution he makes, each person’s fair share of 
the surplus is determined by making shares proportional to claim.”144
Let once again u* be the utility afforded by an agent in the initial bargaining position, 
u# be the utility of his claim and u the utility obtained with the outcome of a joint 
strategy. Then his claim on the co-operative surplus is (u# - u*) and his share of the 
cooperative surplus is (u -u*). His relative benefit is then the proportion [(u-u*) / (u# - 
u*)]. This relative benefit of the initial bargaining position is 0. The relative benefit in 
situation where his claim is satisfied is 1. For the shares to be proportional to claim, 
each must receive the maximum of the minimum (maximin) relative benefit. We fall 
back on a rather egalitarian formula completely in line with his conception of fairness 
which is to ensure that utilities are equitably distributed among all individuals.
Whatever is conceded takes away from the benefit enjoyed hence the unsurprising 
result: relative benefit and relative concession sum to unit [(u# - u) / (u# -u*)] + [(u-u*) 
/ (u# -u*)] = 1. In other words, bargaining is about finding the right balance between 
concessions and benefit such that co-operation is advantageous to all.
There have been extensive commentaries on Gauthier’s minimax and maximin 
principles and we will come back to his critics’ comments in chapter HI. At this stage, 
we just want to review how he has addressed Barry’s criticisms of justice as mutual 
advantage.
We wondered if what was assessed was the fairness of the process or the fairness of the 
outcome independently from the process. Gauthier’s answer is very clear: “given the 
original position, co-operation is just if the joint strategy on which it is based is the 
outcome of a fair bargain among the co-operators. But the fairness of the bargaining 
process does not correct any partiality that may be present in the initial position; indeed 
it would simply transmit the partiality from the initial position to the joint strategy 
selected.”145 So Gauthier is clear, the fairness of the process is an integral part of the 
fairness of the outcome. But Gauthier goes back further than the other bargaining 
theorists since the fairness of the process also applies to the initial bargaining position.
144 Morals by Agreement, p 154
145 Morals by Agreement, p 151
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If the initial position is ‘unfair’ i.e. obtained through fraud or force or if it is spoilt by 
parasitism or free riding, the outcome of the bargaining process will be unfair or 
impartial even if the process itself is fair.
The parties do not play any strategic games and do not try to develop their bargaining 
powers. Therefore the intuitive ‘unfairness’ of the Nash’s solution is replaced by a 
rather egalitarian solution: Gauthier’s minimax allows Matthew to play only 56% of the 
time against the 93% suggested by Nash formula146.
The very sophisticated rationality that Gauthier attributes to his bargainers allows him to 
label deadlocks or threats as irrational. Any rational individual would see the individual 
gain he could derive from a share of the co-operative surplus and nobody would be 
foolish enough to play strategic games that would put such an advantage at risk. We 
have already commented on this conception of rationality and we shall come back to it 
later in chapter IV.
One of Barry’s argument against justice as mutual advantage was that arbitration would 
simulate the outcome of bargaining which somehow defeats the purpose of having an 
arbitrator. But arbitration is needed when there is danger of deadlocks. Gauthier’s 
bargainers are so ‘rational’ that they don’t need an arbitrator. They don’t bluff, they 
don’t he, they don’t threaten, they are perfectly informed, they suppose there is a 
possible agreement and they aim at it.
Now that parties to bargaining have rationally agreed on a joint strategy based on 
straightforward utility maximisation, Gauthier turns to what he calls the external 
rationality of co-operation i.e. the rationality o f keeping the agreement. He tackles this 
issue from two angles: first he explains on which rational basis, parties can ground their 
compliance (constrained maximisation); second, he comes back to the initial bargaining 
position (Lockean proviso) considering that if this starting point is unfair, the full 
process is unfair and therefore rationally unstable.
146 See Barry’s Theories of Justice, chapters 1 and 2
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Core conception 3: Constrained maximisation
External rationality and keeping the agreement
Gauthier’s answer to the Fool and the solution to the problem of extending the concept 
of value developed in parametric situations to strategic situations are contained in core 
conception 3, that of constrained maximisation.
Parties have agreed on a principle of mutually advantageous co-operation that should 
rectify the distortions caused by externalities in natural and market conditions. The 
problem is now to ensure compliance with the agreement rationally contracted. The 
conception of constrained maximisation rests on two complementary concepts: a 
disposition to comply and translucency. One concept is of no use without the other. 
Indeed, on the one hand, by acquiring a disposition to comply with the agreement, a 
party is accepted into the co-operative group and is allowed to benefit from the co­
operative surplus. A party that is so disposed is called a constrained maximiser (CM). 
On the other hand, a party who is disposed to cheat will be excluded from co-operation 
and will not be allowed to benefit from it. Such a party is called a straightforward 
maximiser (SM). However a SM is excluded from co-operation only if the others can 
spot her as such. If a SM is wrongly taken for a CM and accepted in the group, then 
there is exploitation. That is where translucency comes in the picture: the parties 
develop a skill to identify correctly each others as CM or SM. The development of 
translucency amongst the parties also acts as a motivation to acquire the disposition to 
comply. If I know that people are likely to ‘read’ my intentions correctly than I am a lot 
more inclined to acquire the most beneficial intention i.e. the intention to comply with 
the co-operative agreement. It then becomes rational to acquire the disposition to 
comply. Constrained maximisation is therefore the type of rationality suited to co­
operation and to strategic situations. Constrained maximisation is the external 
rationality needed to keep the agreement.
A disposition to comply.
In order to fully appreciate Gauthier’s achievement, we need to come back to the Fool’s 
challenge. We remember from chapter I that the Fool never contested that it was 
rational to enter an agreement. His argument was rather that, once the agreement
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contracted, it could be more beneficial and therefore rational not to keep it when the 
others were keeping it. Or said differently again, the Fool compares the utility he would 
gain were he to comply to his utility were he to unilaterally defect; if the latter is bigger, 
he considers it worthwhile not to comply.
Hobbes’ reply to the Fool was as follows: when disposing himself to cheat, the Fool
takes the risk of being discovered and of being excluded from the society of men. A
Fool has more to lose from being excluded than from complying:
“A person disposed to violate his covenants cannot be admitted as a party to co­
operative arrangements by those who are both rational and aware of his disposition, and 
such a person cannot rationally expect to reap the benefits available to co-operators ... 
The disposition to decide whether or not to adhere to one’s covenants by appealing to 
directly utility maximising considerations, is itself disadvantageous, if known, or 
sufficiently suspected, because it excludes one from participating, with those who 
suspect one’s disposition, in those co-operative arrangements in which the benefits to be 
realised require each to forego utility maximisation ... This will prove to be the key to 
our demonstration that a fully rational utility-maximiser disposes himself to compliance 
with his rationally undertaken covenants.”14
The most immediate reading of this quote is as follows: the disposition not to comply 
“is itself disadvantageous if known or sufficiently suspected’. It is in someone’s best 
interest to dispose herself to comply if her disposition not to comply can be spotted by 
the other parties to the contract. To be spotted as a straightforward utility maximiser in a 
society of co-operators entails exclusion and is therefore detrimental to the one so 
disposed. It becomes rational to dispose oneself to comply. Compliance to a covenant 
must be accompanied by a change of rationality such that reason is no longer connected 
to direct benefit in performance but rather to the benefit in the disposition to perform.
According to Gauthier, Hobbes distinguishes the two forms of rationalities (natural 
reason versus right reason) but considers men incapable of internalising this change. 
Hobbes’ individuals remain straightforward maximisers and the change of rationality 
has to be forced upon them by the sovereign through punishment and prophylaxis. The 
answer to the Fool is political rather than moral.
Gauthier on the other hand claims that it is possible to give a moral response to the Fool, 
i.e. that it is possible for each individual to internalise the required change of rationality
147 Morals by Agreement, p 162
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and understand that it is in her best interest to constrain her maximisation by disposing 
herself to comply. But once again the disposition to comply becomes advantageous and 
therefore rational only if ‘known and sufficiently suspected’. The issue at stake is central 
to Gauthier’s claim: would Gauthier’s individuals still acquire the disposition to comply 
were their disposition to comply or not to comply be impossible or difficult to identify? 
Said otherwise, is their change of rationality coming from within themselves or is it the 
fruit of an external motivation? Let him develop his claim.
We saw in core conception 2, that parties to bargaining would base their agreement on 
the principle of minimax relative concession. They agree on a joint strategy that if 
followed by all should bring about a mutually advantageous state of affair. A 
constrained maximiser maximises his utility within the joint strategy agreed upon, i.e. 
he maximises his utility given the utility afforded to the others, whereas a 
straightforward maximiser maximises his utility given the others’ strategies. A 
constrained maximiser bases her actions on a joint strategy, a straightforward maximiser 
employs an individual strategy.
Gauthier is fully aware of the fact that there will always be some straightforward 
maximisers hidden amongst the co-operators and that they will make the outcome less 
optimal than what it should have been had everybody been constrained maximisers. The 
outcome in Gauthier’s scenario of co-operation is therefore nearly fair and optimal. 
Once we accept that not all parties will keep the agreement a new piece of information 
enters the decision process of the potential co-operators: their expectation of the others’ 
compliance. A potential co-operator has to calculate her utility given her estimate of the 
degree of co-operation of the others. To each estimate corresponds a joint strategy. The 
actual outcome of everyone’s actions does not have to be identical to the outcome of the 
ideal joint strategy were everyone to comply, as long as it does not fall too far short of 
the latter. Said otherwise, a constrained maximiser is not disposed to co-operate at any 
price, she must have grounds to believe that she is amongst like-disposed persons before 
she actually constrains her behaviour. To be rational, a conditional disposition to 
comply must fulfil some criteria.
Gauthier characterises the constrained maximiser as follows. She is someone who is 
conditionally disposed to base her actions on a joint strategy or practice and who acts
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on this conditional disposition. The only condition for this disposition to develop is that 
the utility she expects were everyone to base their action on the joint strategy be no less 
than what she would expect were everyone to employ individual strategies. In other 
words, the utility she expects must approach what she would expect from the co-
1 4 0
operative outcome determined by minimax relative concession.
It is interesting to note that the comparison point is universal non-co-operation. The 
threshold seems to be rather low and therefore constrained maximisation is likely to be 
recommended in most cases. However, there are cases where such a threshold might not 
work. Let us illustrate our claim with an example.
As I write these pages, the Olympic Games are taking place in Athens. A lot of athletes 
are facing a challenging dilemma: should they take steroids to improve their 
performance or not? Let us imagine that all the athletes and their coach sit at a table and 
agree that nobody would take steroids for the race. If, back in the changing room, one 
athlete suspects competitor A will defect, what will he do? If he feels that he had a good 
chance of coming first, he can now expect to be only second. If he felt he could have 
come second, he can now only dream of a bronze medal. Worse, if he thought he had a 
fair chance of coming third, he now has no hope of getting on the podium at all. 
Besides, if he suspects competitor A will defect, he will assume that he is not the only 
one to have doubts about him. If each of the other parties to the agreement has the same 
doubts, he can easily imagine that the doubt will trigger their temptation to defect too. 
How many will resist? When you prepare for four years for one race, you want to 
maximise your chance of wining whatever you feel you deserve. In this case, the 
suspicion of one defection is rationally sufficient to justify straightforward rather than 
constrained maximisation. Gauthier has not yet addressed the Fool’s challenge.
It can be, on occasion, disadvantageous to constrain one’s maximising behaviour if one 
has wrongly estimated others’ compliance level. Therefore, the rationality of 
compliance cannot rest on this leg alone as we could have been led to believe from 
Gauthier’s characterisation of a constrained maximiser given above. We can only say 
that having a reasonable expectation of others’ disposition to comply is a necessary
148 Morals by Agreement, p 167.
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condition of rationality but it is not sufficient. Gauthier now needs to introduce the 
moral dimension of compliance.
One has to maintain one’s disposition to comply even when it might not be 
advantageous. Constrained maximisation is not about gaining the trust of others by 
regular compliance in order to benefit in the future, it is about developing a disposition 
to comply. Only those who are so disposed can be accepted as parties to a co-operative 
agreement and benefit from mutual advantage. A constrained maximiser disregards the 
individual strategies available to him because he cultivates within himself a sense of 
justice when amongst like-minded people. His disposition to comply is motivated by his 
conviction that co-operation is mutually beneficial. He assumes that the others being 
equally rational have acquired a similar disposition. This disposition has to pre-exist 
interactions and must constrain his behaviour. Those who have acquired the conviction 
that co-operation is more beneficial, have in fact internalised the change o f rationality 
from the pursuit of individual gain to the pursuit of mutual advantage. They are 
prepared to constrain their behaviour on this basis alone.
However, even if the disposition to comply must pre-exist interactions, the rationality of 
keeping this disposition depends on the compliance of others. We fall back on our initial 
condition: a disposition to comply is rational only if known or sufficiently suspected by 
others. The rationality of disposing oneself to comply depends on this second condition: 
the ‘disposition spotting skill’. That is what Gauthier calls ‘translucency’.
Before we move on to presenting Gauthier’s concept of translucency, we note that there 
is a full aspect of the theory which does not seem to have been addressed. Gauthier’s 
argument is that, when spotted, straightforward maximisers are excluded. When 
reasoning about which disposition to choose, a person argues as follows: “suppose I 
adopt straightforward maximisation. Then I must expect others to employ maximizing 
individual strategies in interacting with me”149. The question is really how does one use 
at the same time, individual strategies when interacting with straightforward 
maximisers, and a joint strategy when interacting with constrained maximisers? In the 
above example, if an athlete suspects competitor A of defecting and wants to employ an 
individual strategy in interacting with him, as a result he also uses an individual strategy
149 Morals by Agreement, p 172
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in all his interactions including interactions with potential co-operators. It is either he 
takes steroids or he does not. (Or in another example, it could be: either I pay my tax or 
I don’t). More generally, the issue of how concretely to exclude straightforward 
maximisers seems to have been left unattended. This is rather unfortunate since 
Gauthier insists that the rationality of disposing oneself to comply rests also on the 
effective exclusion of the straightforward maximisers. Indeed, if I can employ 
individual strategies without any fear of exclusion than why should I dispose myself to 
employ a joint strategy? Minimax relative concession and constrained maximisation are 
rational responses to the problem posed by externalities and public goods in the market 
and nature conditions. It would be relevant to know how (and at what cost) one can 
prevent a straightforward maximiser from using a road or a lighthouse. Gauthier has not 
achieved much if, in order to apply his theory, Hobbes’ enforcement system is replaced 
by an exclusion system. The cost of such an exclusion system would surely make the 
outcome sub-optimal.
Translucency
Leaving aside the concrete reality of exclusion, we can now turn to translucency. 
Gauthier acknowledges that he developed concept of translucency in reaction to a 
comment that D. Parfit made about Reason and Maximisation.15° We saw in chapter 1 
how Gauthier initially presented constrained maximisation. Parfit noted, in this original 
version, the implicit supposition that constrained and straightforward maximisers could 
clearly identify each other for what they were, as if they were transparent. In Morals by 
Agreement, Gauthier modifies this unrealistic assumption and creates the concept of 
translucency. Translucency is less than transparency but more than opacity. The 
disposition of a translucent person can be identified with a reasonable degree of 
accuracy but not with certainty. Gauthier assumes that there is such a feature as 
translucency. It is, in itself, a very strong assumption. We are provided with full details 
on how the ‘disposition spotting skill’ contributes to the rationality of constrained 
maximisation, but we lack information on the existence and the development of such 
feature.
150 See Reasons and Persons in his discussion of the ‘self-interest theory’, especially pp 18-19.
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If we accept that individuals are only translucent, then it is possible to mistake a SM for 
a CM and therefore it is possible to find situations of defection and exploitation. Co­
operation ineluctably yields only nearly fair and optimal outcomes. Given the possibility 
of error, we need to know from what threshold it is rational to dispose oneself to 
comply. To address this issue, Gauthier creates a measure of translucency. Let p be the 
probability that CMs will achieve mutual recognition and successfully co-operate and q 
be the probability that CMs fail to recognise SMs but will be recognised by them and 
therefore will be exploited. Then the ratio p/q can be a measure of translucency: the 
more CMs are translucent, the more likely will they achieve co-operation and the less 
likely will they suffer from exploitation. The ratio works as follows:
• When there are more CMs, they achieve an outcome closer to the optimal one suggested 
by the minimax relative concession rule. They can afford a certain level of exploitation 
without losing out too much. Therefore, p/q can be small. Said differently, it is not very 
important if they are not translucent enough to identify each other correctly since they 
will still benefit from the high level of cooperation.
• The fewer the CMs, the further will the outcome be from the ideal joint strategy and 
greater the ratio p/q must be for co-operation to be rational. Indeed, the CMs cannot 
afford exploitation as much and they must display a reasonable level of translucency in 
order to recognise each other with as little failure as possible.
Realistically, and Gauthier labels it clearly, his argument appeals “implicitly to the 
requirement that co-operation yield nearly fair and optimal outcome.”151 An individual 
is more likely to dispose herself to comply if she feels she is amongst like-minded 
people and therefore she is likely to achieve a nearly fair and optimal outcome. He 
introduces a distinction between narrowly and broadly compliant persons. A narrowly 
compliant person is disposed to co-operate in ways that if followed by all would yield 
nearly fair and optimal outcomes, whereas a broadly compliant person is disposed to 
co-operate in ways that if followed by all would merely yield her some benefit in 
relation to universal non-co-operation. The broadly compliant person is the constrained 
maximiser as she was characterised above. Gauthier specifies that such a person is an 
easy target for unscrupulous SMs. So although she can still reap some benefit from her
151 Morals by Agreement, p 178
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disposition, she probably does not perform as well as a narrowly compliant person who 
is seeking co-operation wherever it is mutually beneficial on terms equally fair and 
rational to all. With the introduction of translucency and the problem posed by the 
difficulty for SMs and CMs to identify each others correctly, Gauthier has to narrow 
down his characterisation of constrained maximisation in order to maintain the 
rationality of the concept. If we assume equal rationality amongst individuals, only 
narrow compliance is rational.152
Gauthier also insists on the rationality of developing the ‘disposition spotting skill’. As 
SMs and CMs improve their skill at detecting each other, CMs benefit more and more 
from co-operation and suffer less and less from exploitation. The probability p increases 
while q remains constant. The overall rationality of constrained maximisation benefits 
from the development of translucency. As people will develop the skill of correctly 
identifying the others as CMs or SMs, CMs will be able to co-operate more often 
together and avoid exploitation. Not only will they benefit from mutual advantage but 
the disposition to comply will come more naturally to them. They will develop a sense 
of guilt when behaving as SMs. A population of CMs gains in stability.
In order to have a clear picture of this core conception, it seems appropriate to 
recapitulate the conditions o f rationality required in constrained maximisation.
(1) A constrained maximiser must estimate at a reasonable level the degree of the 
others’ compliance. If a constrained maximiser feels that he is amongst like minded- 
people, he expects to achieve a nearly fair and optimal outcome and to gain from mutual 
cooperation.
(2) A disposition to comply or not to comply must be identifiable and identified with a 
certain degree of accuracy. The more CMs, the less necessary it is to be translucent, the 
less CMs, the more relevant it is for them to be able to recognise each others without 
fail.
152 See Gauthier’s demonstration in Morals by Agreement p 226-227
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(3) Last but not least, SMs must be effectively excluded from co-operation when 
spotted. Gauthier only mentions this rather obvious condition153. But, as we saw above, 
this condition, although essential and rather problematic, seems to have been 
underdeveloped.
Has Gauthier addressed the problem raised in section 1 about the identification of 
rationality with utility maximisation in strategic situations?
In parametric situations, rationality is identified with utility maximisation at the level of 
particular choices. In strategic situations, Gauthier suggests identifying rationality with 
utility maximisation at the level of a disposition to choose. Through his disposition, a 
constrained maximiser finds himself in a situation yielding better outcomes than is 
yielded by the situation of a straightforward maximiser. “In parametric contexts, the 
disposition to make straightforwardly maximising choices is uncontroversially utility- 
maximising. We may therefore employ the device of a parametric choice among 
dispositions to make constrained choices, rather than straightforwardly maximising 
choices, is utility maximising.”154
The pursuit of mutual advantage being in our best interest is represented in our coherent 
and considered preferences. In strategic situations utility remains a measure of these 
preferences. If we remember our chocolate cake example, we had characterised them as 
follows:
• They reveal a preference for a state of affair rather than for a direct object of choice;
• They are based on our level of information and our beliefs at the time of decision;
• They depend on the valuer (subjective value);
• They depend on the state of affair she wants to bring about at the time of decision 
(relative value).
If an individual has chosen to bring about a state of affair where she co-operates and 
benefits from the mutual advantages and she believes that (most of) the others are like-
153 Morals by Agreement, p 182
154 Morals by Agreement, p 183
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minded, then by constraining her utility maximisation, she reveals her considered and 
coherent preferences through her choices. Rationality can still be equated with utility 
maximisation but with constrained rather than straightforward utility maximisation.
We also remember the three conditions on strategically rational choice and in particular
condition A: Each person’s choice must be a rational response to the choices she
expects the others to make. We can now replace it with condition A’:
“Each person’s choice must be a fair optimising response to the choice he expects the 
others to make, provided such a response is available to him; otherwise, his choice must 
be a utility -maximising response. A just person is disposed to interact with others on 
the basis of condition A’.”15
As initially announced optimality is a necessary condition of rationality but it depends 
on the existence of the fair optimum. The second condition of rationality is therefore the 
degree of compliance of the others.
Has Gauthier provided a moral answer to the Fool?
Let us reformulate the Fool’s challenge: some agents have rationally agreed to a 
contract that, if kept, can be mutually advantageous to all. Why would an agent comply 
with this covenant rather than individually defect? Would it be fair to answer as 
follows?
A Hobbesian’s agent would comply because he knows it is in his interest, but more 
generally because he dreads being spotted and punished by the sovereign. The 
expectation o f punishment makes it more costly to defect than to comply and therefore 
makes it rational to comply.
A constrained maximiser complies with this agreement because she disposes herself to 
do so; and she disposes herself to do so because she dreads being spotted and excluded. 
The expectation of exclusion makes it more costly to defect than to comply and therefore 
makes it rational to dispose herself to comply.
155 Morals by Agreement, p 157
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If this answer is correct, and Gauthier’s response to the Fool was in the blurred (and 
probably institutionalised) reality of exclusion, Gauthier would have failed to give a 
moral answer to the Fool. We must look elsewhere for his answer. The rationality of 
constrained maximisation depends on our estimate of the others’ compliance, on the 
concept of translucency and on the effective exclusion of SM. But all this technical 
probability apparatus can only feed or discourage an existing pre-disposition. For people 
to find it rational to comply, they must have internalised the change of rationality that 
sustains morality. Some of us have realised the benefit we would all gain were we all to 
comply and have fully assimilated the rationality of compliance. We assume that the 
others, being equally rational, must have reached a similar conclusion. We are disposed 
to comply on this basis alone. They have acquired the disposition to comply or, to put it 
differently, they have become just persons; they possess this artificial virtue called 
morality. The change of rationality from the pursuit of individual gain to the pursuit of 
mutual advantage has taken place within them and this change in turn supports their 
compliance. Based on the assumption of equal rationality, agents decide to comply 
because they have internalised the change of rationality. That is Gauthier’s moral 
answer to the Fool. The fact that the others’ actual behaviours subsequently strengthens 
or weakens their disposition is only secondary to the argument. The technical apparatus 
meant to demonstrate the rationality of compliance makes sense only once some have 
chosen morality, based on their belief that the others, being equally rational, have made 
the same rational choice. They have accepted to constrain their behaviour in line with 
the agreement rationally contracted. The change of rationality from individual to mutual 
gain triggers the sense of justice of some agents. The development of this sense of 
justice amongst individuals, in turn, feeds the practical rationality of compliance.
This moral response is reemphasized later in Morals by Agreement when Gauthier 
addresses Glaucon’s challenge.
“Glaucon’s claims that were the just man to put on the ring of Gyges he would behave 
no differently from the unjust man. In so claiming Glaucon thinks of the just man 
merely as someone who recognises the need to accept certain constraints, but whose 
emotions are in no way engaged by them. The ‘just man’ thus lacks any sense of justice, 
any capacity to be moved by considerations of justice as such... This shows only that he 
is not truly the just man. Properly understood, the just man is the person who 
recognising a certain course of action to be just, finds her feelings engaged by that
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recognition and so finds herself moved to adhere to that course of action because of its 
justice.”156
Gauthier’s response to the Fool therefore should read:
A constrained maximiser complies with the agreement because she disposes herself to 
do so; and she disposes herself to do so because she has internalised the change of 
rationality required for cooperation to exist. Depending on the others’ compliance, her 
disposition will be strengthened or weakened.
The internalisation of the change of rationality from individual gain to mutual advantage 
creates the disposition to comply. The principle of co-operation (minimax) obtained 
through bargaining provides the object of compliance; the minimax substantiates co­
operation.
Could this be the difference between internal and external rationality? Before we can 
answer this question we need to complement our picture of external rationality with the 
next core conception that of the initial bargaining position.
Core conception 4: The Lockean Proviso
External rationality and fairness of the initial bargaining position.
Before we develop this core conception, it seems appropriate to make a couple of 
comments on it. Firsdy, it comes in the fourth position which is rather strange when 
logically it should have been the starting point of the theory. The initial bargaining 
position should have been logically and chronologically anterior to bargaining. This 
anomaly is not accidental. Secondly, we have noted that Gauthier’s strategy so far has 
been to establish the rationality of a core conception and only then to reconcile 
rationality with impartiality. In presenting the Lockean proviso, he first focuses on 
demonstrating its impartiality prior to demonstrating its rationality. Once again this 
change is not accidental.
156 Morals by Agreement, p328
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This sub-section will hopefully make sense of these two introductory points. We shall 
first present the Lockean proviso prior to developing on its sustaining morality and 
rationality. We shall then be fully equipped to come back to our last issue: why does 
Gauthier need to distinguish between internal and external rationality?
The Lockean proviso
So far impartiality has been assessed by the individuals involved in bargaining and not 
by an external observer. This standpoint intricately links impartiality with rationality. 
Indeed, rational individuals who voluntarily agree, in full knowledge of their 
circumstances and capacities, are responsible for their own best interest. As such they 
are the guarantors for the impartiality of the agreement ... unless they are coerced or 
victims of force or fraud. Therefore, it is essential to Gauthier’s theory that rational 
individuals make their choice free from coercion of any sort. In this context, the initial 
bargaining position must be cleansed of the effects of previous force, fraud, free riding 
or parasitism. As we shall see, any discrepancies in bargaining power between future 
parties to an agreement are reduced as a consequence of this cleansing job.
Locke’s theory of property states the following:
“He that subdued, tilled, and sowed any part of it [earth], thereby annexed to it 
something that was his property, which another had no title to, nor could without injury 
take from him. Nor was his appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it, any 
prejudice to any other man, since there was still enough, and as good left; and more 
than the yet unprovided could use.”157
Gauthier’s Lockean proviso, following Nozick’s, is based on this sentence in italics and 
becomes: the proviso “prohibits worsening the situation of others except where this is 
necessary to avoid worsening one’s own position.”158 A bit of explanation is required. 
To worsen or better someone’s situation is always in relation to a base point. The most 
obvious base point is then someone’s situation in my absence. What would be your 
situation had I not been here or interacting with you: if it would have been better, than I
157 Second Treatise of Government, Chapter 5, paragraphs 32/33, p 633
158 Morals by Agreement, p 203
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worsened your situation; if it would have been worse, than I bettered your situation159. 
Similarly, my situation is worsened (or bettered) by you if it would have been better had 
you not be here. There are particular cases to this broad rule. For example, if you are the 
tax inspector in charge of my file and you are away from your desk each time that I try 
to contact you, your absence worsens my situation. It is not you in particular that I try to 
reach but the tax inspector in charge of my file who happens (to my sorrow!) to be you. 
Within this institutional framework, your mere absence does worsen my situation. In 
general, Gauthier states that the proviso allows us to better our situation as long as we 
don’t worsen anybody else’s.
In this pre-co-operation environment, each has to maximise his utility given the 
assumption of mutual unconcern. Each assesses her own situation separately, taking 
only immediate reciprocity into consideration. The proviso imposes a constraint on this 
utility maximisation according to the following rule. An individual should first try to 
better or at least not worsen his situation, without worsening that of anyone else. If that 
is not possible, then he should try to better or at least not worsen his situation, trying to 
minimise the worsening of the situation of others. If that is not possible, he must then 
try to minimise worsening his situation when interaction is not to his advantage.
The proviso forbids any unnecessary worsening of others’ situation. This is obviously a 
departure from Hobbes’ state of nature where every man had a right to everything ‘even 
to one another’s body’. The constraint is a huge requirement. Let us imagine that we are 
in a non co-operative environment, and you are a lot stronger and brighter than me, why 
should you stop yourself from abusing your natural advantage over me? Both the moral 
and the rational motivations of the proviso need now to be presented.
Proviso and impartiality.
The proviso is the constraint “by which we move from a Hobbesian state of nature, in 
which there are no exclusive rights whatsoever but only liberties, to the initial position
159 Gauthier assumes a causal implication between my absence and the bettering or worsening of your 
situation.
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for social interaction.”160 It is a four-step move. The first two steps are about the 
conversion of the pure state of nature. The last two steps concern the transition from 
natural to co-operative interactions.
Step 1: The proviso affords each person exclusive right to the use of his body and its 
power, his physical and mental capacities and imposes a duty not to use another’s power 
since that would worsen their situation.
Step 2: I am entided to the possession of whatever I produce using my power and 
capacities. However, my situation is not worsened if someone seizes the fruits of my 
labour but compensates me for it or if someone uses something for which I had no 
intended use. Therefore there is no exclusive right to possession. The compensation 
required is ‘full’ i.e. sufficient to cover my loss. ‘Market’ compensation, which is 
superior to ‘full’ compensation, can only be given in step 4, once out of the state of 
nature.
Step 3: Gauthier distinguishes between natural and social interactions. In natural 
interactions, the incidental imposition of costs on others does not violate the proviso. 
However, once we view others as potential co-operators (even still in the state of 
nature), whatever betters the situation of one by worsening the situation of others calls 
for compensation if the proviso is not to be violated. When moving from natural to 
market interactions, costs must be internalised amongst those interacting.
Step 4: This last step ensures the conversion from the state of nature into society, from 
common use to exclusive right o f possession to land or other good. This exclusivity 
means that individuals feel secure to maximise the use of their possessions. Each 
specialises and everyone’s needs are met through market exchange. Division of labour 
becomes mutually beneficial. However, not everyone benefits equally from this change. 
Gauthier needs next to confirm that this inequality does not generate partiality.
Before we move on to his argumentation, we must note that we have arrived, in the state 
of nature, at a definition of the actors in terms of initial factor endowment as rights to 
their persons and property. These rights have to pre-exist bargaining and social
160 Morals by Agreement, p 209
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interactions. Indeed, bargaining pre-supposes a clear definition of each actor’s initial 
factor endowment. This definition is provided by the proviso. The proviso is a 
constraint on utility maximisation. It remains to be demonstrated that this constraint is 
impartial.
To argue for the impartiality of the proviso, Gauthier gives the example of 16 Crusoes 
living on 16 different islands. Each is either clever or stupid, either energetic or lazy, 
either strong or weak, either living on a well or an ill supplied island. All the possible 
combinations are represented from the clever, energetic, strong Crusoe living on a well 
supplied island to the stupid, lazy, weak Crusoe living on an ill supplied island. 
Gauthier claims that, although such distribution is completely arbitrary, it is no one’s 
responsibility to redistribute in a more egalitarian way the natural assets so that the 
weak, stupid and lazy Crusoe benefits from the help of the clever, strong, energetic one. 
Any redistribution would be classified as free riding or parasitism. Gauthier’s initial 
bargaining position is determined as if the parties were Crusoes on their islands using to 
their best ability their natural endowment.
“Each human being is an actor with certain preferences and certain physical and mental 
capacities which in the absence of her fellows, she naturally directs to the fulfilment of 
her preferences. This provides a basis in no way arbitrary, from which we may examine 
and assess interaction, introducing such conceptions as bettering and worsening... A 
principle that did not take this basis as normatively fundamental would not relate 
impartially to human beings as actors.”161
It is interesting to note that impartiality is based on the concept of bettering and 
worsening, which in turn is based on individuals’ natural power and capacities. We 
remember that in Core Conception One, impartiality was assessed rather on whether 
individuals were differentially affected or not.
Let us imagine that due to your natural endowment (for example force or intelligence), 
you could successfully use some predatory power on me. Does the proviso mean that 
you cannot use your power? And if you do, does the proviso mean that you have to 
compensate me before bargaining? On the one hand, you are able to worsen my position 
by bettering yours. On the other hand, our natural endowments are such that you are 
able to prey on me. Why should you refrain from using predatory powers you did not
161 Morals By Agreement, p 221
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choose to have? Why should you compensate me for having used these natural powers? 
The proviso in deciding who is better off and who is worse off does affect us 
differentially.
One can understand that the parties who have suffered from predation in the state of 
nature would not find it rational to comply with an agreement based on such coercion. 
But what about the predators: why would they sit at a bargaining table if, before they 
do, they are asked to surrender some of their predatory powers and gains? And if they 
do bargain on this basis, why should they comply afterwards? It is now time to turn to 
the rational defence of the proviso.
Proviso and rationality.
I believe that it is worth taking Gauthier’s example and follow his reasoning faithfully.
We are two fisherfolks. “You, the upstreamer, discharge your wastes into the running 
water of the river, thus causing pollution, and so costs for me, the downstreamer. This 
benefits you in interaction with me, and so brings the proviso into play; you lack the 
right to pollute.”162
There are then two alternatives: either your use of the river for waste disposal is the 
most efficient method overall or it is not. Two optimal responses are available.
Optimal response 1: If it is, you should continue to use it but compensate me for the 
costs it brings me. If it is not you should use and finance some other method of waste 
disposal.
Optimal response 2: If it is, you continue to use it. If it is not “I should pay you the 
difference in your costs necessary to induce you to adopt the most efficient method,
tsince this payment must be less than the cost to me o f your pollution.”
162 Morals By Agreement, p 223
163 Morals By Agreement, p 223
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Before we pursue this example, two small comments can be made. Firstly, it is 
surprising that in the state of nature, we should consider the overall efficiency of a 
process. Gauthier has emphasised before that prior to any agreement each uses 
individual strategies independently worked out. To decide whether a method is efficient 
overall requires some mutually devised reference point. Secondly we note that optimal 
response 2 is the perfect illustration of how a threat advantage can make a substantial 
difference in the outcome. The upstreamer is clearly in a stronger position than the 
downstreamer and can therefore dictate his preference. It is interesting to see how 
Gauthier will defend the rationality of not making use of such an obvious threat 
advantage. So let us continue his argument.
Why would the upstreamer keep the proviso? Here is Gauthier’s answer:
“Co-operation has, as it sole and sufficient rationale, the maximisation of expected 
utility. Thus in bargaining, the claim advanced and the concession offered by each 
person depend on his endeavour to maximise his utility, together with his recognition of 
the similar endeavour of every other person. The principle of minimax relative 
concessions determines the outcome of co-operative interaction in such a way that 
shares in the cooperative surplus are related to contributions to its production in the 
same way for all. Of course not every particular interaction, considered apart from a 
practice of cooperation, will benefit each party to it proportionately to his contribution. 
Everyone may expect to gain from certain arrangements for mutual assistance even 
though on any given occasion the recipient o f assistance gains and the donors loses. It 
is the practice, and not the occasion, that must satisfy minimax relative concession. 
Think now of the fisherfolk. I take a net loss if you dump your waste in the river. 
Disposing of waste by the method least costly to the disposer, ignoring all effects on 
others, is not a practice offering expected benefit to each member o f society. The 
particular interaction cannot then be defended by relating it to the practice that satisfies 
minimax relative concession. Hence it violates the requirement, fundamental to rational 
co-operation, of mutual benefit proportionate to contribution.”164
This very long quote calls for some comments.
Firstly, Gauthier has in effect demonstrated the rationality of the proviso through its 
compatibility with the minimax relative concession principle. The minimax principle 
has to pre-exist the proviso for the proviso to be rational. But we now face a surprising 
conclusion. Indeed, the initial bargaining position being the fruit of the proviso and the 
proviso being subsequent to the minimax, parties to the bargaining process are choosing 
the principle not knowing their initial bargaining position, as i/they were behind a veil
164 Morals By Agreement, pp 224-5
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of ignorance. Gauthier appeals to their assumed equal rationality not to their best 
interest to justify the minimax. This approach is a lot more Kantian than Hobbesian and 
not really compatible with Gauthier’s contractarian framework.165
The second issue also concerns the outlook on the minimax relative principle developed 
here. Indeed, we understand that Gauthier refers to an overall rationality: individuals do 
not assess the benefit of each situation within co-operation but the overall benefit that 
co-operation can bring to them. Sometimes they gain sometimes they lose. It does not 
matter as long as, overall, they gain: hence the need to be disposed to comply. The 
disposition to comply is the only true answer to the Fool’s proposed unilateral defection 
on those occasions where compliance is not beneficial.
Lastly, Gauthier seems to appeal to another level of rationality namely overall social 
rationality. Co-operation, in being beneficial to all, is rational for all. Precisely because 
it is not the rationality of each particular case which is assessed but the overall 
rationality of co-operation, is it possible to have losers and winners in each situation as 
long as everybody gains from cooperative interaction. Gauthier does not evaluate how 
rational it is to adopt the proviso for each o f the fisherfolk, but rather how rational it is 
to adopt the proviso in this particular interaction overall. In this interaction cooperation 
would be in jeopardy if the proviso was not applied. It is because cooperation is at threat 
and both parties supposedly want cooperation equally that the proviso is rationally 
justified.
Why would the upstreamer obey the proviso? Why should a predator refrain from using 
his natural endowment? The above answer leaves us short of an individual rational 
answer for each actor. So Gauthier continues. If a predator, free rider or parasite wants 
co-operation with others, or if future co-operation with others will be beneficial then she 
has to constrain her behaviour in the state of nature and either refrain from predation or 
compensate (before bargaining) prospective partners in co-operation if predation has 
occurred. The rationality of the proviso for the predators depends on this threshold 
between what they have to lose if they refrain from making full use of their power in the 
state of nature and what they have to gain from future co-operation. The last word is to 
expected utility maximisation.
165 This point will be developed at length in chapter IV.
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“For utility maximisers, the link between co-operation and mutual benefit must take 
precedence over the link between co-operation and impartiality or fairness... the 
proviso constrains the initial bargaining position to the extent, that such constraint is 
compatible with the co-operative outcome affording each person the expectation of a 
utility greater than that afforded by the non-cooperative outcome. It is rational to 
comply with a co-operative joint strategy if and only if its expected outcome is (nearly) 
optimal and as fair as its compatible with mutual benefit. We abandon neither the 
proviso nor narrow compliance, but we subordinate them to the requirement of mutual 
benefit.”166
What about the distinction between internal and external rationality?
Let us recapitulate. The two central ideas of this core conception are as described by 
Gauthier himself: the Lockean proviso “moralises and rationalises the state of nature -  
but only insofar as we conceive the state of nature as giving way to society”167.
The fairness of the process is considered from the initial bargaining position onwards. If 
the initial position is ‘unfair’, the outcome of the bargaining process will be unfair. If 
the outcome is unfair then the parties will not comply with it. On the fairness of the 
initial bargaining position depends the rationality o f keeping the agreement. Fairness is 
therefore a pre-condition to the agreement not its by-product.
“It is both rational and just for each individual to accept a certain constraint on natural 
interaction and on the determination of his initial factor endowment, as a condition of 
being voluntarily acceptable to his fellows as a party to co-operative and markets 
arrangements -  to social interaction. This constraint is part of morals by agreement, not 
in being an object of an agreement among rational individuals, but in being a pre­
condition to such an agreement.”168
We saw above that morality was an impartial constraint on the direct pursuit of 
individual utility. In the state of nature, there is no agreement on a joint strategy yet and 
we each maximise our individual utility. Gauthier demonstrates that the proviso is an 
impartial constraint on this individual utility maximisation. The proviso guarantees this 
artificial impartiality that replaces the natural impartiality prevailing in natural and 
market conditions. Morality, in the form of this impartial constraint, has therefore to 
pre-exist the agreement. This brings us to the second central idea of the proviso.
166 Morals by Agreement, p 229-230
167 Morals by Agreement, p 193
168 Morals by Agreement, p 192
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Parties accept a constraint on their utility maximisation in the initial position only with 
co-operation and social interactions in sight. It is because they are expecting to 
mutually benefit from co-operation that they voluntarily accept the proviso. In the state 
of nature, they constrain their behaviour with their future partners in co-operation in 
order to be accepted in the co-operative agreement. The proviso is therefore a rational 
requirement if we want the agents to comply with the agreement made. And it is a 
rational requirement because it guarantees fairness. We are back to the scenario of core 
conception 3. Once individuals have internalised the change of rationality from the 
pursuit of individual gain to the search for mutual advantage, they accept to constrain 
their behaviour. They constrain their individual utility maximisation with the prospect 
of benefiting from a co-operative surplus. It is this prospect that motivates their 
constraint.
Gauthier goes further: parties in the initial bargaining position don’t just vaguely know 
that it is beneficial to co-operate, they know about the exact terms of their future co­
operation since they know about the minimax relative concession principle and about 
constrained maximisation. “Without the prospect of agreement and society, there would 
be no morality, and the proviso would have no rationale. Fortunately, the prospect of 
society is realised for us; our concern is then to understand the rationale of the morality 
that sustains it.”169 They have to work from the principle of co-operation back to the 
proviso. As with core conception 3, the internalisation of the change of rationality 
motivates their disposition to obtain co-operation and the minimax relative principle 
substantiates the co-operation they have to comply with.
We are now able to make sense of the two introductory points made both on the 
structure of the book and the structure of the chapter on the Lockean proviso. Gauthier 
needs first to introduce the minimax and the concept of constrained maximisation to 
establish the moral need for the proviso. It is in turn the role played by the proviso (in 
securing impartiality) that supports its own rationality.
At last, we can also better understand the distinction between internal and external 
rationality. Once individuals have realised that it is in their best interest to pursue
169 Morals by Agreement, p 193.
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mutual benefit rather than individual gain, once they have realised the need for co­
operation, two rationales are in place.
The internal rationality of co-operation deals with making the contract. Sophisticated 
straightforward maximisers negotiate their respective share of the co-operative surplus. 
Morality has no place in this process. The principle o f co-operation is a product of pure 
practical rationality. Internal rationality is the rationality that sustains the pursuit of 
individual gain.
The external rationality deals with keeping the contract. Parties have internalised the 
change of rationality required for co-operation to blossom. They have acquired a 
disposition to obtain and maintain co-operation. Morality has emerged from this change 
of rational disposition. External rationality is the rationality that sustains morality. 
Parties constrain their utility maximisation both in the initial position and in co­
operative interactions. The principle of co-operation, fruit of the internal rationality, 
merely provides them with the object of compliance.
We must remember that for Gauthier, the contract is hypothetical and that anybody at 
any time can go through the above mental exercise. The two schemas below should help 
the reader to visualise our explanation. However, where we can accept in principle the 
possibility of such a mental exercise, it is a lot more difficult to accept the suggested 
distinction. This dual rationality seems unrealistic and unnecessary. If, individuals have 
changed their rational disposition, then the change must shine through all their choices 
and decisions whether before, during or after bargaining. Besides, we still feel that the 
relation between the proviso and the minimax relative principle has not been fully 
explained yet. The proviso has to pre-exist the principle of co-operation. Therefore its 
rationality cannot be explained using the minimax. There should be a stand alone 
rationale for the proviso. In chapter IV, we come back to this central theme.
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Core conception 5: The Archimedean point
Rationality and morality
This core conception stands out from the rest of the theory. The theory could have 
stopped at the proviso but Gauthier wanted to reconcile justice as mutual advantage 
with justice as impartiality. “From the Archimedean point one has the moral capacity to 
shape society.”170 His starting point is therefore impartiality rather than rationality. His 
ambition is to demonstrate that a rational ideal actor who has to choose the framework 
of co-operation arrives at the first four core conceptions. However, because she chooses 
from an impartial standpoint, her choice expresses the norms of justice.
We find in the Archimedean point the approach he had until 1979: he first presents his 
disagreement with Harsanyi’s average utility principle and with Rawls’ lexical 
difference principle, prior to presenting his own standpoint. As mentioned before, when 
taking this approach he arrives at the maximin relative benefit principle rather than at 
the minimax relative concession principle. However, the Archimedean point is now 
enriched with a proper ideal actor and this actor chooses not only the maximin principle 
but the proviso, the market as a morally free zone in conditions of perfect competition 
and the concept of compliance and translucency.
The ideal actor
Recall his original approach of the maximin in his Social Contract. Here was the way he 
described the bargaining position and the standpoint of choice:
“We assign an expected utility for each party to the social contract to the state of nature, 
as status quo, and to each possible society, as possible bargaining outcome.... We now 
select a rational individual at random, and attempt to present an argument that would 
convince him to agree to the adoption of any member of a particular set of principles for 
cooperative action. A similar argument must be equally convincing to any other rational 
person. Therefore the argument means that it is possible to correlate with each party to 
the social contract, a set of principles for cooperative action, any member of which the 
particular party would rationally agree to adopt. We then consider the intersection of 
these sets’ to obtain the content of the social contract.”171
170 Morals by Agreement, p 233
171 ‘The Social Contract: Individual Decision or Collective Bargain ?’ p56
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This time the individual selected at random becomes the ideal actor who has to choose a 
just society. Let’s read her description.
“The ideal actor is of course rational and generally informed, but she seeks her greatest 
utility without being aware of the particular circumstances in which she acts, the 
particular capacities with which she acts, and the particular preferences for whose 
fulfilment she acts.
But the ignorance of the ideal actor extends only to her inability to identify herself as a 
particular person within society. About the nature of the society and its members her 
knowledge is as complete as can be. She knows the limits and variations of human 
capacities and interests. She knows the range of feasible social structure, and the 
individual roles afforded by each... She chooses a society in ignorance of the life she 
will find in it, and she chooses ... only by considering the ways in which the 
preferences, capacities and circumstances can fit within the feasible societies.”172
We remember that Gauthier reproached both Harsanyi and Rawls for choosing an 
impersonal individual in the Archimedean point. For both theorists, the Archimedean 
standpoint was occupied by individuals that could not be real persons and that could not 
have preferences or capacities or circumstances to relate their preferences to. Gauthier 
insists on that very point and makes the individual in the Archimedean point an ideal 
actor, ideal because of her knowledge and actor because she is not a mere observer, or 
an emphatic sympathiser but is implicated in the actual choice among principles of 
interactions. As an actor, she is a chooser.
“Each must be able to identify with the ideal actor, so that each may recognise, in the 
choice made from the Archimedean point, the choice he could have made, had he been 
subject to the constraints in knowledge that define that point. The ideal actor must 
therefore choose, not as if she had an equal chance of being each of the person affected 
by her choice, but as if she were each of those persons.”173
We could object that if the ideal actor must choose as if she was each of us, can’t we say 
that she merely simulates the bargaining process by computing it? Instead of each of us 
defending our position, we have this ideal actor having all the relevant data to do the 
choosing job on each of our behalf. By being simultaneously each of us, she is doing, on 
her own, the job that we are each doing from our own position.
Each of us could be an ideal actor in theory. We would just have to choose a society 
amongst the feasible ones and then imagine that we are any other person selected at a
172 Morals by Agreement, p 235-6
173 Morals by Agreement, p 255
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random and ask ourselves whether, were we in her position, we would or not make the 
same choice and select the same principles. The impartiality of the ideal actor relies 
precisely on each of us being able to identify with her and agree with her choices.
The ideal actor now greatly resembles the individual selected at random of the Social 
Contract. Like him she is a utility maximiser, fully informed and she could be any and 
each of us. It is easy to see what we are getting at with our objection. If the ideal actor 
merely computes all our positions in order to choose principles of co-operation, what is 
the difference between what she does and what we have been doing up till now in the 
four previous core conceptions? Said otherwise, should it come to us as a surprise if she 
derives the same principles as we did? What extra features does she possess that could 
make the difference? Does she refer to a meta-level of rationality?
Gauthier answers this last question straight away: no, the ideal actor maximises her 
utility given her particular capacities, assets or circumstances. “There is no other level 
of rationality involved.”174
In a way, his description of the Archimedean standpoint actually rejoins our objection. 
Read:
“We may think of the Archimedean point as a point of convergence; beginning from 
individuals choosing, each from his own perspective, principles for social interaction -  
principles which will of course reflect the chooser’s concern to maximize his own utility 
-  we alter the perspectives until we find that the same principle would be chosen by all. 
Thus each person is able to place himself in the Archimedean point by considering the 
circumstances under which his choice among principles for social interaction would 
converge with the choices of his fellows.”175
When do we start to have converging choices? We start to have converging choices 
when we all aim at the same goal. Being the ideal actor in the Archimedean standpoint, 
she must achieve convergence and convergence is achieved through aiming at the 
common goal rather than at each individual’s goal (when in conflict with the common 
one).
“They [the principles of interactions] address themselves to the intent that is common to 
all... The convergence of choice in the Archimedean point achieves this, ensuring that
174 Morals by Agreement, p 256
175 Morals by Agreement, p 255
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the intent common to all will be considered and no individual intent can be 
considered,”176
That was the last element missing for the ideal actor to be fully one of us. The intent 
that is common to all is to bring about co-operation since it is mutually beneficial. We 
have just spent the last three conceptions explaining how this central idea was at the 
root of each one of them.
• In the bargaining position, parties do not bluff, threaten or lie because it would put at 
risk their chances of being part of the co-operative venture.
• The parties acquired a disposition to comply with the agreement rationally contracted 
because this agreement sets the conditions for the beneficial co-operation they all want 
and need.
• Parties who are willing to participate in the co-operative venture will also refrain from 
coercive, free riding or parasitic activities in the state of nature or compensate their 
prospective partners in co-operation if they do.
However - and we probably hold here the difference we were looking for between her 
job and ours - Gauthier insists: the ideal actor has to ensure that no individual intent can 
be considered. Said otherwise, the ideal actor is required to disregard the intent of the 
straightforward maximisers. Only the intentions of the constrained maximisers are to be 
taken into account. In this way the outcome obtained by the ideal actor will be different 
from the outcome obtained through our interactions, it will be ‘cleansed’ of individual 
players.
What principles would the ideal actor choose?
“Want for others what you want for yourself’: that could be the ideal actor’s maxim. If 
she wants benefit and freedom for herself, then she must want mutual benefit and 
freedom for all. She would reject the anarchic Hobbesian state of nature where we can 
each pursue our own interest without limits. She would choose instead the proviso 
according to which we can each pursue our own interest as long as we don’t worsen the
176 Morals by Agreement, p 256, emphasises added.
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others’ position. Once mutually accepted by a group, the proviso enables this group to 
become a society.
Given freedom constrained by the proviso a market emerges. In the absence of 
externalities and in conditions of perfect competition, the ideal actor would choose the 
market since it is the only option compatible with optimality. Any other distribution of 
costs and benefits would involve displacement of costs.
The presence of externalities leads to an outcome that is sub-optimal with respect to the 
market. Gauthier gives the example of two individuals of similar talents and energy who 
come from two different backgrounds. One would obviously do better than the other. 
Their return might correspond to their contribution to the production of goods. 
However, the structure in which they evolve is unfair “because it fails to relate benefits 
to the contributions each person would have made had each enjoyed similar 
opportunities.”177 The ideal actor, when choosing a social structure, must therefore 
ensure that no individuals benefit differentially from it. The principle chosen from the 
Archimedean point must provide that each person expects a share of the fruits of social 
interaction that is in relation to the contribution he would have made in the social 
structure most favourable to the development of his talents and capacities. To harmonise 
these contributions and express their common measure within the same social structure, 
Gauthier suggests equating it to the claim each would make on the surplus and calls it 
the maximum social benefit. In this context, the ideal actor wanting to benefit from co­
operation would choose to maximise minimum relative benefit i.e. the minimax relative 
benefit.
The only conception that cannot be chosen from the Archimedean point is constrained 
maximisation since the rationality of compliance depends on the characteristics and 
circumstances of each individuals involved in interaction. The ideal actor can only 
choose the processes that make narrow compliance rational. The hope we had earlier 
that from the Archimedean point, the intent of straightforward maximisers could be 
disregarded now collapses. We are left with nothing to distinguish the ideal actor from 
the parties to interactions.
177 Morals by Agreement, p 263
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We had been lead from chapter I to have high expectations of Gauthier’s Archimedean 
point and ideal actor. But I believe that in giving so much ‘flesh’ to his ideal actor, 
Gauthier has failed to distinguish her from the bargainers and parties to interaction 
described in the first four core conceptions. In doing so I believe that he has also failed 
to reconcile justice as mutual advantage with justice as impartiality.... unless his justice 
as mutual advantage was already embedded in impartiality.
The story is not over yet. Gauthier dedicates a full chapter to cover topics as varied as 
the problem of inequalities in natural assets, the problem of rents, inter-nation 
relationships or inter-generational problems such as inheritance or investment. But as he 
says it himself: “we embark on the present chapter in a spirit of exploration .. .ready to 
admit that, even if our theory of morals by agreement be fully acceptable, much that we 
say here must be tentative and controversial.”178 And indeed a lot of the views 
expressed in this rather less theoretical chapter are very controversial. Each of the topics 
covered could be the object of a debate in itself. To give only a couple of examples, 
Gauthier claims that factor rent should be divided among co-operators, or that an 
outsider able to make much better use of a land than its present occupiers has a right to 
settle on the land as long as he keeps the proviso and compensates the inhabitants.
I choose not to develop on any of these debates which, anyway, add nothing to the 
theory developed above. However, it is relevant to know that, according to Gauthier:
• The proviso allows for inheritance and provides room for property rights passed by 
bequest
• Investment is not only allowed but recommended as it increases the absolute value of 
the surplus from generation to generations.
178 Morals by Agreement, p 269-270
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Conclusion
We have just travelled a long way. Gauthier’s theory has taken us from pure practical 
rationality to morality. From mere utility maximisation, we have discovered the 
minimax relative concession principle, constrained maximisation and Lockean proviso. 
We have explored Gauthier’s conception of morality, justice, impartiality and 
rationality.
We remember from chapter I that Gauthier considers Hobbes as the ‘true parent of 
rational morality’. However, Gauthier also believes that Hobbes chose the wrong 
premises on the state of nature and that he failed to bring to a satisfactory completion 
the concept of rational morality. I claimed then that his own theory was primarily built 
by rectifying the double failure he found in Hobbes. I believe that Morals by Agreement 
is meant to be an improved and modernised version of the Leviathan where these two 
major weaknesses are rectified using the tools of modem moral and political 
philosophy.
I hope that this second chapter has now substantiated my claim. We have just seen how 
Gauthier replaced the Hobbesian state of nature by a Lockean one, how he replaced the 
search of self preservation by the pursuit of mutual benefit and how he has emphasised 
the difference between natural and conventional reason using the internalisation of 
conventional reason as the basis for rational morality. Has he really succeeded in 
providing a convincing theory? Has he really improved the Leviathan? The answer to 
these questions is postponed to later.
One thing is for sure: Morals by Agreement has become an unavoidable classic of 
modem moral and political philosophy. It has been extensively commented upon and 
prior to making any comments on its long lasting impacts, it is fair to turn first to the 
criticisms made of it and Gauthier’s reply to them.
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PART 2
IS GAUTHIER’S CONTRACTARIAN 
MORAL THEORY POSSIBLE?
Introduction
Morals by Agreement generated an abundant literature. At first, David Gauthier actively 
participated in the debate that followed the publication of his theory, but from 1993 
onward, he started to explore new horizons. Faithful to the idea of a contractarian moral 
theory, he first replaced his constrained maximiser with a resolute planner using 
McClennen’s concept of resoluteness. He then came back to his interpretation of 
Hobbes, modifying his initial understanding of it. Both these changes profoundly 
modified his original contractarian moral theory. However, the core idea remained the 
same: Gauthier wanted to derive morality, or at least distributive justice, from pure 
rational grounds. This second part assesses his achievement with regards to this goal, 
whether in Morals by Agreement or in the numerous articles he wrote after 1986.
The present part is organised as follows. In chapter m , I first review the debates that 
took place after the publication of Morals by Agreement and Gauthier’s reply to his 
critics. I conclude on what is left of this original version of his theory. I then develop in 
chapter IV my own criticism in the continuity of the interpretation provided in chapter 
II. I first demonstrate that Gauthier’s bargainers aren’t and cannot be straightforward 
maximisers and that they are constrained maximisers. I then evaluate the consequences 
of such a claim on Gauthier’s achievement and argue that the bargainers’ disposition 
involve a moral attitude that jeopardises his core project.
I then turn to Gauthier’s latest articles and new developments. In chapter V, I review his 
concept of a resolute planner and demonstrate against both his and McClennen’s claims, 
that sophistication is a better strategy than resoluteness in assurance games. I also argue 
that resoluteness cannot be a stand-alone rational concept. In chapter VI, I review his 
latest interpretation of Hobbes. Unsurprisingly, Gauthier looks for renewed inspiration 
in his Hobbesian background. In Chapter I, we saw how much his interpretation of the 
Leviathan influenced his research. Again, this time his original (if not controversial)
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interpretation of both Hobbes’ contractarian theory of law and concept of public reason 
will refresh his research.
From both these changes has emerged a new skimmed theory which the backbone 
remains Morals by Agreement. In chapter VII, I attempt to reconstruct the latest version 
of his contractarian moral theory. I insist on the fact that Gauthier has continued to refer 
to Morals by Agreement for the broad lines of his contractarian theory and he has never 
published any new version of it. The reconstruction drafted in the last chapter is only a 
suggestion of what his latest theory could be, based on the acknowledged shortcomings 
of Morals by Agreement and his latest publications. I conclude that this latest version 
carries the same weakness as the one highlighted in chapter IV: in assuming a change of 
rationality, Gauthier introduces morality at the outset of the agreement.
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CHAPTER IH: GAUTHIER AND HIS CRITICS
Gauthier’s theory has been extensively commented on and criticised.179 David Gauthier 
initially defended Morals by Agreement, but the theory so perfectly articulated in 
Morals by Agreement had almost entirely collapsed by 1993. Indeed Gauthier had to 
give up on most of his assumptions (equal rationality and mutual unconcern) as well as 
on most of his core conceptions. The market as a morally free zone was proven to be 
sustained by morality, the minimum relative concession principle did not resist the 
game theorists’ attacks and constrained maximisation was challenged by McClennen’s 
concept of resoluteness. Gauthier expressed some doubts about the Lockean proviso 
further to comments about its fairness. The only core conception that is still standing is 
the Archimedean point.180
From 1993 onwards, Gauthier stopped defending his masterpiece and started to 
concentrate on two new fields of research: firstly, the concepts of resoluteness, rational 
deliberation and rational commitment; secondly, the more practical application in 
politics of his work on individual rationality and commitment.
It would have been almost impossible to mention all the objections made against Morals 
by Agreement. I have made a selection and have chosen to present arguments that either 
contribute to explaining where and why Gauthier failed or arguments that could be 
adapted to fit into current debates.
179 These criticisms and comments are to be found primarily in the following publications:
+ In 1987, Ethics was the first journal to react to Morals by Agreement with a symposium on David Gauthier.
+ In 1988, the revue Social Philosophy and Policy dedicated a full volume to Gauthier’s New Social Contract. 
The same articles were edited the same year by Paul, Miller and Ahrens in The new Social Contract: Essays on 
David Gauthier.
+ In the same year again, The Canadian Journal of Philosophy published a symposium on Morals by 
Agreement.
+ Contractarianism and Rational Choice from P. Vallentyne is an excellent selection of essays on Morals by 
Agreement. It was initially published in 1991.
+ In 1993, Gauthier co-edited with Robert Sugden Rationality, Justice and the Social Contract.
+ Morris & Ripstein Practical Rationality & Preference: Essays for David Gauthier was published in 2001 and 
is the most recent publication on the topic.
180 Quotes and references on this paragraph’s statements are obviously provided in the body of this chapter.
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Twenty years after it was first published, one can wonder what is left of Gauthier’s 
classic. In this chapter, we will review the debates that have taken place around Morals 
by Agreement, assumption by assumption, core conception by core conception. The only 
core conception that we will not review is the Archimedean point since it has hardly 
been commented on. In conclusion, I review what is left of Morals by Agreement. 
Surprisingly, despite the apparent collapsing of his theory, its core ideas are still very 
much alive. Even if his approach has changed, Gauthier continues to defend the 
concepts of hypothetical contract, rational morality and morality as constrained 
behaviour. Prior to developing on the criticisms made of Morals by Agreement, it seems 
appropriate to open this chapter with some comments on Gauthier’s moral theory.
About Gauthierfs moral theory
Morals by Agreement applies to cool rational adults who can contribute something to 
society ... that leaves out a good fringe of the population! What type of morality does 
he obtain and does it have anything to do with morality anymore? The following quotes 
draw a very good picture of what is reproached in Gauthier’s theory.
A. Baier writes: “His morality ... simply drops a very large section of what has 
traditionally passed as morality”181. We saw in chapter I that Gauthier is not worried 
about reconciling his morality with traditional morality. However, the objection is a lot 
deeper. Baier continues:
“He had already made it clear that any commitment to care for the handicapped and 
dependent elderly is not one of the constraints of his modest morality182 - those who 
never had or no longer have anything left to bring to the moral bazaars and markets are 
to get nothing from them, on pain of the charge of parasitism or free ridership.”183
Similarly, J. Hampton argues that Gauthier’s theory doesn’t capture the nature of 
morality but she diagnoses it differently:
“regardless of whether or not one can engage in beneficial cooperative interactions with 
another, one owes that person respectful treatment simply in virtue of the fact that he is 
a person. Not all value is subjective; in particular, the value which human beings have is 
objective, and demands one’s respect, whether that human being is an infant with whom
181 ‘Pilgrim’s progress’, p 326
182 See Morals by Agreement, p 268
183 ‘Pilgrim’s progress’, p 327
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one will never have reason to cooperate, an elderly man past his prime, or an adult 
whose talents one finds of no particular use. It is because Gauthier does not assume that 
human beings have an objective worth that he sometimes gets unintuitive and 
unacceptable results in his moral theorising.”184
D. Braybrooke raises a similar issue but expands it beyond the level of human beings: 
“Gauthier’s contract, like the morality entailed by it, leaves out of account people who 
are not in a position to contribute to producing any part of the cooperative surplus.” If a 
rich nation has nothing to gain from cooperating with a poorer nation, do we have to 
understand that it is moral for the rich nation not to interact with the poorer one? “Many 
(I among them) will feel that this possibility of indifference -  or of worse -  toward other 
people is an enormous limitation on the morality that here emerges from the deduction 
project.” We shall comment on the assumption of mutual unconcern later. We just want 
to emphasise here the point made by Braybrooke. “Why should we think that all that 
any of us want to find in morality or justice will be put there by reason alone?”185 
Where Hampton diagnosed a wrong account of value, Braybrooke explains Gauthier’s 
counter-intuitive and limited morality by the cool and sole use of rationality. We are not 
mere rational machines. We feel as well as we think.
We saw before that Gauthier clearly puts a distance between conventional morality and 
his rationally derived morality. This poses a problem: his moral theory cannot be tested 
since, in his view, the truth of moral judgements is not known independently of the
1 QAplausibility of the moral theory. This means that Gauthier cannot afford to rely on 
non-demonstrated or non-ascertained assumptions or conceptions. Everything the theory 
rests on has to be proven or at least generally accepted. As we shall now see, Gauthier is 
no way near such an achievement.
184 ‘Can We Agree on Morals?’, p 352
185 ‘Contract Theory’s Fanciest Flight’, p 756
186 See C. Morris ‘Relation Between Self-interest and Justice’, pl30-131
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Section 1: The main assumptions and the concept of coherent and considered 
preferences
The assumption of equal rationality
“I should admit ... that were I to become convinced that an appeal to equal rationality 
was either a concealed moral appeal, or inadmissible on some other ground, then I
1517should have to abandon much of the core argument of Morals By Agreement .”
David Gauthier, 1988
“The appeal to equal rationality is part of the flawed argument that I am now 
persuaded I must abandon.”188 David Gauthier, 1993
Why is the assumption of equal rationality so essential to Morals by Agreement? And 
why does Gauthier have to abandon it?
The importance o f the assumption of equal rationality
As we saw in chapter n, the assumption of equal rationality supports most of the core 
conceptions.
1- Equal rationality is one of the conditions on rational bargaining. Since each utility 
maximiser seeks to minimise her concession, then no one can expect any other rational 
person to be willing to make concessions that she would not be willing to make
1 fiQherself. The minimum relative concession principle is entirely dependent on this 
assumption.
2- Equal rationality prevents bluffing and threatening in bargaining between fully 
informed individuals. No one would make a threat or attempt to bluff. Being fully
187 ‘Morality, Rational Choice, and Semantic Representation’, p 186
188 ‘Uniting Separate Persons’, p 180
189 Morals by Agreement, p 143-144
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informed, no one would believe anyone who claims that she will act in a non-utility 
maximising way.190
3- Equal rationality is indispensable to support his defence of narrow compliance 
against broad compliance. It cannot be rational for everyone to be disposed to broad 
compliance. If it is not rational for everyone, it is not rational for anyone. On the 
contrary, a rational person finds it rational to comply given the minimum relative 
concession principle and the proviso. She expects others to adhere to the agreement and, 
given equal rationality, considers it rational to adhere herself.191
4- Equal rationality is the foundation of Gauthier’s concept of justice: “We do claim that 
justice, the disposition not to take advantage of one’s fellows, is the virtue appropriate 
to co-operation, voluntarily accepted by equally rational persons. Morals arise in and 
from the rational agreement of equals.”192
5- Gauthier uses the assumption of equal rationality to show that rationality requires us 
to accept constraints which apply impartially to all of us. The assumption obviously 
backs up the concept of Archimedean point. The ideal chooser providing the impartial 
standpoint must assume the equal rationality of the agents.193
Objections to this controversial assumption
G. Harman was the first one to react to the assumption of equal rationality. In substance, 
he made the two following points. Firstly, he argued that equal rationality does not 
mean equal bargaining power. Unless equal bargaining power means that each adopts 
the same attitude toward any given level of relative concession, equal rationality cannot 
imply equal relative concession.194 Secondly, he questioned the validity of the equation 
between equal rationality and equal compliance. Equal rationality cannot mean similar 
psychology or situation of those involved and therefore cannot be a relevant assumption 
for real people in the real world.195
190 Morals by Agreement, p 155
191 Morals by Agreement, p 226
192 Morals by Agreement, p 232
193 Morals by Agreement, p 235
194 ‘Rationality in Agreement’, p 6-7
195 ‘Rationality in Agreement’, p 9-10 and 14
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The first point was taken over by R. Goodin196. His argument is that the assumption of 
equal rationality insidiously introduces impartiality in the premises. Like Harman, he 
claims that equal rationality does not mean equal bargaining power. Real people in the 
real world have different tastes and different resources.
A collector can be prepared to pay a disproportionate amount for an item missing in his 
collection. Given his taste, it is perfectly rational to make a relatively bigger concession 
than the seller on the price of the item. Similarly, it is perfectly rational for people with 
lesser resources to make greater concessions than richer people. The only difference 
between the collector and the poor is that the poor concedes relatively more out of 
necessity not out of desire. Bargainers who are better endowed can last longer in a 
bargain and hold a stronger position. Someone with lower resources can settle for a less 
advantageous bargain not because she is less rational but because she has more to lose if 
she doesn’t. Differing attitudes towards risks lead perfectly rational people to make very 
unequal relative concessions. Attitudes towards risk are not a matter of personal tastes 
or personality: for those who have less, it is rational to be reluctant to take risks.
In all these cases, ‘preferences’ for greater concessions are rational with regards to the
bargainers’ particular taste or situation. These ‘preferences’ are forced upon them.
“The effect of such preferences, once people have internalised them, is to make it 
rational for agents to behave in the ways described. If it works to their relative 
disadvantage in bargaining games to have these preferences, then that is just their bad 
luck... But a model that commends this course of action can hardly be said to be 
‘morally impartial’ as between rich and poor.”197
A very similar argument could be built up against the assumption of equal rationality 
with regards to compliance. Equal rationality does not mean equal interest in 
compliance. It does not mean either that there is a unique degree of compliance which is
1QCrationally prescribed Even if we can all see the rationality in complying with 
mutually advantageous rules, not all rules are equally important to each of us. The father 
of young children has probably a lot more interest in the compliance of all with road 
rules than a bachelor. He has a lot more too lose if these laws are not kept. As Harman
196 ‘Equal Rationality and Initial Endowment’, p 119 -122
197 ‘Equal Rationality and Initial Endowment’, p 122
198 See R. Sugden’s ‘Is the Contractarian Enterprise Possible?’ for a good defence of this argument.
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labels it, real people have different psychologies and are in different situations. The 
bachelor might find these rules a bit boring and useless. The father looks at them as 
essential to his children’s safety.
As we saw at the beginning of this section, Gauthier abandons the assumption of equal 
rationality in 1993.
The assumption of mutual unconcern and morality
Many have commented that the assumption of mutual unconcern is false and does not 
correspond to reality: emotions and affectivity do enter into our preferences and can 
play a role in co-operation199. We do care about our family and about our friends. Our 
concern for them does affect our preferences. Our emotions can sometimes move us in 
favour of co-operation naturally without any rational grounding. Our feelings can affect 
our motivations at the bargaining table.200The assumption leaves all these human 
aspects aside. In doing so, it fails to connect the theory to reality and precludes an 
accurate description of ‘real’ or ‘true’ preferences. Such a false assumption introduces a 
damaging bias into a contractarian theory based on bargaining and involving real people 
in their real life situation.
To understand the nature of the objection, let us make a litde detour by Morals by 
Agreement to see how Gauthier introduces this assumption.
Gauthier does not deny that we do exhibit a concern for people close to us but our 
positive fellow feelings are restricted to a very limited circle of individuals. He seems to 
imply that therefore the impact of such fellow feelings is necessarily limited. Since in
the vast majority of cases, co-operation involves people we don’t know and therefore
001we don’t care about, the assumption is an adequate simplification of reality.
199 See A. Baier in ‘Pilgrim’s progress’ (‘Our actual psychology diverges importantly from that required of 
the hypothetical progenitors of Gauthier’s liberal individual.’ p 326). See also C. Morris in ‘Relation 
Between Self-interest and Justice’, p 129, L. Thomas ‘Rationality and Affectivity’ or P. Vallentyne 
‘Contractarianism and the Assumption of Mutual Unconcern’, p 72
200 P. Vallentyne, ‘Contractarianism and the Assumption of Mutual Unconcern’, p 73
201 Morals by Agreement, p 100-101
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His argument actually goes further. This assumption is not a mere simplification. It is 
made necessary by the very fact that our fellow feelings are so restricted in scope. We 
cannot rely on such feelings to build up a moral theory and therefore we are lead to 
assume a lack of mutual concern if we want to free the theory from marginal and partial 
cases. The assumption makes possible a broader application of the theory202.
Nevertheless, in his enthusiasm, Gauthier then turns the argument:
“We shall show that moral constraint is not only compatible with mutual unconcern, but 
indeed rationally required given this unconcern and the typical structures of interaction. 
Thus we propose to defend the liberating idea of a society that imposes no affective 
bonds on its member.”203
The starting point is no longer reality and the existence of acknowledged human 
affective bonds, but rather what is expected from and for a moral theory. Unconcern is a 
given data. Morality must not depend on affection, so it speaks to reason rather than to 
contingent emotions and feelings.204
As if the above was not enough, Gauthier turns to Kant to justify the assumption. Kant, 
he claims, insists that morality cannot depend on such particular psychological 
phenomena however humane and however universal.205
Most of the objectors strongly contested Gauthier’s reference to Kant . Kant can 
assume mutual unconcern within his theoretical framework, but Gauthier’s use of 
rationality is instrumental and such an assumption is out of place in his theory. What 
about Gauthier’s other arguments in favour of the assumption of mutual unconcern? 
Unconvincing they say!
Can we use it as a simplifying assumption? No. The most compelling reason suggested 
against this argument was provided by C. Morris. Indeed, he claims that what is 
simplified is the complexity of interests in each others’ interests which in itself is
202 Morals by Agreement, p 102
203 Morals by Agreement, p 102
204 Morals by Agreement, p 238
205 Morals by Agreement, p 103 or p 238
206 See for example P. Vallentyne in ‘Contractarianism and the Assumption of Mutual Unconcern’, p 72-3 
or C. Morris in ‘Relation Between Self-interest and Justice’ p 127-8
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morally relevant.207. Gauthier wants to exclude morality from his premises in order to 
derive morality from exclusively rational grounds. However, this assumption of mutual 
unconcern introduces a major flaw in this strategy. In denying the existence of positive 
(love or care) as well as negative (envy, hatred or spite) feelings, it eliminates one of the 
major threats to morality in human nature. The assumption is not only false it also 
introduces a moral bias in the outcome of the theory. The bias runs from the outcome of 
bargaining through compliance with it. Out of love or hatred, I can bargain against my 
interest or fail to comply with an agreed norm.
More worrying is the fact that some will exploit others by using their feelings. Gauthier 
claims that in assuming that we are unconcerned, we can re-assess on purely rational 
grounds some of our existing practices as well as those relationships involving 
affections. The morality obtained can then be freed from inherited conventional 
norms.208 Therefore, for the purpose of evaluation, we are entitled to refer to mutual 
unconcern. Such an argument obviously seems appealing and could address some of the 
feminist’s concerns. Morris objects that such an option is not open to Gauthier who 
refers to a subjective account of value.209 Indeed, such an account of value denies any 
relation of priority amongst preferences. In particular, self-interested preferences are not 
given priority over other-regarding preferences. However, for a successful evaluation, 
one must assume that these premises have an evaluative priority over the conclusion. 
Without appealing to objective value, no priority relation can be sustained.
In response to these objections, Gauthier argues that moral loading of the assumption 
would have to be positive rather than by default. After all, he is not suggesting that the 
preferences should have a moral content (such as an appeal to just behaviour in 
preferences). As such the assumption of mutual unconcern could be removed if its sole 
purpose was to constrain individual preferences. “It is important to show that the 
argument for morality is compatible with persons having strictly nontuistic preferences, 
but to do this, we need not assume that our preferences are in fact predominantly 
nontuistic.”210
207 See C. Morris, ‘Relation Between Self-interest and Justice', p 129
208 See Morals by Agreement, p 351
209 See C. Morris, ‘Relation Between Self-interest and Justice, ppl42-144
210 See ‘Morality, Rational Choice and Semantic Representation’, p 215-216
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Gauthier is more concerned by the second level of Morris’ objection. He agrees that his 
account of value does limit his use of the assumption of mutual unconcern. He therefore 
suggests revising the role of the assumption in his theory. The assumption is now 
provided with a forward-looking justification that strikingly resembles the justification 
of the proviso. Individuals choose their practices and institutions based on their 
nontuistic preferences but with the prospect of benefiting later from such preferences as 
long as others do the same. Once the agreement is made, individuals are free to act upon 
their tuistic preferences as long as they fit into the institutions chosen.211 In order to 
address Morris’s objection, Gauthier is led to prioritise preferences. Such a modification 
is not without consequences for two of his concepts: considered preferences and 
subjective value. Let us illustrate with an example the problem posed by this revised 
account.
In my younger days, I was a dedicated student. One evening I was preparing for an 
exam that I had to sit on the next day. My plan was to read all my notes once more and 
go to bed for an early night. I was reading when a heart broken friend knocked at my 
door seeking comfort. What was I suppose to do? Let her in and comfort her, running 
the risk of a late night, no revision and therefore failed exam or send her back home 
with her sorrow but with a chance for me to better perform at the exam on the next day? 
It was her interest against mine. My considered preference was to comfort her. I valued 
more a state of affair in which she would stay but with a risk for me of failing my exam 
on the next day to a state of affair in which I would send her off but with a higher 
chance of passing my exam on the next day. I had reflected enough on my preference. 
Based on past experience, I knew that, if I were to send her home straight away, I would 
feel a sense of guilt on the next day that would impede my concentration at the exam 
anyway. Gauthier’s revised account does not allow for such considered preferences.
In 1991, he modifies his views once more. Originally he defined morality as a rational 
constraint on the pursuit of individual interest. In 1991, he acknowledges that such a 
formulation is misleading. “I want to defend morality as a rational constraint on the 
pursuit of one’s aims and objectives, whether or not these objectives have any 
connection with one’s interest or one’s personal well-being.” The formal aim of a
211 See ‘Morality, Rational Choice and Semantic Representation’, p 216
212 ‘Rational Constraint: Some last Words’, p 323
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rational individual becomes the maximum realisation of her substantive aims. We shall 
come back later to this new concept of substantive aim and its impact on the theory. For 
the moment, we just need to note that, in effect, this new formulation of morality 
amounts to a removal of the assumption of mutual unconcern.
Our emotions and feelings do affect our preferences. So does our environment. Now, we 
need to turn to another sort of issue raised by our affective bonds and emotions. I call it 
the circularity problem.
The circularity problem and rationality of considered preferences
Gauthier acknowledged that we have emotions and feelings that could enter in our 
preferences but already in 1988 suggested channelling them towards co-operation and 
framing them within rational agreement:
“In my argument, preferences are fixed... as objects of rational reflection and then 
dispositions are defined in relation to them. But what if these dispositions are 
themselves objects of preference? ...I must allow for the possibility of such preferences 
... for since human beings have, in addition to beliefs and desires, emotions that affect 
their willingness and ability to behave in different ways, the cultivation of appropriate 
feelings for our fellows may be essential to inducing behaviour that is maximally 
conductive to mutual preference fulfilment. The cultivation of appropriate fellow 
feelings thus becomes a suitable object of rational agreement.”213
With such a statement, Gauthier leaves us with a new issue. What comes first: the 
change in our preference or the bargaining from a pre-social position? Do we bargain 
with brand new preferences cautiously acquired by appropriate cultivation of our 
feelings for others or do we have to agree first on which preference to acquire and then 
cultivate? I shall call this problem the circularity problem. As Harman suggests: 
“Gauthier abstracts away from the actual dynamic character of human convention... 
Surely in real life it is not possible to separate cooperating from bargaining.”214
Gauthier is aware of this circularity problem but he continues to argue in favour of the 
hypothetical contract. In his opinion, a theory based on a hypothetical contract can still 
be used in an on-going society. As a theoretical tool, it enables us to step back and
213 ‘Moral Artifice’, p 401
214 G. Harman, ‘Rationality in Agreement’, p 13-14
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reflect on the society we live in. When assessing our existing institutions and practice 
we can decide whether it is rational to maintain them or preferable to change them. 215 
Gauthier continues: “The same reflective capacity, I claim, leads from those principles 
that would be agreed to, in existing social circumstances, to those that would receive ex- 
ante agreement, prior to all society.”216
This defence of the hypothetical contract only confirms the circularity problem met by
his concept of coherent and considered preferences. If we assess our practices and
institutions from within, our considered preferences are necessarily influenced by our
environment and our existing system of evaluation. As C. Morris notes:
“A choice would not be a fundamental evaluation of the institution, for its standards are 
not independent of the domain of evaluation. For a rational choice evaluation of a social 
practice or system to be fundamental the preferences are to be more than coherent and 
considered. They must also be independent of the practice or system. In the absence of 
such independence, all that can be shown by rational choice is that the preferences are, 
broadly speaking, consistent with the practice or system.” 217
It seems that to maintain his claim, Gauthier is forced to take a Rawlsian turn:
“rational persons will revert from actual to hypothetical agreement, considering what 
principles they would have agreed to from an initial position not structured by arbitrary 
constraints... Once awareness of what persons would have agreed to apart from the 
arbitrary contingencies of actual society, becomes known, existing institutions and 
practices in contravention of those agreements will be destabilised.”21
In such a defence, Gauthier is forced to move away from his initial description of real 
people bargaining from their situation in real life. Individuals are now required to decide 
not only on the way to distribute the co-operative surplus but also on which society they 
want to live in. They have to agree on social practices and institutions. In order to be 
able to do so, they are required to abstract from their social contingencies, abstract from 
any received models or values and use exclusively their rational skills.
Such a move seems incompatible with his theory of bargaining. Either the reflective 
choosers are real people influenced by their practices and institutions in which case their 
considered preferences are biased or they are choosing from behind a sort of veil of
215 See ‘Morality, rational Choice and Semantic Representation’, p 179 -182
216 ‘Morality, rational Choice and Semantic Representation’, p 184
217 C. Morris ‘Relation Between Self-interest and Justice’, p 140.
218 ‘Morality, rational Choice and Semantic Representation’, p 185
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ignorance in which case Gauthier has to work his way down a Kantian theory of justice. 
The instrumental rationality referred to in these cases is not the same.
91 0A. Weale raised a similar issue in his 1993 article . In this article, he argues that 
Gauthier presents us with a theory of social union (involving some common final ends 
between its members) to be reconciled with the separateness of persons. In attempting 
this reconciliation, Gauthier ends up blurring the type of instrumental rationality he 
refers to. Indeed, common ends or some social norms and institutions become the 
condition for individual rationality rather than a derivative from it: it is rational to 
conform to these norms and institutions if one wants to benefit from the cooperative 
surplus.
‘It would seem that the only conception of rationality capable of moving individuals to 
conformity in this context is not one that rests upon the practical advantages of 
individual conformity, but is one which instead appeals to the rationality of being able 
to will only that which could be rationally willed by all. Whether Durkheim and Kant 
can be so invoked to succeed where Hobbes and the theory of games fail is of course an 
open question’220
If Gauthier wants his theory to apply to real people in real life situations, he has to take 
on board some aspects of human psychology in describing their preferences: people do 
care about each others (or at least some others) and they are influenced by their 
environment. This double influence from our emotions and from our environment 
obviously raises a difficult question about the rationality of our preferences.
Considered preferences are based on sufficient and adequate experience and reflection. 
K. Baier notes that all we can say is that considered preferences are the fruit of careful
991reasoning but if based on false beliefs, they can be irrational. Preferences based on 
eccentric or brain washed beliefs are prime candidate for irrationality.222
In response to this objection, Gauthier re-emphasises two points. Firstly, he reminds us 
that considered preferences are attitudinal preferences. If one fails to behave according 
to the outcome of one’s adequate reflection, it is a case of weakness of will. Coherent 
and considered preferences are those preferences for which attitude and behaviour are
219 ‘Justice, Social Union and the Separateness of Persons’.
220 ‘Justice, Social Union and the Separateness of Persons’, pp 93-94
221 See ‘Rationality, Value and Preference’, pp 37-40
222 See also J. Fishkin, ‘Bargaining, Justice and Justification’, p 54-55 for a similar point. Fishkin calls it the 
indoctrination problem.
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coherent. Secondly, he insists on the self-critical dimension of practical rationality. 
Rational persons subject their preferences to reflective assessment. Indoctrinated or 
brainwashed people have preferences which are not autonomous and therefore cannot 
be ‘considered’ in Gauthier’s sense.223
Can we be satisfied with such a defence? I am not. I believe that we are all brainwashed 
whether by the media or by our politicians or religious leaders. What is ‘rational’ in 
France can be completely ‘irrational’ in Korea or in Jordan or even in the United 
States224. Real individuals are framed by their language, social background or political 
system. It is an illusion to believe that their preferences, even considered, are 
autonomous. At best we can be aware of our lack of autonomy but, even if we are, we 
meet two difficulties. The first one is to be aware of the full extent of the influence 
exerted over us. The second one is to exercise enough imagination to step back and 
reflect on what we really want.
In earlier days, Gauthier acknowledged that social contract theory was framed in 
Western ideology.225 If he can accept that we are influenced by our cultural and 
historical background, how can he claim that we can have autonomous preferences and 
be able of self critical assessment? Now, if he believes that it is possible to educate 
preferences so our emotions and feelings can enhance co-operation, his theory needs to 
be amended.
223 ‘Morality, Rational Choice and Semantic Representation’, p 191-195
224 Have you ever tried to explain French labour laws to an American citizen? I have. She thought we were 
mad.
225 See ‘Social Contract as Ideology’.
138
Section 2: The market as a morally free zone
This core conception is marginal in Gauthier’s theory and, as such, it has been hardly 
commented upon. The main comments were about the following ambiguous quote from 
Morals by Agreement that caught our attention in chapter II:
“The absence of force and fraud is essential to the workings of the market. Before 
Smith’s invisible hand can do its work, Hobbes’s war of every man against every man 
must first be exorcised. And this, as we shall see, means that the ideal of free 
interactions which Smith celebrates is not natural but artificial, arising, for rational 
persons, only within a framework of agreed constraints. In understanding the perfect 
market as a morally free zone we shall be led back to its underlying, antecedent 
morality.”226
Most commentators who showed an interest in this core conception noted this 
ambiguity. If the market is a morally free zone, how are we to understand that it has an 
underlying antecedent morality? The answer was unanimous: the market is not a 
morally free zone.227
One could defend this quote as follows. Gauthier had just explained that there is no such 
thing in real life as the perfect market. What Smith describes as the perfect market is 
only what Gauthier calls cooperative interactions. The perfect market being unrealistic, 
the nearest approximation or realistic simulation is agreed co-operation. Gauthier’s 
subsequent theory is dedicated to explaining how such an agreed co-operation possesses 
‘underlying antecedent morality’. The last sentence could therefore read, ‘in 
understanding the failure of the perfect market to exist and function as a morally free 
zone, we shall be led back to understanding how morality needs to be introduced to 
allow the existence and the functioning of its nearest simulation (i.e. agreed co­
operation).’ The above was my initial understanding of it.
Nevertheless, on closer examination, this interpretation does not hold. Gauthier 
distinguishes between market activity and co-operative interactions implying that the 
market regulates private goods transactions and agreed co-operation regulates public
226 Morals by Agreement p 85.
227 See for example P. Danielson’s ‘The Visible Hand of Morality’, p 367 who claims that at best, the 
market can be described as a co-operation free zone, D. Braybrooke’s ‘Contract Theory’s Fanciest Flight’, 
p 757-760, K. Baier’s ‘Rationality, Value and Preference’, footnote 2, p 18 or J. Buchanan’s ‘The Gauthier 
Enterprise’, p 89-91.
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goods’ ones.228 Such a distinction is not sustainable. Any transactions whether on 
private or public goods is supported by rules, laws and institutions. “Individual rights 
must be guaranteed; contracts must be enforced; fraud in exchange must be 
prevented...market relationship offers the exemplar of rational morality, rather than a 
morally free zone”.229
The social contract must apply to all types of transactions. In keeping private goods out 
of the social scope, two issues are left unattended. Firstly, Gauthier does not provide a 
principle for dividing the utilities obtained by agreed co-operation from utilities 
obtained by the free running of the market. Secondly, if co-operation is constrained, 
utilities received through the market might increase, thus raising the issue of distributing 
market’s benefits.230
Gauthier rapidly seized the problem. In 1988, he wrote
“I now think that choice of the market, as of other determinate principles and 
institutions, cannot be shown to follow from a consideration simply of the reasoning of 
the Archimedean chooser, but depends on information about the determinate effects of 
differing possible ways of organizing social and economic life. She views society as “a 
single co-operative enterprise” , but in so viewing it, she does not view the market 
in isolation as I supposed her to in chapter. VIII.4.3.”231
Having conceded that much, Gauthier is still reluctant to completely let go his concept 
of the market as a morally free zone. In replying to Buchanan, he is very vague about 
the extent of his concession. He only concludes:
“For we may suppose that morality replaces the forcibly imposed external constraints ... 
by voluntarily accepted internal constraints that ... open up an area, albeit limited, of 
genuine freedom, this area being of course the market... He [Buchanan] and I can agree 
that it is unfortunate that so much recent thought and practice has been devoted to 
inventing new ways in which pervasive and overriding political direction can be alleged 
to be necessary after all.”232
This passage is difficult to understand. I believe that the only sustainable interpretation 
of Gauthier’s position about the market is now as follows. He accepts that agents must 
internalise some constraints in order to interact successfully on the market. From this
228 See for example ‘Moral Artifice’, p 394
229 J. Buchanan’ s ‘The Gauthier Enterprise’, p 89
230 These issues were raised by D. Braybrooke in ‘Contract Theory’s Fanciest Flight’. The first one is on p 
757 and the second one on p 758
231 ‘Moral Artifice’, p 414
232 ‘Morality, Rational Choice and Semantic Representation’, p 204
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point of view, market interactions are no different from co-operative ones. Internalised - 
and therefore moral - constraints must back the market. However, in the absence of 
these moral constraints, political solutions have been put in place. In any case, the 
market can no longer be considered as a morally free zone.
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Section 3: Theory of bargaining and Minimum Relative Concession Principle
In this section, I will give an overview of the objections raised against the minimum 
relative concession principle (MRC hereafter) prior to developing on Gauthier’s latest 
view. Gauthier’s bargaining theory has left many commentators perplexed. Vallentyne 
argues that it is best understood as a consensus theory233. 1 personally believe that it is 
best understood as a bargaining theory but between constrained maximisers. I develop 
this argument in chapter IV. Most of the objections below hardly moved Gauthier. The 
only one that eventually made him surrender was the attacks from ‘orthodox’ game 
theorists as exemplified by K. Binmore.234
MRC and fairness
Many commentators have objected that the MRC relied on a pre-conception of fairness.
We raised that issue in chapter II §2, CC2. Hampton argues as follows:
“The mushiness of our intuitions on these matters gives us good reason to turn to a 
contractarian methodology in the hopes that it will persuasively single out a unique 
distributive principle. Gauthier insists that this methodology singles out the MRC 
principle, but my argument against the MRC principle suggests that this contract 
language only disguises an implicit appeal to our intuitions about fairness.... Depending 
on what intuitions one has, one will prefer a certain method of reward, and it is easy to 
imagine (and define) contractors in a hypothetical contract situation who share these 
intuitions and preferences. But such imagining hardly counts as proof.”235
Gauthier’s reply on this issue is rather blunt: “MRC may or may not have intuitive 
appeal, but its defence is to be found not in moral intuitions, but in an analysis of 
rational bargaining.”236 Is MRC’s defence to be found in an analysis of rational 
bargaining? I am not the only one to think that it is not.
As argued above, his conception of rational bargaining is already morally loaded. 
Gauthier explains: “[a]ny distribution of the surplus is advantageous, and an equal 
distribution reflects their equal bargaining power in reaching agreement.”237 Gauthier 
assumes (or even ensures) that the parties to bargaining have equal bargaining power
233 See ‘Gauthier’s three projects’, footnote 9 p 5
234 A. Rubinstein’s ‘Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model’ and K. Binmore’s ‘Bargaining and Morality’
235 ‘Can We Agree on Morals?’ p 338. J. Mendola makes a very similar comment in ‘Two kinds of 
Rationality’, p 772-773.
236 ‘Moral Artifice’, p 394
237 ‘Moral Artifice’, p 392
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and MRC naturally follows from it. However, to assume equal bargaining power is to 
skip a full aspect of bargaining, it is to miss out on what makes bargaining so 
unpredictable. More than anything it is contrary to reality. To be mutually advantageous 
does not necessarily imply that needs are identically reciprocal. As we saw above, the 
division of the surplus depends on many factors such as the bargainers’ particular 
circumstances, bargaining skills and/or respective concession thresholds.
Similarly, P. Danielson claims: Gauthier “defends a principle of rational bargaining, 
against the widely held conviction that bargaining situations admit of no strictly rational 
solution.”238 There is very little rationale involved in how bargainers split the surplus. 
G. Harman argues in the same direction. He claims that in identifying MRC as the 
unique bargaining solution, Gauthier probably means that MRC is the most salient 
solution. If it is so, he makes two points. Firstly, saliency appeals to psychological 
rather than rational factors. Secondly, what is salient to one person might not be salient 
to another. In any case, MRC is not determined by the rationality of the participants, 
contrary to Gauthier’s arguments.239
About MRC and fairness, Kraus and Coleman also raised a very different issue. They 
argued that unfair bargains are not always unstable and that some unfair bargains are 
rational.240 We shall come back to that point later when discussing the proviso.
MRC and the number of players.
MRC is perfectly meaningful in two-person interactions, but problems arise once the 
number of persons interacting increases. We can identify three categories of problems: 
alternative coalitions, non cooperative behaviour and information required.
About alternative coalition
J. Hampton first raised the issue of alternative coalitions: “the rational solution to a 
bargain depends not only upon how much each could get by herself but also upon how
238 ‘The visible Hand of Morality’, p 359
239 G. Harman, ‘Rationality in Agreement’, p 8
240 See ‘Morality and the Theory of Rational Choice’, p 726 -730. Harman makes a similar point in 
‘Rationality in Agreement’, p 11 -12
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much each could get if she joined alternative coalitions.”241 Why should individuals be 
prevented from forming alternative cooperative coalitions? Why should there be only 
one societal investment opportunity for each individual? Such a restriction cannot 
conceal the fact that even within one society people have multiple cooperative 
opportunities.
Gauthier admits that in general, in multi-person interactions, there is a problem in
949determining the appropriate cooperative infrastructure. However, he claims elsewhere
9 4 9that usually community bonds flourish naturally (historically or otherwise). He also 
admits that the contribution of each person to the overall cooperative surplus is not 
always easily discerned. Although he acknowledges the difficulty of applying MRC to 
multi-person interactions, he sees “no reason to doubt that an appropriate multi-stage 
application of MRC offers a satisfactory resolution.”244
About non cooperative behaviour
Gauthier dismisses as easily Buchanan’s double objection regarding the set of players 
and non co-operative behaviour. Firstly, Buchanan notes that co-operative behaviour is 
not all inclusive. Two firms could co-operate and create a duopoly to the disadvantage 
of consumers.245 Similarly, we know that rich countries co-operate and do fix the price 
of commodities to their advantage. Their co-operation is mutually advantageous but 
detrimental to poorer countries. Gauthier answers: “Given that several persons can, by 
interacting, achieve a cooperative surplus, cooperative behaviour has value for them. 
That it may have disvalue in relation to other persons need not be worrying.”246 He 
continues by reminding us that, after all, it is not advantageous to society if the 
prisoners co-operate in the famous prisoners’ dilemma. Once again, Gauthier is not 
bothered with the normative significance of his theory neither does he worry about its 
compatibility with conventional morality.
‘Can We Agree on Morals?’, p 342
242 ‘Moral Artifice’, p 397
243 ‘Morality, Rational Choice and Semantic Representation’, p 204-205
244 ‘Moral Artifice’, p 398
245 ‘The Gauthier Enterprise’, p 76-79
246 ‘Morality, Rational Choice and Semantic Representation’, p 204-205
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Secondly, Buchanan argues (but does not demonstrate) that the bigger the number of 
players, the less likely the prospect of co-operative behaviour. “In order for the Gauthier 
rule to dictate continued adherence to a cooperative strategy as numbers in the 
interaction increase, the probability of any one player adopting the co-operative strategy 
must increase, which seems to counter common-sense notions about the way persons 
behave.”247 To this argument Gauthier responds that community bonds flourish 
naturally (historically or otherwise). Within these boundaries, the theory does not 
require universal but only widespread compliance. If the moral practice is mutually 
advantageous, widespread compliance is realistic to expect.
Personally, I am absolutely not convinced by Gauthier’s answer. He continues his 
argument as follows:
“If tax revenues are wisely spent in the protective and productive ways suggested in 
Buchanan’s The Limits o f Liberty, then each may expect to do better voluntarily paying 
his taxes in circumstances in which most of his fellows do the same, than in a society in 
which everyone pays only what is coercively extracted from him.”
Given the scale of a country (i.e. involving a large number of individuals), the 
likelihood of all (or even a majority) agreeing with the ways the tax revenues are spent 
is already rather slim. The likelihood of a majority paying voluntarily is even slimmer. 
The more people involved, the more anonymous one is and the more marginal one’s 
contribution is with regards to the big total. If one knows that one’s defection will go 
unnoticed, one will defect in the absence of an enforcement system. I can only agree 
with Buchanan that numbers play against co-operation. This objection is obviously 
relevant to discussions about resolute choice.
About the realism of MRC
In addition to the above, a couple of philosophers have objected to the realistic 
application of MRC. For example, R. Hardin demonstrates that MRC is not applicable 
to a real economy. Co-operation has a cost which is not taken into account in MRC. The 
larger the society, the more difficult it is to distinguish contributions, cooperative 
surplus and a fortiori shares of it in proportion to contributions. Similarly, very few 
individuals can make a difference in their social contributions and therefore nobody can
247 ‘The Gauthier Enterprise’, p 80
248 ‘Morality, Rational Choice and Semantic Representation’, p 206
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really threaten to withdraw from social interaction at a cost to the others.249 Gauthier’s 
bargaining theory is not applicable to real society.
D. Braybrooke’s comment is in the same vein. He notes that Gauthier makes a fantastic 
demand on information which no contracting parties or even government could ever 
meet. Gauthier’s agents are required to identify the social structure under which they 
would reach their fullest personal development and he wonders how they would ever be 
able to collect and compute the information needed to make such a choice. In any case, 
he notes that MRC certainly does not enable us to make such a choice 250
MRC and ‘orthodox* game theory
We know from above that, in raising the issue of multi-person interactions, J. Hampton 
had opened a first breach in MRC. In 1991, two game theorists251 made a second indent 
on MRC. They demonstrated that for the general n-person case, MRC should be 
replaced by a lexicographic principle which can be formulated as a maximin principle in 
relative utility gains or a minimax relative principle in relative concession. Gauthier 
admits that their principle meets the formal inadequacy of MRC for multi-person 
bargaining, but he is aware that this formulation, like his own, “ignores the structure of 
the interactions by which what is distributed in bargaining has been produced.” He 
acknowledges: “I am now convinced that MRC needs at least some 
modification.”252 We have to wait until 1993 to read that MRC could not stand in its 
present form. Let us go back a few years to understand why.
In the 1950’s, Nash developed two approaches to solve the bargaining problem. The 
two approaches, given specified conditions, converge towards the same bargaining 
solution. Together they form what is known as the Nash Program. The bargaining 
problem can be described as follows. Two individuals have to choose between several 
possible contractual agreements. Both have an interest in reaching an agreement and
249 R. Hardin’s ‘Bargaining for Justice’, p 6 6 - 7 0
250 D. Braybrooke, ‘Contract Theory’s Fanciest Flight’, p 760
251 W. Gaertner and M. Klemish-Alert, ‘Gauthier’s Approach to Distributive Justice and Other Bargaining 
Solutions’.
252 ‘Rational Constraint: Some Last Words’, p 325
253 See the Appendix, section 1, b
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they are both assumed to behave rationally. The question to answer is what contract will 
they agree on?
According to the axiomatic approach, the bargaining process does not need to be 
provided. However, the game is described by a set of possible outcomes. “One states as 
axioms several properties that it would seem natural for the solution to have and then 
one discovers the axioms actually determine the solution uniquely.”254 In the strategic 
(or non-cooperative) approach, the bargaining process of the players is specified. Do 
players make proposals in turn or simultaneously? What is the cost of time? ... Once the 
negotiation situation is fully described, it can be modelled as a ‘non-cooperative’ game. 
This game is then analysed using standard game theory tools.
Gauthier’s bargaining theory is axiomatic. It does not specify the bargaining process 
and therefore avoid the problems inherent to the strategic approach. However his 
solution is highly contested by game theorists. Gauthier’s solution stands alone and is 
not backed by the strategic approach. K. Binmore argues that Nash axiomatic solution 
can be defended only because it is securely grounded in non-cooperative game theory. 
The solutions generated by the Nash axiomatic approach can also be generated by the 
strategic approach, given plausible assumptions about the negotiations process 255
Such defence cannot apply to Gauthier. Not only, Gauthier does not describe the 
negotiations process, but his theory departs so unrealistically from the standard game 
theory that no non-cooperative model could ever describe it.256 Binmore lists the 
departures from the standard theory that would prevent any strategic modelling.
• Gauthier relies on the out-dated Zeuthen principle. Most game theorists consider it an 
ad hoc criterion no longer used in strategic or axiomatic approaches.
• Gauthier assumes equal rationality of the bargainers. Binmore notes that such an 
assumption amounts to assuming that bargainers choose in equivalent if not identical 
circumstances. This assumption is unrealistic and difficult to describe in a non- 
cooperative model.
254 Nash, ‘Two-Person Cooperative Games’, p 129
255 See ‘Bargaining and Morality’, pp 134 and 141-142.
256 See ‘Bargaining and Morality’, especially pages 134 to 140.
147
• The concept of constrained maximisation departs from the “most fundamental 
principle of non-cooperative game theory -  namely, that players will not use a 
strongly dominated strategy.”257 Defection in the Prisoner dilemma is almost a 
tautology in game theory. In demonstrating why, Binmore raises the two following 
corollary points.
• Firstly, he notes that constrained maximisation is made possible by the assumption of 
translucency. Binmore does not see the point of examining a model containing such 
an idealised assumption.
• Secondly, he notes that Gauthier attributes players with the power to make 
commitments in a game. In doing so, Gauthier disregards another game-theoretic 
tautology; commitments in game theory have to be modelled formally as moves 
within the games, providing that a convincing enforcement mechanism is in place and 
described.
Most of the above became clear to Gauthier when he heard a game theorist called Ariel 
Rubinstein at a conference. If he is ‘unmoved’ by Binmore’s attacks against his concept 
of constrained maximisation258, he understands the importance of the strategic approach.
Ariel Rubinstein wrote in 1982 an article entitled Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining 
Model. In this article, he shows that Nash solution is the solution to non-cooperative 
games in some fairly general cases. Based on simple bargaining rules, Rubinstein’s 
theory offers a minimalist defence of the Nash bargaining solution.
Despite his reservations about Nash’s independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom and 
about the rejection of the Zeuthen principle, Gauthier no longer wishes to defend 
MRC and accepts that what he said in Morals by Agreement about bargaining “is 
simply undercut by the non-cooperative approach.”259 He admits: “The real work of 
defending MRC as a bargaining outcome ... requires arguing that in the circumstances 
of the social contract, MRC coincides with the Nash bargaining solution.”260
257 ‘Bargaining and Morality’, p 136.
258 ‘Uniting Separate Persons’, p 186
259 ‘Uniting Separate Persons’, p 177
260 ‘Uniting Separate Persons’, p 178
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Section 4: Constrained maximisation and Resolute Choice
In this section, we will first review the main objection to this core conception prior to 
turning to McClennen’s concept of resolute choice. Gauthier has not officially 
abandoned constrained maximisation. However, since 1988, he has worked almost 
exclusively within the framework of McClennen’s concept of resoluteness using as well 
Bratman’s research on plans and intentions, and Parfit’s work on irrationality.
Introductory objection.
The main objection to constrained maximisation is about the gap left open by Gauthier 
between disposing oneself to comply and acting upon such a disposition. Harman is 
amongst the first to spot this weakness:
“Although I agree that under idealised conditions, it could be rational to dispose oneself 
to be a conditional co-operator and then rational actually to act from that disposition, I 
do not agree with Gauthier’s assumption that, necessarily, if it is rational to acquire a 
disposition to do D in circumstances C, then it is rational actually to do D in 
circumstances C. This assumption is not universally true.”
The problem is that in the context of Gauthier’s contractual morality, dispositions must 
be irrevocable.
Gauthier does not demonstrate that if it is in our interest to acquire a disposition to do D 
in circumstances C, it follows that it is in our interest to do D in circumstances C. It can 
be rational for me to acquire the disposition to comply at date t. At f, I am genuinely 
committed to comply with our agreement. However, at the time of acting t+1, I might 
not be prepared to act upon my disposition. Indeed, it might be irrational for me to do 
so. Let us review a few illustration cases (the list below is not exhaustive).
Case 1: Change o f situation
The most usual case is a change of situation that renders compliance irrational. I agreed 
to meet you at a date t, but I had to accept an interview for the job of my dream on the
261 ‘Rationality in Agreement’, p 5. H. Smith calls this assumption the causal efficacy thesis: ‘the thesis that 
forming an intention to do A will cause the performance of A.’ (See ‘Deriving Morality from Rationality’, 
p 235). Like Harman, she argues that Gauthier has not proven this assumption true.
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same day. I could not foresee this change of circumstances and I have to cancel our 
appointment.
Case 2: Change o f perception
The perception of the situation can change between t and t+1. At the time of acting t+1, 
I don’t see the agreement in the same light as I did at t when I disposed myself to 
comply with it. To act upon my original disposition appears irrational to me now. Let us 
illustrate this case with a classical example.
My car breaks in the middle of the desert. You pass by with a car in good condition. 
You offer to give me a lift out of the desert on the condition that I commit myself to 
giving you a generous lump sum when I can access my bank account. In the middle of 
nowhere, without water or food, I see you as my saver and genuinely commit myself to 
giving you the money. I believe my life is worth the amount you want and I am 
disposed to pay you. However, once out of danger, after I have drunk and eaten, my 
outlook is different. I think that after all, someone else could have passed by and helped 
me. I don’t see you anymore as my saver. I wonder how I could have committed myself 
to give you such a ludicrous amount of money for such an insignificant favour. Gauthier 
claims that I must give you the money as promised but he has not demonstrated that it is 
rational to do so.262
Case 3: Exception to the best strategy
The strategy ‘comply with agreement’ has been beneficial until now and I have 
genuinely acquired a disposition to comply. However, I am now in a situation where 
adhering to the strategy chosen and therefore complying is irrational. The loss that I 
would incur were I to comply would more than offset all the past (and future) benefits 
made (to make) with the strategy.263
262 H. Smith labels this attitude the “rationality of perseverance” principle and notes that Gauthier offers no 
positive argument in favour of this principle. See ‘Deriving Morality from Rationality’, p 244.
63 D. Parfit illustrates such a situation with the case of a threat ignorer who can be killed if he ignores the 
next threat. See ‘Bombs, Coconuts, or Rational Irrationality’ p 82-83
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This case is obviously not considered by Gauthier. He has explicidy excluded repeated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma situations.264 However, as Harman notes, we seldom gain 
confidence in one another in one shot Prisoner’s Dilemmas. The disposition to 
cooperate normally comes into play in repeated prisoner’s dilemma situations where co- 
operation can be defended by an appeal to long term self interest. Again Gauthier 
excludes that type of justification.266
This attitude towards iterated games is particularly troublesome in threat cases. Is it 
rational to carry out a threat if it was rational to make it? It can be rational to make a 
threat and it is usually rational to carry it out when one want to be taken seriously in 
future threats. The cost encountered in carrying out the threat then is balanced out by 
future gain prospects. This justification does not apply to non iterated games.
Case 4: Deception and other alternative rational strategies
CM and narrow compliance are not uniquely rational for equally rational agents.267 
However, knowing that Gauthier has given up on the assumption of equal rationality, 
these objections should not worry us. More preoccupying are the objections in favour of 
deception. The Fool, who was shown the door, comes back by the window.
At t, it is rational for me to commit myself to comply in order to gain others’ trust and 
compliance but at t+1 it is not rational for me to comply. I can foresee at t that I will 
defect at t+1 but I decide to try and deceive others, to appear as a CM when I remain 
really a SM..
Gauthier argues that I am not able to acquire the disposition to comply if I know that I 
will not comply at the time of acting. However, there are two objections to his 
argument. Firstly, agents are translucent and not transparent. Translucency allows for a 
degree of error which Gauthier has not catered for. He argues that rationality requires 
developing a skill to spot SM but one could argue that rationality equally requires
264 See Morals by Agreement, p 169-170
265 See Rationality in Agreement, p 5
266 See Morals by Agreement, p 169-170
267 See Danielson’s ‘The Visible Hand of Morality’, pp 373 -  383 in which he suggests ‘Reciprocal 
Cooperation’ as an alternative strategy that dominates CM. See also Kraus and Coleman’s ‘Morality and 
Rational Choice’, pp 736 -  745. They argue against the unique rationality of narrow compliance.
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developing the skill of deception, pretending to be a CM when one is really a SM. As 
a corollary to this argument, one notes that in order to become a CM, individuals must 
carry out a SM’s reasoning. The decision to acquire a CM’s disposition is the outcome 
of a SM’s calculus.269 Where is the threshold? It is now time to turn to McClennen.
McClennen*s friendly alternative to constrained maximisation
McClennen’s objections to constrained maximisation are quite lethal. However, one 
must not be mistaken: McClennen fully supports Gauthier’s project of building a 
rationally based contractarian theory of morality.270 His concept of resolute choice fits 
such a project. As we shall see in chapter VII, McClennen’s objection actually opens a 
new door for Gauthier’s project.
• McClennen’s objections to constrained maximisation.
Firstly he notes that, in demonstrating that it is rational to acquire a disposition to 
cooperate271, Gauthier assumes that agents are transparent. In his calculus, agents know 
with certainty who is a SM and who is a CM and therefore calculate their expected 
utility accordingly. Indeed, the calculus provides transparent agents with a compelling 
reason to become CM.
However, McClennen notes that the same reasoning applied to mere translucent agents 
could fail to demonstrate the rationality of constrained maximisation. The person who is 
willing to adopt the disposition to cooperate will face a trade-off between expected 
gains when cooperating with like-minded people and expected losses when interacting 
with SMs in disguise. Whether one does better in acquiring a disposition to co-operate 
depends then on
“one’s estimate of the proportion of deceptive SMs to CMs in society, the relative 
frequency of one’s encounters with members of each group, the probability of being 
mistaken about whether a given person is a deceptive SM or CM, the magnitude of the
268 See G. Sayre-McCord, ‘Deception and Reasons to be Moral’ in which he develops the ‘trans-opaque’ 
strategy: SM send all sorts of misleading signals to be trusted as CM.
269 See for example McClennen’s ‘Constrained maximisation and Resolute Choice’, footnote 8, p 98.
270 See ‘Constrained Maximisation and Resolute Choice’, p 108-109
271 See Morals by Agreement, p 172
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gains and losses in each case, and one’s estimate of one’s ability to effectively play the 
role of a deceptive SM.”272
This quote reveals the full extent of the weakness of constrained maximisation. There 
are too many factors to take into account in such a calculation for it to be 
straightforwardly rational. McClennen includes as well the advantage of deception in 
such a calculus reminding us that a future CM first reasons like a SM.
In view of the numbers of uncertain factors involved, McClennen prefers to assimilate 
the decision problem to become or not a CM to a coordination problem. Like Parfit273, 
McClennen concludes on this first point that when agents are translucent and not 
transparent, the best strategy remains to appear to develop a disposition to co-operate 
and to continue to choose in a strategic manner. Obviously if everybody does the same, 
co-operation never takes root. Gauthier fails to demonstrate the rationality of co­
operation for translucent agents and instead feeds the Fool’s argument in favour of 
deception.
McClennen second argument against constrained maximisation is a lot more subtle. 
Like other critics mentioned above, McClennen notes the divorce between the 
disposition and acting upon the disposition. The so-called divorce, he claims, can be 
traced back to the difference in reasoning in two choice situations - namely ex-ante, 
when choosing a disposition, and ex-post, at the time of action. Ex-ante, transparent 
agents expect higher returns from disposing themselves to co-operate whereas, ex-post, 
their rational choice of action is to behave like SM. Foreseeing this discrepancy, 
transparent agents are unable to acquire the disposition at the first place. Being 
transparent, their lack of disposition will be revealed to others and co-operation will be 
forgotten.
The reason for such a divorce, argues McClennen, is that in parametric reasoning, a 
decision made at t to adopt a disposition can have no carrying power over time since the 
outcomes still available at t+1 are the same as they were at 1.1 cannot dispose myself at 
t not to choose a certain outcome A at t+1, when I know already at t that A not only will 
still be available at t+1 but will also be the most rational outcome to choose then.
272 ‘Constrained Maximisation and Resolute Choice’, p 103
273 See ‘Bombs and Coconuts, or Rational Irrationality’.
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McClennen has now set the context and can safely introduce his concept of resolute 
choice.
• McClennen *s concept o f resolute choice
In the Prisoners’ Dilemma scenario, we all know that to co-operate is the best mutual 
outcome but the traditional account of rationality leads each agent to defect. In doing so, 
they realise their worst mutual outcome. In knowledge of their inherent rational 
weakness, agents have come to put in place costly surveillance and enforcement devices 
in order to secure mutually advantageous co-operation.
McClennen’s key argument is then as follows: if rational individuals are willing to tie 
themselves using costly devices in order to secure mutual benefits, why can’t they 
motivate themselves to secure these very benefits free of charge. They would achieve 
the same benefits at lower costs, i.e. they would make even greater benefits. As 
expected utility maximisers, such a prospect can only appeal to them.
This pragmatic approach bears two consequences on preferences. Firstly, it means that 
these ‘context dependent preferences’274 for actions are rooted in the disposition to seek 
greater benefits. Preferences for co-operation are therefore endogenously derived. 
Secondly, it means that agents have a holistic rather than an incremental outlook. They 
choose an outcome that maximises their over-arching preferences rather than an 
outcome that maximises their preferences at each stage of the decision process.
“In place of Gauthier’s model of an agent who, it seems, must reason parametrically at 
each point in time, one can consider a different model altogether, predicated on the 
notion that the agent is a being who continues over time, with concerns that have some 
continuity to them. Such an agent can be understood to view himself as deliberating 
over alternative plans..., as choosing some particular plan, and then proceeding, at least 
in the normal course of events, to make specific choices (at different points in time) that 
serve to execute or implement the plan chosen. What is characteristic of such an agent is 
that his ex-post preferences among available actions are disciplined or shaped by what 
he judges, from the perspective of plans taken as wholes to be the best plan to pursue... 
Such an agent can be described as a resolute chooser.”275
274 ‘Constrained Maximisation and Resolute Choice’, p 110-111
275 ‘Constrained Maximisation and Resolute Choice’, p 111-112
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To illustrate this point, let’s take an (extensively used) example, borrowed from
on f\Elster . Ulysses knows that he has to pass by the sirens’ islands on his way to Ithaca. 
His preference is not to stop and go straight home. However, he knows that if he hears 
the sirens he will prefer to stop on their island. Knowing that, Ulysses can decide at the 
beginning of his trip that he will bind himself to the mast in order to make sure that he 
will pass by the island without stopping. Myopic Ulysses resolves to sail by the island 
but succumbs to his preference to listen to the sirens when he passes by their island. 
Sophisticated Ulysses binds himself to the mast and sails straight home. Resolute 
Ulysses resolves not to stop on the island and does not stop.
• Gauthier’s response.
Gauthier very rapidly accepts the objection:
“McClennen’s account of resolute choice is more systematically developed than my 
conception of constrained maximisation and it has wider applicability. In 
embracing straightforward maximisation for individual decision making, I have, 
as I now realise, ignored preference change and I should want to extend the scope 
of constrained maximisation.”277
From this 1988 quote, we can see that Gauthier has taken the full measure of 
McClennen’s theory’s potential. 1993 is probably the last year he mentions constrained 
maximisation and it is already within the resolute choice framework.
“I remain convinced that this [constrained maximisation] remains the most fruitful idea 
in Morals by Agreement”. Indeed, he will remain faithful to the core idea of morality as 
self-imposed constraints but he continues:
“A constrained maximiser, as I shall use the term in a way that generalises somewhat 
from my use in Morals by Agreement, is someone who takes her reasons for acting, not 
only directly from the utilities of possible outcomes she may bring about, but also from 
her plans and commitments.”278
The seed is planted and the tree will not stop growing from then onwards. As we shall 
see in chapter VII, Gauthier will develop this theme extensively, trying to save what can 
be considered as the very heart of Morals by Agreement. Gauthier remains convinced 
that rational morality is viable.
276 Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality.
277 ‘Morality, Rational Choice, and Semantic Representation’, p 209.
278 ‘Uniting Separate Persons’, p 185-186
155
Section 5: The Lockean Proviso
As we saw in chapter n, the rationale of the proviso is forward looking. The prospect of 
benefiting later from co-operation and society makes it rational for individuals to 
constrain their behaviour in the pre-bargaining position. The argument is two fold. 
Firstly, Gauthier argues that individuals would not be accepted as parties in bargaining 
if they were not willing to comply with the proviso requirements. Secondly, he argues 
that people would not comply with a bargain that started from an unfair initial position. 
In ensuring the fairness of the initial position (and therefore contributing to the fairness 
of the bargaining process) the proviso secures individuals’ future compliance to the 
agreement so obtained.
Two aspects of this argument have been contested. It has been argued that Gauthier’s 
Lockean proviso is not necessarily fair or that it can generate an unfair starting point. It 
has also been demonstrated that it can be rational to comply with a bargain starting from 
an unfair initial point.
Prior to developing both these arguments, I would like to bring to the fore an objection. 
A. Baier wrote a rather violent diatribe against Morals by Agreement which I find 
mostly unfair. However, she noted something about the proviso that did strike me too 
when I read chapter VIII. Gauthier is rather silent about people’s social endowment: “It 
is as if the adolescent Emile is to suffer amnesia, forget his parents, wet nurses, and 
tutor, perhaps to see himself as sprung fully factored from the head of Zeuthen- 
Nash.”279 What about education, social or historical background and other social inputs? 
Is education considered as an externality? We mentioned similar issues above in section 
1 (about mutual unconcern and the circularity problem of considered preferences). 
However, this omission from Gauthier is unexpected in a chapter fully dedicated to the 
initial bargaining position.
Proviso and forward looking rational defence
Gauthier suggests a no-coercion baseline: whatever has been obtained through coercing 
others or being coerced by them should not be on the bargaining table or available for
279 ‘Pilgrim’s Progress’, p 320
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redistribution. He argues that if coercion is built into bargaining, parties will not 
voluntarily comply and costly enforcement will have to be put in place. In removing 
coercion and unfairness from the starting point, Gauthier’s revised proviso ensures 
voluntary compliance and reduces enforcement costs. The proviso’s rationale is 
therefore forward looking.
Two arguments are often suggested against this claim. Firstly, it is argued that it is not 
always irrational to agree to and comply with an arrangement that does not satisfy the 
proviso. Secondly, this claim seems to rest on moral rather than rational grounds. Let us 
develop both these arguments.
Which irrationality?
Is it really irrational to voluntarily comply with a joint strategy agreed to from a 
coercive position? After all bargaining is about distributing a surplus. If the surplus is 
big enough and allows each to make a big enough gain from the status quo, than it does 
not matter whether the status quo was coerced or not. If the parties do gain from the 
bargain, they will voluntarily comply. Departures from the no-coercion baseline do not 
necessarily entail enforcement costs, at least as far as purely rational individuals are 
concerned. So on what basis does Gauthier justify the irrationality of coercion?
Gauthier equates the irrationality of coercion with the irrationality of unproductive 
transfers.
“An unproductive transfer brings no new goods; it simply redistributes some existing 
goods from one person to another. Thus it involves a utility cost for which no benefit is 
received, a utility gain for which no service should be provided.”280
Gauthier claims that, by nature, unproductive transfers cannot be voluntary and can only 
be obtained through coercion. As such they cannot be rational.
‘False!’ reply some objectors. Unproductive transfers can have a rational function and 
therefore be rational. Indeed they can secure the stability of the bargain. For example, 
when the bargaining situation of the parties is not equal, a transfer that is apparently
280 Morals by Agreement, p 197
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unproductive can stop the less favoured party from attacking the most favoured one.281 
More generally, what Gauthier calls an unproductive transfer can merely balance out a 
structural threat advantage. A transfer enables one to offset the threat advantage of 
another and bargain on a more equal footing with her.
Rationality, psychology or morality?
“Why should coercion being built into the baseline necessarily diminish the value of 
bargains based on it, in the eyes of purely rational egoists?” asks R. Goodin. 282 
Goodin’s answer is rather straightforward: “what is really at work here is an argument 
not from irrationality of coercion but rather from its immorality... It is moral offence, 
not rational miscalculation, that drives the model here.”283 Goodin sees two moral 
inputs in the proviso.
Firstly, Goodin argues that people must see themselves being coerced when Gauthier 
sees them being coerced. Resentment and resistance to coercion are psychological rather 
than rational factors. Human beings resent and resist coercion not because it is irrational 
but because it is immoral. The argument for the cost of enforcement rests on moral 
rather than rational factors.284
Secondly, Gauthier distinguishes between worsening someone’s situation and failing to 
better it. The proviso prohibits the former not the latter. Goodin notes that such a 
distinction is itself morally loaded. It has no appeal to a rational egoist. Why should a 
rational person make a difference between worsening someone’s situation and failing to 
better it? It seems that Gauthier merely imposes his own conception of fairness as a 
starting point.
281 See G. Harman’s ‘Rationality in Agreement’, p 11
282 ‘Equal Rationality and Initial Endowments’, p 125
283 ‘Equal Rationality and Initial Endowments’, p 126. G. Harman makes a similar claim but does not develop it 
(see Rationality in Agreement, p 11).
284 Although I agree with most of Goodin’s argument, I believe that Gauthier’s point is not that resentment is 
rationally derived. His claim is that it is based on a feeling of unfairness that Goodin calls moral offence. This 
resentment then generates defection and resistance to the agreement. In knowledge of such a process, Gauthier 
argues that it becomes rational to remove unfairness from the baseline in order to secure future compliance.
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Gauthier writes: “I agree that the proviso is a moral premise. The question then is 
whether it is rational to accept it as a constraint on bargaining to the social contract.”285 
Gauthier is aware that he inputs a conception of fairness in the proviso. The forward 
looking rational of the proviso depends on it. Unfortunately, as we shall now see, his 
conception of justice is far from having gained general acceptance.
Proviso and fairness.
Is Gauthier’s revised Lockean proviso fair or does it secure a fair starting point to 
bargaining? According to most commentators on the topic, the answer is no. Through 
his revised Lockean proviso, Gauthier artificially attempts to rectify the unfairness of 
original or natural threat advantages. His attempt is not only procedurally unfair; it is 
also structurally unfair either because it does not preclude coercion in the initial 
bargaining position or because it can partially affect the bargaining outcome. Knowing 
that Gauthier’s initial position was built up in reaction to J. Buchanan’s one, it seems 
appropriate to open this sub-section with Buchanan’s response.
Procedural fairness
Buchanan deals with Gauthier’s example of masters and slaves very bluntly. If the 
slaves are in this situation, it is “only because of some inability to enforce more
Oft Afavourable terms of existence.” More generally, if one coerced another in the pre­
bargaining situation it is because one is stronger or better (in a way or another) than the 
other. Why should it be rational or even fair to rectify the existing pre-bargaining 
situation? Buchanan’s core argument is that any rectificatory redistribution involves 
violation of the contractarian or agreement based criteria for fairness.287
Gauthier rectifies the existing pre-bargaining situation by using a secession criterion. He 
tries to establish what would have been the situation of each of the bargaining parties if 
they had been living separately on isolated islands. The use of this criterion to correct 
past injustices does not only seem unrealistic, it is also counter-intuitive. Buchanan
285 ‘Uniting Separate Persons’, p 183
286 ‘The Gauthier Enterprise’, p 84
287 ‘The Gauthier Enterprise’, p 87
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argues that even in a coerced situation, individuals are likely to perform better as part of 
a group rather than in isolation.
Buchanan does not claim that it is wrong to investigate the several historical stages of a 
pre-bargaining situation. He only claims that it is against the contractarian approach to 
label as unfair some past stages and to rectify past injustices. Any process of 
rectification of the existing pre-bargaining situation is procedurally anti-contractarian.
“If fairness criteria have been violated at earlier stages of the process that generated that 
which exists, do these historical violations in themselves offer justification for 
violations in some process of rectification?”288
Gauthier is unmoved: “failure to rectify past injustice destabilises present 
arrangements.”289 For such an argument to remain valid, Gauthier’s revised proviso 
must rectify all past injustices and establish a fair starting point. We shall now see that 
he fails to do so.
Structural fairness
Indeed, many critics have argued that Gauthier’s Lockean proviso is also structurally 
unfair. If it fits perfectly Gauthier’s own example of masters and slaves, it is completely 
inappropriate in many other instances. The list of counter examples is endless.
Gauthier’s proviso does not preclude coercion in the initial bargaining position.290 Some 
situations are coercively structured. One might be led into an unfair bargain without 
violating the proviso. Coercion springs from a natural ‘threat advantage’. When I was in 
the desert without any hope of being rescued, I was in a very weak bargaining position 
upon your arrival. You were not responsible for my distress. Therefore you did not 
violate the proviso when you took advantage of your strong bargaining position and 
asked for a ludicrous amount of money. I needed you, you did not need me. The proviso 
can do nothing to rectify that type of naturally coercive situation. Similarly, a poor 
person who needs to work to survive must be prepared to accept exploitative wages. An
288 ‘The Gauthier Enterprise’, p 87
289 ‘Morality, Rational Choice, and Semantic Representation’.
290 See for example J. Fishkin ‘Bargaining, Justice and Justification’, p 47-50 and R. Goodin ‘Equal 
Rationality and Initial Endowments’, p 126-127.
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employer does not violate the proviso when she makes the most of her advantageous 
bargaining position. The poor person is again in a naturally coercive situation that the 
proviso cannot rectify.
I think that Gauthier misses the point when he addresses this objection. He wonders 
why it is morally objectionable if a party makes the most of a threat advantage. He 
argues that the disturbing aspect is more that to exploit someone in distress does not fit 
some standard practice of social morality. If you are in a position to help me in the 
desert, it seems a social convention that you will do so without expecting me to pay you 
a ludicrous amount in return.291 What does this have to do with his project? He only 
tries to rationally derive a social morality not to defend the standard one. Such an 
argument is inconsistent with his theory. Why should his proviso rectify some form of 
coercion and not others? Why should it rectify some injustice and leave others 
deliberately outstanding? We can only agree with Buchanan: no rectifications at all 
better fits the contractarian project than partial ones.
We have just seen that the proviso fails to rectify all past injustices. Unfortunately, it 
can also generate unfair situations. For example, the proviso permits one to worsen the 
situation of others, if doing so is necessary to prevent one’s own situation from being 
worsened even slightly. The proviso can also allow one to use people in some 
unpleasant way as long as the net effect on them is positive. Finally, the proviso allows 
one to kill or steal from others if it is accepted that someone else would do so if one
9Q9didn’t. In most of these unfortunate situations, the proviso poses problems. Gauthier 
only provides an elusive answer to address these objections: “the proviso is not intended 
to be the last word on morality, but only the first.”293 This argument itself fails when we 
turn to another objection regarding the initial position and property rights.
P. Danielson argues that Gauthier’s revised Lockean proviso generates a more insidious 
form of injustice. If “the only feature relevant to accepting a starting point is its effect 
on the resulting bargain”, then, he argues, personal rights only should be treated in the 
initial position whereas both property rights and public goods should be subject to
291 Gauthier also argues that such situations should not be considered as simple bargaining situations. It is 
obvious that application of MRC in this type of situations will never result in a mutually advantageous 
situation.
292 These examples were suggested by D. Hubin and M. Lambeth’s ‘Providing for rights’.
293 ‘Uniting Separate Persons’, p 183
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bargain. Property rights can adversely affect some bargainers. They would not make 
them worse off in the initial position but it could worsen the outcome of bargaining for 
them. He illustrates his argument with the following example:
“Jim’s building a house and leave homeless Bob no worse off until private home 
ownership acts as a constraint on cooperative interaction, perhaps preventing a 
socialised housing policy. In the prospect of cooperative agreement, Bob is worse 
off.”294
Property rights should not be part of the endowment required to define agents for social 
contracting since they put at risk the impartiality of the proviso.
Gauthier first addressed this issue in 1988. He admitted:
“It is true that its [the proviso’s] effect is to permit state of nature interaction that leaves 
some persons ultimately worse off than they would have been had everything (except 
personal rights) been decided by agreement... But those persons whose bargaining 
position is weakened are nevertheless better off than at the no interaction point... State 
of nature interaction does not confer short term benefits at the risk of long term overall 
costs.”295
Gauthier then endeavours to demonstrate that the exclusion of property rights from 
initial endowments would affect the stability of the bargaining outcome.
What to make of such a reply? Gauthier admits that the proviso’s rectificatory process is 
only partial but he claims that it does not affect the rationality of the proviso since it 
does not affect the stability of the future agreement. The comparison point is not what is 
best in the absolute for the bargainers but what is best in comparison to the no­
interaction point. The choice of the no-interaction point as a comparison standard is not 
only counter-intuitive, it can also be unfair. If it can be unfair, how can it secure the 
stability of the bargaining outcome? Once again, Buchanan’s argument makes sense. 
Any rectificatory device of the pre-bargaining position can only be partial and therefore 
necessarily adversely affects the bargaining outcome. Any manipulation of the existing 
pre-bargaining position is anti-contractarian by nature.
In 1993, Gauthier generalises his inclusion of property rights in the initial endowment: 
The exclusive use of particular resources is allowed “in so far -  and only in so far as -
294 The quote continues as follows: “Some criticisms of private provision of schooling or medical services 
often make a similar point. They focus not on the immediate detraction from the public services but on the 
shift in the initial position for bargaining that may block improvements to the public services.” ‘The Visible 
Hand of Morality’, p 366
295 ‘Moral Artifice’, p 411
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this benefits the user without net cost to those no longer entitled to treat these resources 
as in common use.”296 How does one measure this net cost? Does one take into account 
post bargaining losses? These questions being left unattended, we can consider 
Danielson’s objection as still valid.
The proviso is probably one of the core conceptions that Gauthier is the least willing to 
let go. Although, he is aware of its weaknesses, he believes that the proviso is an 
indispensable basis to his theory.
“The formulation of the proviso in Morals by Agreement is at best only a first 
approximation. But a more adequate formulation would leave unanswered the strong 
challenges that may be brought against its relevance for both agreement and 
compliance. Occasionally I find myself tempted to discharge the proviso from its 
contractarian employment ... But then I find myself once more convinced that it is 
exactly that power of the proviso -  to convert as it were, a Hobbesian state of nature 
into a Lockean one -  that is needed in a full contractarian moral theory.”297
296 ‘Uniting Separate Persons’, p 183
297 ‘Rational Constraint: Some Last Words’, p 325
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Conclusion: What is left of Morals by Agreement?
I believe that to understand Gauthier’s achievement, we must remember what his goal 
was. We remember that he was dissatisfied with Hobbes’ answer to the Fool. His 
concern was that, with the sovereign, Hobbes had given a political answer to the 
compliance problem intrinsic to any social contract theory. He believed that it was 
possible to give a moral solution instead. He was convinced that it was possible for 
individuals to internalise rationally derived constraints. In other words, his ambition was 
to provide a contractarian moral theory.
In order to do that, he used modem tools, relied on a subjective account of values, 
worked within the rational choice theory framework, used game theory, developed a 
bargaining theory and padded the baseline with a Lockean proviso. He has obtained a 
theory but this chapter has taken us through its flaws.
• The market as a morally free zone is a marginal core conception; it is not 
indispensable to the coherence of his theory. However, we can consider that he no 
longer defends it. Indeed, we saw that the market was proven to be morally sustained.
• One can say that Gauthier’s bargaining theory is now abandoned. It rested on the 
assumption of equal rationality and its outcome was the Minimum Relative Concession 
principle. Gauthier has admitted that the assumption of equal rationality is flawed and 
that MRC at best needs modification. Gauthier does not show any interest in defending 
his bargaining theory anymore. In line with the above argument, I believe that his 
bargaining theory was either incompatible with the rest of his theory or was not a 
bargaining theory in the agreed sense.
• The conception of constrained maximisation suffered a major blow from the 
arguments of E.F. McClennen. However, this conception, so central to his moral theory, 
is very much alive. Gauthier has taken the full measure of the potential of McClennen’s 
concept of resoluteness and the core idea of his moral theory will be re-activated within 
this broader framework.
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• Gauthier does not want to let go of the Lockean proviso. Buchanan argued that the 
proviso was a rectificatory process incompatible with any contractarian theory. By 
nature, rectifications are likely to be marginal or partial and therefore unfair. Gauthier 
is aware of the objection but maintains that the proviso is rationally required to ensure 
the compliance to the agreement. He believes that without this proviso, his moral theory 
would collapse.
• As far as the Archimedean point is concerned, J. Hampton claimed that Gauthier’s 
Archimedean point becomes more Rawlsian and less Hobbesian towards the end of 
chapter VIII of Morals by Agreement.298 Her argument was based on the fact that the 
ideal chooser acts as a proto-individual who selects a scheme of cooperation not 
according to who he is but according to who he could be in any of these schemes. She 
insisted that such a turn in Gauthier’s Archimedean standpoint reflected a change in his 
methodology. Gauthier’s focus moved from the individuals to society. Individuals are 
structured by the social system in which they live and the moral frame has to be chosen 
before the individuals make any choices. We saw in section 1 that this Rawlsian turn 
had been emphasised in Gauthier’s defence of the hypothetical contract. We also saw 
that this Rawlsian turn was incompatible with the rest of his theory.
If Gauthier accepts that Morals by Agreement as a contractarian moral theory is flawed, 
he is determined to demonstrate that the idea of a contractarian moral theory is the only 
way forward. From this point of view, one can say that Morals by Agreement as a 
project is very much alive. Gauthier is still convinced that it is possible to give a moral 
answer to the Fool. We need now to turn to his most recent work to see how he will 
defend the idea of contractarian moral theory without reference to a bargaining theory, 
to mutual unconcern or equal rationality.
298 ‘Can we agree on Morals?’ especially, pp 344-352
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CHAPTER IV: BARGAINING 
AND UTILITY MAXIMISATION
Now that we have reviewed most of the debates that have taken place around Morals by 
Agreement, I would like to suggest my own criticism in continuation of the 
interpretation provided in chapter n. Although, we have seen that most of the core 
conceptions are now either suspended or modified, I believe that the argument 
developed below against Morals by Agreement still applies to Gauthier’s new attempt to 
defend the idea of a contractarian moral theory.
Gauthier’s central idea is that it is possible and even intrinsic to human nature to change 
rationality once in social interactions. Reason is the bridge between natural or market 
interactions and social or cooperative interactions. It is through reason that we discover 
our need to change our rational dispositions. Reason helps us to overcome market 
failures and allow us to benefit from co-operation.
“Conceptions of rationality are not fixed in human nature, but rather the products of 
human socialization ... the capacity to make the choice of a conception of rationality is 
itself a necessary part of full rationality”.299
This idea is repeated in Morals by Agreement:
“Reason, which increases the costs of natural interaction among human beings, offers 
not only a remedy for the ills it creates, but also the prospect of new benefits achieved 
mutually through co-operation.”300
Or again:
“At the core of our rational capacity is the ability to engage in self-critical reflection. 
The fully rational being is able to reflect on his standard of deliberation, and to change 
that standard in the light of reflection.”301
The change of rationality occurs once the pursuit of mutual advantage supersedes the 
pursuit of individual gain. In other words, there is an evolution or a change of rationality
299 ‘Reason and Maximisation’, p 430-31
300 Morals by Agreement, p 113
301 Morals by Agreement, p 183
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when individuals give priority to the pursuit of mutual benefit over pure individual gain. 
They constrain their natural disposition to solely pursue individual gain in order to 
achieve cooperation. The change is therefore from ‘natural’ to ‘artificial’ rationality or 
from straightforward to constrained maximisation. The rationality that prevails in 
market and natural interactions is supplanted by the rationality of cooperation. The 
rationality that sustains natural impartiality is taken over by the rationality that sustains 
artificial impartiality.
The question is now to know when the change of rationality occurs: before bargaining 
or after? Is this change of rationality a pre-condition to the agreement or a mere by­
product of it?
Read:
“Cooperative interaction is not itself bargaining... Bargaining gives rise to cooperative 
interaction but is itself non-cooperative. This distinction is of great importance in 
subsequent discussion, for as we shall see in co-operating persons must at times 
constrain their utility maximizing behaviour, but in bargaining itself persons accept no 
such constraint. The constraints required by co-operation are arrived at through 
bargaining, but are not part of the bargaining process.’
Or again:
“Bargaining is a straightforwardly maximizing activity leading to an agreement on a 
joint strategy. Constraint enters in cooperative interaction, which requires adherence to 
this strategy even though the outcome is not in general equilibrium.”3 3
We saw in chapter II that to consider the bargainers as straightforward maximisers 
poses three problems.
The first problem concerns the type of straightforward maximisation in question. We 
called it ‘sophisticated’ rationality and we noticed disconcerting assumptions as well as 
an unusual disregard for the bargaining power of the bargainers. A straightforward 
maximiser usually tries to maximise his chances to obtain a bigger share of the surplus 
using all the possible tools available such as threats or bluffs. We noticed that 
Gauthier’s bargainers were unusually ‘reasonable’, avoiding putting the bargaining 
process at risk by fear of no co-operation.
302 Morals By Agreement, p i29
303 Morals By Agreement, p l5 1
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Secondly, there is a chronology problem. Gauthier does not date the change of 
rationality. Instead, he distinguishes between two forms of rationality namely internal 
and external rationality. Internal rationality is the rationality of making the contract and 
corresponds to straightforward utility maximisation. External rationality is the 
rationality of keeping the contract and corresponds to constrained maximisation. 
External rationality applies both to relationships in the pre and the post-bargaining 
positions. Indeed, in order to establish the initial bargaining position, the future co- 
operators have to constrain their utility maximisation to guarantee the fairness of the 
process. It seems irrational to expect individuals to be constrained maximisers when 
they establish the initial bargaining position, straightforward maximisers when they 
bargain and constrained maximisers again when they co-operate.
The third problem is corollary to the second one and concerns the link between 
bargaining and the concept of translucency. It seems that this latter concept rests on a 
pre-disposition to comply. Read:
“The disposition to decide whether or not to adhere to one’s covenants or agreements by 
appealing to directly utility-maximizing considerations, is itself disadvantageous, if 
known, or sufficiently suspected, because it excludes one from participating with those 
who suspect one’s disposition, in those co-operative arrangements in which the benefits 
to be realised require each to forego utility-maximization.” 04
Or again:
“Only those disposed to keep their agreements are rationally acceptable as parties to 
agreements. Constrained maximisers are able to make beneficial agreements with their 
fellows that the straightforward cannot, not because the latter would be unwilling to 
agree, but because they would not be admitted as parties to agreement given their 
disposition to violation.”305
I claim that it is necessary to re-establish the chronology for the coherence of the theory. 
Individuals must first change their rationality and acquire a disposition to obtain and 
maintain co-operation based on the pursuit of mutual interest rather than of individual 
gain. They can then establish the initial bargaining position, bargain and co-operate 
using the same rationality i.e. constrained utility maximisation. I therefore claim that 
Gauthier's bargainers must be constrained maximisers.
304 Morals by Agreement p 162
305 Morals by Agreement p 173
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However one must not be confused: if the change o f rationality must pre-exist the 
agreement, its content is fixed by it. If the rational disposition to cooperate and the 
constraint on choices have to pre-exist bargaining, the actual constraint on behaviour 
can only take place after agreement. Behaviour can only be constrained by a known and 
established principle.
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that Gauthier’s bargainers are constrained 
maximisers and to evaluate the consequences of such a claim on Gauthier’s theory. 
After emphasising the incoherence of the theory as interpreted in chapter 13, we will 
demonstrate that the logic of Morals by Agreement could be recovered if Gauthier’s 
bargainers are constrained maximisers. However, if we accept this claim, it weakens 
Gauthier’s achievement since he assumes what he meant to derive.
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Section 1: Gauthier’s bargainers are constrained utility maximisers
Gauthier describes the bargaining as a two-stage process: 1) each party advances a 
claim; 2) each party offers a concession by withdrawing some portion of his original 
claim and proposing an alternative outcome. We saw in chapter II that their starting 
point is the ‘baseline’. They each come to the bargaining table with their own situation. 
It is this initial situation and the first stage of the bargaining process that is at stake in 
this section.
Bargaining conditions and constrained maximisation.
“In defending constrained maximisation we have implicitly reinterpreted the utility- 
maximizing conception of practical rationality. The received interpretation... identifies 
rationality with utility maximisation at the level of particular choices. A choice is 
rational if and only if it maximizes the actor’s expected utility. We identify rationality 
with utility maximisation at the level of dispositions to choose. A disposition is rational 
if and only if an actor holding it can expect his choices to yield no less utility than the 
choices he would make were he to hold any alternative disposition.”306
If constrained rationality is a disposition to choose, if it is a disposition to give priority 
to co-operation over pursuit of pure individual gain, I claim that the bargainers must 
possess this rational disposition in Gauthier’s theory.
The difference is as follows: a straightforward maximiser devises an individual strategy 
that will enable him to strike an advantageous bargain and he will use all the bargaining 
power available to do so. A constrained maximiser is already in the joint strategy mode. 
He considers it more beneficial to co-operate than to manage solo. He has internalised 
the change of rationality from the pursuit of individual gain to the pursuit of mutual 
benefit. He is therefore disposed to constrain his utility maximisation in bargaining in 
order to better benefit from co-operation.
Gauthier imposes two constraints on his bargainers in the first stage of bargaining, two 
‘pre-conditions’ on making claims:
306 Morals by Agreement, p 182-183
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“In deciding how much is possible [to claim], each is constrained by the recognition 
that he must neither drive others away from the bargaining table, nor be excluded by 
them. Hence each person’s claim is limited by the overall cooperative surplus and more 
specifically by the portion of the surplus that it is possible for him to receive.”307
“Each person may not always claim all of the cooperative surplus that he might receive 
but only that part of the surplus to the production of which he would contribute. Each 
person’s claim is bounded by the extent of his participation in co-operative 
interaction.”308
Is it really the way it works in bargaining between straightforward maximisers? It seems 
that bargainers would make the maximum claim compatible with their bargaining 
power not one proportional to their contribution. As we shall now see, Gauthier seems 
to ignore the role of threat advantages and unequal bargaining power in bargaining.
Would a straightforward maximiser abide by Gauthier’s bargaining conditions?
At the end of his chapter on bargaining, Gauthier specifies ‘a few’ constraints on the 
bargainers:
“In ordinary bargaining persons may conceal significant features of their circumstances, 
or the full range of their options, may misrepresent their preferences, or the strengths of 
their preferences. But we suppose each person to be fully informed... In ordinary 
bargaining persons may bluff ... But here there is no place for bluffing; not only is each 
person fully informed but he is a rational-utility maximiser who knows his fellows to be 
also rational utility maximisers. In ordinary bargaining persons may make threats but 
among fully rational persons threats are useless; no one will believe anyone who claims 
that he will act in a non-utility maximising way should others not comply with his 
threat...Our bargainers have no psychological strengths to exploit or psychological 
weaknesses to be exploited.”309
I believe that what Gauthier calls ‘ordinary bargaining’ should read ‘bargaining between 
straightforward maximisers’. What he calls ‘full rationality’ should read ‘constrained 
rationality’. I almost wonder if ‘fully informed’ should not read ‘translucent’ here. How 
would we ‘know’ the exact preferences, strengths, thoughts and dispositions of our 
fellow bargainers otherwise? It is true that if we are all rational utility maximisers, then 
we can simulate each others’ reasoning. But it does not say anything about each 
bargainers’ ability to conceal or distort his preferences or thoughts to the others, or his 
inability to spot the others’ manipulations.
307 Morals by Agreement p 134
308 Morals by Agreement p 134
309 Morals by Agreement p 156
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What Gauthier assumes here is that, for the sake of obtaining co-operation, his 
bargainers are prepared to surrender the tools that would improve their bargaining 
power. If we can concede that it is rational to pursue co-operation in order to benefit 
from a co-operative surplus not available otherwise, it does not mean that it is irrational 
for a straightforward maximiser to improve his baseline in order to gain a bigger share 
of the co-operative surplus than he would be entitled to otherwise. The pursuit of mutual 
advantage does not preclude individuals from exploiting the advantages that their 
baseline provides them with. It is along these lines that Barry develops his argument 
against Gauthier’s rationality in bargaining.
For example, Gauthier’s main argument against threats is that it would be irrational to 
make a threat that can only be defective to carry out. Not only, if I am rational, I would 
not make a threat, but also even if I was irrational enough to make a threat, my fellow 
bargainers in assuming that I am a rational utility maximiser would not believe that I 
would carry it out.
What about the concept of ‘threat advantage’, common to Nash and Harsanyi? As
'X 1 nexplained by Barry , to threaten somebody is to attempt to affect his behaviour by 
stating a conditional intention. The conditional intention here is to do something unless 
the other performs and not to do it if he does. We remember Luke and Matthew story 
from chapter II. Matthew has the threat advantage since, unlike Luke, he prefers 
cacophony over silence. If Luke refuses to let him play solo by playing the piano, 
Matthew can bring about Luke’s worst outcome by playing the trumpet at the same 
time. By using such a strategy, Matthew can improve his bargaining power when 
negotiating with Luke. The optimal threat is what puts one in the best position to strike 
an advantageous bargain.
Gauthier is aware of these strategies and he waves them away but claiming that
“they play a purely hypothetical role... since [the bargainers] do not actually choose 
them, but merely appeal to them to determine the costs that each could impose on the 
other in a strict competition for bargaining advantage. Maximally effective threat 
strategies would not be chosen by [the bargainers] were they to find themselves unable 
to co-operate; the threat point bears no particular relationship to the non-cooperative
310 Theories of Justice, p 69
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outcome. But if [the bargainers] would not choose these strategies, then they cannot 
credibly threaten with them.”311
In this quote, we can see that Gauthier does not adequately distinguish between credible 
and non-credible threats. This poses the problem of specifying the non-agreement point.
As Barry points out, the non-agreement point plays a hypothetical role in Gauthier’s 
theory just as much as in Nash’s. So the first part of Gauthier’s argument is irrelevant.
Now the next question is to know whether it is rational or not to make a threat with the 
intention to carry it out if the other party does not perform. Let us take the case of 
Matthew and Luke. It might be sufficient for Matthew to state that he prefers cacophony 
to silence for Luke to understand that he is in a weaker situation. Luke is then aware that 
if he wants co-operation and therefore a chance to play solo on some evenings, he has to 
concede more solo evenings to Matthew or else Matthew will bring about his worst 
outcome, namely cacophony. So it is rational to make a threat when one has an obvious 
threat advantage.
Let us go further: is it rational to carry out a threat when to make it is not sufficient to 
strike an advantage in bargaining. If, on the one hand, as it is the case in most real life 
situations, the relationship between the parties is on going, one could claim that it is 
rational to carry out a threat in order to be credible in future interactions. For a few 
nights, Matthew could play the trumpet while Luke is practising his piano until Luke 
comes in search of a compromise. It can be rational to pursue a worse outcome in the 
short run in order to bring about a better one in the long run. If, on the other hand the 
bargainers have a one off interaction, a threat is counterproductive and therefore 
irrational to carry out.
We are now touching the core of Gauthier’s argument. What is to be avoided above all 
are deadlocks or no agreement. Whatever could lead to no agreement is labelled as 
irrational under the assumption that co-operation is necessarily better than the status- 
quo. A  share of the co-operative surplus is necessarily better than no share at all. Once
311 Morals By Agreement, p 200
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again, we will follow Barry’s argument against this logic. Indeed he argues that such a
logic undermines completely the strategic aspect of bargaining:
“If we rule out any such strategic play as irrational and insist on non strategic 
maximisation as the only form of rational action, we automatically eliminate the 
rationale for any bargaining solution. For what drives every bargaining solution is the 
notion that rational actors will refuse any offer that they consider being inadequate even 
though it represents an improvement over the non-agreement point.”312
A straightforward maximiser will always try to get away with less concession and more 
benefits.
The question now is why Gauthier is so adamant that threat behaviours are ‘irrational’? 
Here comes his last argument: “In a community of rational persons, threat behaviour 
would be proscribed. Unlike cooperation, threat behaviour does not promote mutual 
advantage.”313 The same argument could easily apply to bluff and other standard 
bargaining tools. As claimed originally, I believe that the rationality Gauthier refers to 
here is already the rationality of mutual advantage and of morality. Bargainers are not to 
use these tools if they have internalised the benefit of mutual advantage. They must be 
prepared to surrender some of their personal advantage to better benefit from the future 
fruits of co-operation.
A straightforward maximiser, even pursuing mutual benefit and aiming at co-operation, 
would still try to improve his baseline in order to claim a bigger share of the co­
operative surplus. Bluff and threats are only a few of the tools he would use in order to 
maximise his utility. The conditions imposed on Gauthier’s bargainers forbid such 
practises. No straightforward maximiser would abide by his conditions, these are 
conditions for a constrained maximiser.
How was the confusion between straightforward and constrained maximisation possible?
From the above it seems easier to understand what has happened. Three of Gauthier’s 
assumptions make the confusion possible. The assumptions of full information and 
equal rationality have vastly contributed to the distortion of Gauthier’s bargaining
312 Theories of Justice, p 60
313 Morals by Agreement, p 186
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theory. These two assumptions have been discussed at length in the literature and a 
review of their impact was provided above. I believe that a third more insidious and less 
noticeable assumption is equally damaging: the assumption of equal need and want for 
co-operation. Indeed, Gauthier’s bargainers behave as if they all equally need and wish 
to achieve co-operation. They constrain their claims, they fear to put in jeopardy the 
‘bargaining process’ in the apparent belief that the others need and will co-operation as 
much as they do.
As suggested above, these three assumptions together contribute to equip all the 
bargainers with a roughly equal bargaining power and an equal willingness to comply 
with the agreement reached. In allocating equal bargaining power to his bargainers, 
Gauthier has removed all the strategic aspects that usually characterise bargaining 
between straightforward maximisers.
More importantly, these three assumptions considerably increase the benefit of co­
operation in comparison to solo behaviours. At equal bargaining power, the pursuit of 
mutual advantage almost merges with the pursuit of individual gain. If I know that my 
fellow bargainers are fully informed, equally rational and equally motivated to reach co­
operation, it becomes my direct best interest to pursue mutual advantage.
The threshold between pursuit of mutual advantage and pursuit of individual gain 
becomes insignificant. There is a co-operative surplus that comes into existence only 
through co-operation and bargainers have to aim at co-operation in order to benefit from 
a surplus that would not be available otherwise. The choice faced by a rational utility 
maximiser is then between the pursuit of co-operation that gives access to a benefit not 
available otherwise and the status quo. Presented this way, it is obvious that 
straightforward maximisation dictates the pursuit of mutual advantage as an integral 
part of individual gain. Under these assumptions, straightforward and constrained 
maximisation merge into one undistinguished form of rationality.
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Section 2: A new reading of Gauthier’s theory
I expressed in chapter 13 my reservations regarding Gauthier’s distinction between 
internal and external rationality. It seemed artificial to assume that individuals can 
simultaneously be straightforward maximisers while bargaining and constrained 
maximisers otherwise.
I can possibly accept that individuals are straightforward maximisers in the state of 
nature and during bargaining. Once in social interactions, they internalise the need for 
constraints on their behaviour and become constrained maximisers. Such an 
interpretation would have made sense if it was not for the proviso. The proviso 
introduces a chronological incoherence. Indeed, while still in the state of nature, 
Gauthier’s prospective bargainers have first to constrain their utility maximisation 
according to the proviso’s requirements in order to establish their respective initial 
bargaining positions. They then revert to straightforward maximisation to bargain. The 
outcome of bargaining leads them back to constrained maximisation.
I argue that if Gauthier believes that it is intrinsic to human nature to change rationality, 
this change of rationality has to precede bargaining. While in the state of nature, 
individuals become aware of the need for co-operation and they give priority to mutual 
advantage over pure personal interest. They then establish the original baseline applying 
the proviso, they bargain and they live in social interactions as constrained maximisers.
The two schemes on the next page illustrate my argument. Scheme 2 shows the new 
reading of Gauthier’s theory suggested above. It shows that in natural and market 
interactions, individuals are straightforward maximisers, impartiality is naturally 
sustained and the factor endowments are given. Through reason, and in the face of 
externalities, individuals come to realise the need for co-operation. They accept, in 
principle, to constrain their utility maximisation in the hope of benefiting from mutual 
advantage and cooperation in the future. In this frame of mind, they agree on a baseline 
complying with the proviso requirements; then they bargain, choose the Minimum 
Relative Principle and re-establish an artificial form of impartiality.
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Gauthier’s theory has gained in coherence but does it still hold the same interest?
Constrained rationality is the rationality of justice and morality. “Our concern is to show 
that if co-operation results from rational agreement, the constraint it imposes is just”.314 
If the rationality referred to in the above quote is already constrained i.e. the rationality 
of justice then Gauthier has not proven much. In other words, justice and morality pre­
exist the theory. They are not just rationally derived.
In chapter n315,1 showed that the rationality of morality is based on ‘mutual advantage’ 
rather than on pursuit of individual gain. According to my interpretation of Gauthier’s 
theory, impartiality prevails in natural and market interactions. Partiality occurs when 
there is conflict between the rationality required to pursue one’s individual gain and the 
one required to bring about mutual advantage. The reconciliation between these two 
types of rationalities then requires impartial constraints on individuals’ utility 
maximization. These constraints define the boundaries of morality. Morality arises from 
the emergence of partiality and it implements an artificial form of impartiality by giving 
priority to mutual advantage over pure individual gain.
According to our above argument, individuals accept to constrain their utility 
maximisation in the state of nature in order to benefit from mutually advantageous 
cooperative activity in the future. The rationality of mutual advantage supersedes the 
straightforward rationality that prevails in the state of nature. Prior to bargaining, the 
parties have to internalise the need to constrain their behaviour. In other words they 
have acquired the artificial virtue of morality. It comes as no surprise if the outcome of 
the bargain carries through their virtuous mood.
314 Morals By Agreement, pl51
315 See section 2, core conception 1.
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Scheme 1: Initial reading of Gauthier’s theory (See chapter II)
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Conclusion
We opened chapter HI with Gauthier’s moral theory and commented on the restricted 
field covered by it. We can now see why it is so. Gauthier understands morality as a 
constraint on the pursuit of individual utility. This constraint is rationally derived or 
rather the outcome of a change of rational disposition. Individuals in the state of nature 
come to realise the failure of the pursuit of individual interest in maximising their utility 
and rationally acquire a disposition to pursue mutual advantage instead. Morality 
appears when individuals are prepared to constrain the pursuit of pure individual gain to 
better pursue mutual benefit, i.e. when they internalise the change of rational 
disposition. The field of Gauthier’s moral theory is therefore limited to the field of 
mutual advantage.
Whatever is not mutually advantageous is out of the scope of his moral theory. That 
leaves out the long list of individual values that make better persons. More worrying is 
that whoever does not contribute anything to mutual advantage has no place in the 
bargaining process and can only be referred to as a negative externality. Children, 
elderly people or some of the handicapped persons contribute nothing to the co­
operative surplus but need instead schools, hospitals, old age and special homes. If we 
were mere rational machines, this exclusion would not be so shocking but since, as 
human beings, we do have affective bonds, such morality feels counter intuitive. Can 
we still label it ‘morality’?
In 1988, at a time Gauthier was still defending Morals by Agreement, he wrote:
“we must show,..., that the constraint captures at least something of our intuitive or pre- 
analytic understanding of morality. Failure here would not deprive our argument of 
interest and significance, but it would disqualify it as a rational reconstruction of 
morality.”316
It seems from the above that Gauthier failed in this project.
In this chapter, we demonstrated that morality, understood as constraints on individual 
utility maximisation was an input as much as an output of the agreement . We shall 
demonstrate in the rest of part II that this criticism carries through Gauthier’s latest 
articles.
316 ‘Morality, Rational Choice, and Semantic Representation’, p 177
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CHAPTER V: SHALL WE BE RESOLUTE?
As we saw in chapter HI, constrained maximisation remains the core idea of Morals by
Agreement. However, further to McClennen’s criticism, Gauthier realised that this
conception was too narrow and did not take into account preference changes. Gauthier
remained faithful to the core idea of morality as self-imposed constraints but, from
1993, he started to work within the framework of McClennen’s resoluteness.
“I remain convinced that this [constrained maximisation] remains the most fruitful 
idea in Morals by Agreement... A constrained maximiser, as I shall use the term in a 
way that generalises somewhat from my use in Morals by Agreement, is someone who 
takes her reasons for acting, not only directly from the utilities of possible outcomes 
she may bring about, but also from her plans and commitments.”317
Exploiting Bratman’s research on plans and intentions as well as McClennen concept 
of resoluteness, he replaced the constrained maximiser by the resolute planner. Through 
this change, Gauthier also took a new turn in his approach. We remember that the idea 
of Morals by Agreement was bom when he was first introduced to the Prisoner’s 
dilemma31*. He then realised that it was the modem way to express the Fool’s challenge 
and he tackled the huge task of providing a complete coherent theory to address the 
multi-persons prisoner’s dilemma that a society is.
But in the 1990’s, Gauthier came to realise that the Prisoner’s dilemma was the wrong
starting point. A contractarian moral theory or any theory of rational co-operation must
solve an assurance game instead. In 1998 he wrote: I claim that
‘each does best to be accepted by her fellows as a sincere adherent to these 
arrangements [principles, practices and institutions that would realise mutual advantage 
and would obtain the agreement of everyone] and that the best way to be accepted is to 
be such a person. And from the standpoint of such a person -  a just person -  adherence 
to just arrangements has the character not of a prisoner’s dilemma but an assurance
317 ‘Uniting Separate Persons’, p 185-186
318 See the preface of Morals by Agreement.
319 ‘Mutual Advantage and Impartiality’, p 128
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The distinction is obviously crucial since an assurance game involves dynamic choice, 
intentions and plans rather than mere strategic and static rational calculus as in the 
prisoner’s dilemma.
Gauthier amended McClennen’s concept of resoluteness to adapt it to his own theory. 
In this chapter, I will first review McClennen’s concept prior to detailing Gauthier’s 
amendments to it. I will then demonstrate that whether at intra or inter-personal level, 
sophistication is always a better strategy than resoluteness.
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Section 1: Resoluteness and plans
The contradiction of standard rationality: an assurance game
We saw in chapter HI how McClennen uses the Ulysses example to highlight the 
difference between, myopic, sophisticated and resolute Ulysses. This example 
represents the case of intra-personal dynamic consistency. We turn now to an assurance 
game representing a case of inter-personal dynamic choice. We shall underline the 
contradictions of the standard concept of rationality as described and interpreted by 
McClennen and Gauthier.
David Gauthier suggests the following situation321. My crops will be ready for 
harvesting before yours. It will be better for both of us if we harvest together both yours 
and my crops but you will help me to harvest my crops only if you expect that I will 
help you to harvest yours later. I am rational and if you help me then when the time 
comes for me to help you in return, I will deliberate as follows: if I help you I am still 
better off than if I had harvested on my own but I could be even better still if I don’t 
help you. Knowing that I am rational, you can guess my strategy as just described. 
Since you are rational too, you will not help me. We reach then a rather contradictory 
conclusion: our respective rational calculus brings about the worse outcome for both of 
us i.e. we both harvest on our own and fail to benefit from cooperation.
This ‘interactive game’ could be described as follows:
Outcome 1 (4,4) or (my second best, your best)
Help Don’t help— Outcome 2 (6,0) or (my best, your worst)
You
Don’t help Outcome 3 (2,2) or (my worst, your second best)
Figure 1: the assurance game
320 See section 3.
321 <'Assure and Threaten’, p 692
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The conditions of the game suggested are ideal:
- There is a Pareto-efficient outcome (we both harvest both crops together)
- We are both fully ‘rational’
- We both know that we are both rational
- We both know the strategy structure of each other
- We have common knowledge of preferences with regards to the outcome
In order to ensure that the focus is exclusively on choosing the appropriate mode of 
rational deliberation, Gauthier also specifies that
- I am not concerned about my reputation.
- It is not an iterated game so I am not worried about what will happen next year.
- There is no pre-existing moral standard about promise keeping.
We can identify in the above story an incremental assessment of the situation. The 
situation is assessed at each point down the decision tree. The rational individual 
considers the outcomes still available at each point in time she has to make a decision. 
To understand the issue at stake let us review the situation from both parties’ point of 
view both at t when my crops are ready for harvesting and then at t+1 when yours are 
ready.
As far as you are concerned, at t, the possible outcomes are either you help me and I 
don’t help you and you gain 0, you don’t help me and you gain 2 or you help me and I 
help you and you gain 4. Therefore, your preferred outcome would be that we 
cooperate. However you will not help me if you don’t expect me to return the favour. 
From my point of view, the outcomes are you don’t help me and I gain 2, you help me 
and I help you and I gain 4, you help and I don’t help and I gain 6. At this stage of the 
reasoning, my preferred outcome is that you cooperate and I don’t. The problem is that 
you will not cooperate if you are not convinced that I will cooperate when the time 
comes. If you don’t believe that I will help you, you will stay at home while I harvest 
my crops. This brings about my worst outcome.
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Since, according to the orthodox view developed above, I cannot secure my best 
outcome (you help, I don’t), I must aim at my second best outcome (you help, I help). 
If I want to achieve this outcome I must convince you that I will help you.
The problem is then as follows: in an incremental reasoning, once you have already 
helped me, it is still possible for me not to help you. I have already benefited from your 
help and it is now in my best interest not to help you. How can I then sincerely intend 
to help you at date t and decide not to help you at date t+1? Are we facing a case of 
inconsistency? If we do, how can I consider myself rational and inconsistent?
One could object that the situation changes between t and t+1 and therefore the 
assessment of the outcomes available has to change too. At date t, the fact that you help 
me is a variable data to incorporate as such in my decision-making process, whereas at 
t+1 it is a fact (or fixed data). At date t, I had to include in my reasoning the fact that to 
gain your help I had to convince you and therefore believe myself that I would help in 
return. At date t+1, you have helped me and, when reassessing the situation, I realise 
that it is in my best interest not to help you.
This objection does not hold for two reasons:
• First according to the given characteristics of the story, we are both fully rational and 
there is a common knowledge of our respective rationality. We both have the same 
form of rationality and it will not take you long to sketch the incremental reasoning just 
described. Being no fool, you obviously will not help me.
• Second how is it possible for me to sincerely intend to help you at t, when I already 
know at t that at t+1, my rational calculus will lead me not to help you? A belief is a 
mental disposition, and I cannot acquire such a disposition when I know that the 
statement that is the object of my belief is not true. If I cannot believe that I will help 
you, I cannot sincerely assure you that I will and you will have a good rest while I 
harvest my crops alone.
McClennen and Gauthier argue that, intuitively, the solution to the problem underlined 
dwells in my intentions. At t, either I intend to reach my best outcome (you cooperate
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and I don’t) and I am heading to disaster or I genuinely intend to secure my second best 
outcome (we both cooperate). My sincerity in giving you assurance is entirely 
dependent on my intentions and the success of my strategy is entirely dependent on my 
sincerity. Following our intuition still, we understand that our intentions are the sole 
link between present and future deliberations. Therefore, the notion of intention 
introduces the notion of continuity in rational deliberation. One of the weaknesses of 
rational deliberation as described above is the disconnection between the rational 
calculus at t and the rational calculus at t+1. The rational agent deliberates at t+1 as if 
the situation was new and was not part of strategy decided upon at t. The assessment of 
rationality cannot be disconnected from the ultimate goal.
McClennen’s solution.
The concept of resoluteness brings an interesting solution to the contradictions of 
incremental and separable rationality as underlined above. The reasoning starts at the 
interpersonal level and is then extended to interpersonal situations.
At an intrapersonal level, on the standard theory, a rational agent has to be dynamically 
consistent. In other words, once a rational agent has chosen his objectives and the plans 
that should enable him to attain them, he is not supposed to change these plans until 
completion unless he acquires new information that calls upon him to alter them. If he 
settles upon a plan, and then subsequently abandons it, even though no new information 
comes into play, then he is considered to be dynamically inconsistent. At the same 
time, the rational agent is supposed to look to what would bring about the best possible 
outcome as judged at the time of assessment and his choice of plans is meant to 
maximise his preferences for the outcomes.
This version of rationality allows for various adaptations:
• A plan which is likely to be later abandoned should not be considered as feasible. 
This weakness can be addressed by the introduction of a new degree of sophistication. 
An agent who, when planning at t, can foresee what is the best possible outcome but 
anticipates that the plan chosen to attain this objective is likely to be abandoned at t+i
185
can put constraints or rewards on the path to completion to ensure compliance with the 
original plan rather than treating the plan in question as not feasible.
• Most importantly according to this vision of rationality, it is not part of a rational 
thought process to ensure the coordination of past and present choices. At each point 
down the decision tree, the agent can reassess his situation as if he was at the beginning 
of a new decision tree; his past decisions matter only to the extent that they lead him to 
the present point. In other words, it is not expected from a rational agent to be able to 
follow through an mtertemporal plan, or at least not solely for the reasons set at the 
time of planning.
From the above, we understand that the concept of rationality rests on two principles:
• The principle of separability states that an agent is entitled, at each point in time, to 
deliberate and decide about what to do next on the basis of whatever there and then he 
judges will maximise his present preference with respect to outcomes still available322.
• The principle of feasibility states that a plan is feasible if and only if it is 
consequentially acceptable from a separable perspective at each successive step at 
which that plan specifies a choice to be made323.
A plan is assessed as feasible or not feasible by application of backward reasoning but 
plans are made by looking forward. Therefore, present choices are made according to 
projected subsequent choices. Dynamic consistency is ensured by constraining present 
choices to expected future ones.
At this point of the reasoning, McClennen suggests reversing the logic of consistency 
by constraining future choices to present ones. The agent makes plan at t and constrains 
his future choices to the plan until completion. To be resolute is to be dynamically 
consistent in this way and is a pure act of will; the constraint on future choices is a 
mere mental constraint.
322 ‘Pragmatic Rationality and Rules’, p 229
323 ‘Pragmatic Rationality and Rules’, p 230
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McClennen does not claim that to be resolute is always rational. Unforeseen 
circumstances can arise, of course, under which it will be rational to abandon the plan. 
He only claims that in certain circumstances to be resolute is a necessary condition of 
rational sequential choice. However, for very long term planning the concept of 
resoluteness could be too rigid324.
The concept of resoluteness involves a two level deliberative approach where the first 
level is dedicated to choosing the best outcome available and planning future choices in 
order to reach the goal set and the second level is for choosing and acting upon the plan 
made at the first level. The concept of resoluteness ensures coordination over time for 
an individual and between interacting agents at an interpersonal level.
To be resolute at interpersonal level means that once you have agreed on a sequence of 
choices with other agents, you are disposed to comply with the plan agreed upon 
wherever you have to choose325. In the game described above326, it is now easy to 
understand the power of the concept of resoluteness in solving the contradictions 
underlined. It is once again more ‘efficient’ or ‘productive’ to be resolute than to be 
merely rational.
Let us review our harvesting problem with our new binoculars. At t, your best outcome 
is for us to cooperate. As far as I am concerned, the situation is the same. I want you to 
help me to harvest my crops. In this context, it is in my best interest to convince you 
that I will help you to harvest yours when the time comes. If I want to convince you 
that I will help I have to plan at t that I will help you at t+1. At t+1,1 will not reassess 
the situation anew since nothing has changed, I will just carry out my original plan and 
help you. It is because I am resolute and because I genuinely intend to help you that I 
can sincerely assure you and therefore convince you at t that I will help you if you help 
me. So you will help me.
124 ‘Pragmatic Rationality and Rules’, p236
325 McClennen acknowledges that unforeseen circumstances can arise, of course, under which it will be 
rational to abandon the plan.
326 The conditions are: all the players are fully rational and there is common knowledge of the rationality of 
the players, of the strategy structure of the game and the preferences that each has with respect to outcomes. 
‘Pragmatic Rationality and Rules’, p 243-244.
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Most alternative solutions to the assurance game involve third party surveillance and 
enforcement systems. McClennen claims that voluntary compliance to plans as 
described in his theory is less costly and therefore more efficient.
In what follows, I will present Gauthier’s defence of the superior rationality of the 
resolute mode of deliberation over the sophisticated one at both intra and inter-personal 
levels.327 In both cases, I will defend the opposite argument and attempt to demonstrate 
the superiority of sophistication over resoluteness.328
327 Intra-personal dynamic choice means individual making plans about future choices for himself and 
involving himself only. Inter-personal dynamic choice means individuals making plans about their future 
choices while interacting with each other.
328 The assurance game described above is only one of the situations that have inspired Gauthier. However, 
in theorising about plans and commitments, Gauthier has also attempted to address Kavka’s toxin puzzle 
and a classical threat game. Kavka’s toxin puzzle goes as follows. A billionaire offers to pay one million 
dollars tomorrow morning if at midnight tonight I have convinced her that I intend to drink tomorrow 
afternoon a vial toxin that will make me violently ill for a day but will not be life threatening or have any 
lasting effect. Once she has put the money on my account in the morning, I can decide not to drink the toxin 
in the afternoon. If I don’t intend to drink the toxin, can I convince her that I will? If I really intend to drink 
it, will I drink it when the time comes?
The threat game is also well known. Bob makes a threat to Bill. If Bill complies, Bob has much to gain but 
if Bill resists the threat, it will be costly to Bob to carry out his threat. A lot depends obviously on Bill’s 
assessment of Bob’s intention to carry out his threat. Is it rational to make such a threat? And if it is, is it 
rational to carry it out?
In willing to embrace all these cases under the same theory, Gauthier runs the risk of confusing goals. In 
particular the toxin puzzle is based solely on intention. Unlike in the co-operation case, compliance with the 
intention is inconsequential to the story. The threat game as well should remain out of the scope of his 
analysis since a moral theory is unlikely to spring from such a start. Threat games belong to strategic 
bargaining not to co-operation and moral practice. We shall leave these cases aside in this section.
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Section 2: Rational agency & choice between modes of deliberation -Intra- 
personal dynamic choices
Gauthier’s criterion
To give Ulysses a break, I would like to take another example (more meaningful to 
me!). We met with Michelle in chapter II and we remember her preference for 
chocolate cakes over fruit salads. Michelle cannot resist the smell of cakes when she 
passes her local bakery to go to work. Aware of her extra weight and knowing her 
weakness, she has two strategies available. She can be sophisticated and take a longer 
route that does not pass by the bakery. But Michelle has a very tight schedule in the 
morning and the time wasted to take the longer route is costly to her. Alternatively, she 
can be resolute, realise that in her best interest she must not eat cakes and decides (or 
plans) that she will pass by the bakery without stopping. To be resolute will save her 
the cost in time that she would encounter would she choose to be sophisticated.
When planning, an agent first chooses a goal or preferred outcome. Often a plan 
involves a sequence of choices. If, when planning, an agent can foresee that he will 
experience a temporary change of preference at one of the choice node, the plan is 
called not feasible. To be sophisticated is to be aware of this unwanted change of 
preference and to put in place an enforcement mechanism that will force the agent to 
comply with his original plan. Unfortunately such a strategy usually has a cost that to 
be resolute can spare.
McClennen suggests the following criterion for deciding when resolute choice is 
rationally superior to sophisticated choice:
‘what forms a natural condition for the self being resolute is precisely its becoming 
aware that there are benefits to both the present self and the future self that will be 
foregone if the self cannot act resolutely.’329
329 *Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations’, p 212. To understand the difference, we 
can take another example. To avoid eating cakes at home, Michelle can either be sophisticated and have 
none in the house or be resolute and have cakes in the house but to decide to eat none. To have a cake-free 
home is costless to Michelle. It puts the full family on a diet (which cannot be that bad) and it is actually 
cheaper. Following McClennen’s criterion in this case, sophisticated choice is rationally superior to resolute 
choice. There is no benefit to gain in being resolute rather than sophisticated.
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I believe that this criterion is not sufficient and I am not the only one. Gauthier also 
defends a more stringent criterion.
His argument is primarily against the separability principle. Resoluteness does not 
provide the adequate rational mode of deliberation for agents anticipating preference 
shifts or changes in prospects.330 An agent makes plans for herself based on her present 
concerns. However, at the time of choice, her concern might have changed and her past 
interests should not have any practical significance on her present life. Rational 
deliberation should allow for some preference shifts.
Unfortunately, resoluteness as a mode of deliberation lacks of flexibility and fails to 
adapt to change of concerns since it entails a violation of the separability principle. 
According to McClennen, the preference for the overall outcome becomes endogenous 
and outweighs immediate preferences at each node on the decision tree. So in 
Michelle’s case, when adopting the resolute mode of deliberation, her preference for 
being slim outweighs her preference for cakes when she passes by the bakery. But does 
it?
Gauthier argues that McClennen’s above criterion for deciding between modes of 
deliberation is not satisfactory and he endeavours to provide an alternative one.
Gauthier distinguishes between proximate (or immediate) preferences from vanishing
point (or overall) preferences that an agent acknowledges when choice is not
0 -3  1
imminent. Michelle has a vanishing point preference for being slim, however when 
passing by the bakery, she has a proximate preference for cakes. Agents rationally base 
their choices on vanishing point preferences. If Michelle still has a vanishing-point 
preference for being slim when passing by the bakery, rationality dictates that she 
chooses not to buy cakes. Indeed, if she surrenders to her immediate preference and 
buys a cake, she would do less well in achieving her overall preference for being slim. 
Given her preference at all time for being slim, her vanishing point preference is a more 
rational basis for deliberation than her proximate preference for cakes.
330 ‘Resolute Choice and Rational Deliberation’, p 17
331 ‘Resolute Choice and Rational Deliberation’, p 20
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But what if, when passing by the bakery, Michelle judges that the benefits of realising 
her desire for cakes far outweigh the cost of a lifetime sacrifice to her shape? Surely 
deliberation cannot be rational if it dictates actions contrary to one’s preferences at the 
time of choice. Gauthier argues that resoluteness stops being a rational mode of 
deliberation when the strength of proximate preferences is over a certain threshold that 
he calls the threshold of immediacy. Indeed, if the strength of Michelle’s proximate 
preference when she passes the bakery is such that she will prefer to buy a cake she will 
do less well overall. The resolute mode of deliberation will not allow her to realise her 
overall preference for being slim. When the strength of her proximate preference is 
above a certain threshold, she is better off being sophisticated and taking a longer route 
than being resolute. So what is the threshold?
According to Gauthier, a preference below the threshold is such that at the time of 
choice, an agent would choose not to act on her proximate preference if the alternative 
were to act on all of her proximate preferences of equal strength. A preference above 
the threshold is such that at the time of choice, she would choose to act on her 
proximate preference if the alternative were to act on all of her proximate preferences 
of equal strength. The threshold of immediacy now provides a comparative test for 
modes of deliberation:
“what survives as a candidate for rationality is the mode of deliberation that validates 
acting on proximate preferences if their strength exceeds the threshold of immediacy 
and validates acting on vanishing point preferences if the strength of her proximate 
preferences falls below that threshold.”333
Resoluteness involves acting on the basis of vanishing point preferences. Therefore 
Gauthier argues that it is a rational mode of deliberation only when the strength of 
proximate preferences is below the threshold of immediacy.
How should we understand Gauthier’s criterion for deciding between modes of 
deliberation? Let us apply it to Michelle.
Michelle’s preference is below the threshold of immediacy if at the time of choice she 
prefers to eat a cake today but not to eat cakes on any other days, even if she was to 
experience on all these other days a similar desire for cakes as she does today. In other
332 ‘Resolute Choice and Rational Deliberation’, p 21-22.
333 ‘Resolute Choice and Rational Deliberation’, p 22
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words, at the time of choice, she still prefers to be slim than to eat cakes ... except on 
this very occasion. On the contrary, Michelle’s preference is above the threshold of 
immediacy if she chooses to eat a cake today and considers that she will do so 
whenever she feels, as she does today, that life is too short to be made of sacrifices.
How practical is this criterion? I really wonder. Indeed, when the proximate preference 
is below Gauthier’s threshold of immediacy, one can interpret it as mere ad hoc 
rationalisation of temptation. Gauthier claims that it is then irrational to base 
deliberation on such proximate preferences.334 However, when proximate preferences 
are above Gauthier’s threshold one can wonder if the vanishing point preference has 
not changed. If, at each decision point, Michelle considers that life is too short to 
sacrifice her desire for cakes to her shape, it is possibly because she actually overall 
prefers enjoying cakes more than she prefers being slim. If our interpretation is correct, 
Gauthier’s criterion only reveals a shift of vanishing point preference but does not deal 
with the classic case of weakness of will or rational temptation?35
It is all very nice to tell Michelle that it is irrational to base her deliberation on her 
proximate preferences when they only reflect her temptation for cakes. The reality is 
that wherever temptation exists, agents run the risk of succumbing to it. My argument 
is that a criterion for choosing between rational modes of deliberation would have to 
take into account this risk. I want to argue now that the risk of rational temptation 
actually can make resoluteness rationally inferior to sophisticated choice.
Defence of sophistication over resoluteness
One should assess the rationality of a mode of deliberation in terms of its ability to lead 
to the overall goal set. When deliberating, an agent chooses the goal she wants to 
achieve and indeed makes plans that will enable her to reach that goal. If she has to 
choose rationally between the resolute and the sophisticated modes of deliberation, one 
can describe her rational calculus as follows.
334 ‘Resolute Choice and Rational Deliberation’, p 21
335 The expression ‘rational temptation’ was borrowed from C. Finkelstein’s ‘Rational Temptation’. A 
rational temptation is a ‘temptation an agent faces due to a temporary shift in her preference ordering’ p 57.
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Table 1
Advantages Disadvantages
Sophistication Secure achievement of 
most preferred outcome
Add cost of enforcement 
Introduce rigidity into plan
Resoluteness Avoid cost of enforcement 
Allow for reconsiderations
Run a risk of not achieving 
most preferred outcome
In order to choose between these two modes of deliberation, it is essential to evaluate 
properly the risk involved in resoluteness. Let us attempt to offer an evaluation of this 
risk.
Who needs to make a plan at intra-personal level? Of course, we plan our day, our 
week-end or our holidays; we can also plan our career or our family life. We can have 
intentions about all these various aspects of our life but all these plans depend very 
much on context, opportunity or other criterion. The plans that we set for ourselves are 
usually the ones that enables us to fight a weakness, a recurrent temptation. We need 
resolutions and planning when we know that our will power is not strong enough to 
fight the temptations that are on the way to our most preferred goal.
For example, a student knows that, when the time comes to study, he usually prefers 
watching a good film, reading a good book or going out with the lads. He knows he 
cannot rely on his will power never mind how much he wants to be successful in his 
studies. A student who has no difficulty to motivate herself to study does not need any 
plan or any resolutions. WTien she has work to do or exams to take, she studies, full 
stop. On occasions, she probably also has to fight distractions (a good film or a party) 
but such ‘sacrifices’ hardly counts as counter-preferential choices since her preference 
for successful studies still strongly dominates her preference for the envisaged film or 
party.
To expect someone to choose counter-preferentially at the time of choice is irrational 
argues Finkelstein. Michelle has a strong preference for cakes when she passes by the 
bakery and her preference for cakes temporarily outweighs her preference for being 
slim. Finkelstein argues that people will always choose what they most prefer at the
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time of action. She then demonstrates that resolute plans are either infeasible because 
imposing counter-preferential choices or unnecessary if proximate and vanishing point 
preferences are compatible. Her demonstration is simple: the resolute choice theorists 
would not be able to defend counter-preferential deliberation outside a plan. If counter- 
preferential behaviour cannot be ruled out by the theory of rationality outside the 
context of plan-execution, then the fact that an agent does better in terms of his 
vanishing point preferences would not be sufficient to make his adoption of a resolute 
plan rational.336
We need resolute planning when a plan is rejected as non-feasible by the standard 
account of rationality. There is no need for an enforcement system and therefore for the 
competing resolute planning when all the choices involved in the plan are compatible 
with all the agent’s preferences. Resolute planning necessarily involves counter- 
preferential choice(s). Finkelstein argues that such plans are not feasible whether 
resolute or not. My argument is similar. I claim that resolute planning is either 
unnecessary or less rational than sophistication.
Let us consider several situations. In a first case, the vanishing point preference 
dominates the proximate preferences that are likely to spring out at decision points 
along the plan. The serious student would not mind watching a film rather than working 
at times. She does experience a mild shift of preference on occasions but her preference 
for successful studies dominates her temporary temptations. She can foresee that she 
will resist temptation at each decision point. Her plan is feasible according to the 
standard account of rationality since no counter-preferential choice is involved: at each 
decision point, she still prefers successful studies to a good film or a party. She is fully 
aware o f her motivation to succeed and it dominates her choices. Since no counter- 
preferential choice is involved, resolute planning is unnecessary.
In a second situation, the agent is unsure about the strength of his vanishing point 
preference especially in comparison to the strength of his future proximate preferences. 
He cannot foresee what he will do, and he takes a risk of not reaching his most 
preferred goal. We need to prove that taking a risk is always more costly to the agent 
than enforcement measures. After all, there are various degrees of risk some more
336 See her ‘Rational Temptation’.
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manageable than others. What if the risk to succumb seems slim enough to the agent 
and he finds it more rational to take the risk than to put in place enforcement measures?
The agent’s own evaluation of the risk is the only evaluation that matters in this debate. 
His evaluation depends on two factors: his attitude to risk and the importance of the 
preferred outcome in his overall priorities. These two factors are obviously connected. 
If the outcome chosen is important to the agent, it is clear that he will be less prepared 
to take risk with it than if it is a very lower priority for him.
Now if the outcome of the plan is not so important to him than one can wonder why he 
is wasting time making plans and deliberating about them. One could also argue that if 
the outcome of the plan is a low priority for the agent then the strength of his vanishing 
point preference is mild. If it is mild, most proximate preferences would outweigh it. In 
this case, the agent would not act counter-preferentially if he acted upon his proximate 
preferences. We are back to feasible plan within the standard rationality framework.
From the above, we gather that individuals usually plan where there is an important 
issue at stake. Individuals have to choose between being resolute and being 
sophisticated in situations where they usually have a weakness to fight that threatens 
the achievement of their most preferred outcome. If they had no temptations on the way 
to their preferred outcome, they could rely on the standard account of rationality. If the 
issue is important to them so then they will not be willing to take a risk and fail to 
achieve their desired goal but if they have a weakness, the risk to succumb to 
temptation on the way is high. Therefore individuals would choose sophistication over 
resoluteness as a rational mode of deliberation.
If Gauthier has some reservations about resoluteness at intra-personal level, he believes 
that it is a valid mode of deliberation at an inter-personal level. I agree with him that 
the concept of resoluteness does apply very differently at an inter-personal level than it 
does at intra-personal level. However, I want to argue that resoluteness has no chance 
to take root without some pre-moral standards. Until these standards are in place 
sophistication remains the only rational mode of deliberation.
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Section 3: Rational agency and choice between modes of deliberation - Inter­
personal dynamic choices
Gauthier’s concept of resoluteness
As a general comment, we can say that Gauthier’s solution to the assurance game is 
largely inspired by McClennen’s. However his objections to the concept of resoluteness 
are similar to the ones raised above in Michelle’s case. We can sum them up in two 
points .
• Firstly, he disagrees with McClennen’s rejection of the separability principle. 
Gauthier considers that agents are entitled to reconsider their plans at each node point. 
Reconsideration does not necessarily mean modification of the original plan. It only 
means checking that the original outcome-orientated plan is still the best plan available 
considering the agent’s preferred outcome. We shall come back to his reconsideration 
criteria below.
• Secondly, he finds that McClennen concedes two much to the orthodox theory of 
rationality in supposing that directly maximising considerations are to brought to bear 
on each particular choice. Gauthier rejects the concept of endogenous or context 
dependent preferences and assumes that agents can make counter-preferential choices. 
Immediate preferences bear on current choices only if they can contribute to bring 
about the preferred outcome.
Gauthier’s agents first choose their preferred outcome. They then make a plan that, if 
followed, will bring about the chosen outcome. The agent forms an intention to carry 
out the plan. At each decision point, he will check that the original plan-suggested 
choice is still the best choice available in the current situation. If the agent still expects 
to do better in executing his intention than if he had not formed it, then he has an 
adequate reason to execute it. The agent will then rationally disregard any immediate 
preferences that are not compatible with the original plan. If the agent no longer
337 Gauthier has made these two points in several articles. For reference we can suggest looking at 
‘Commitment and Choice: An essay on the Rationality of Plans’ §5.2, p 240-242
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expects to do better than if he had not formed the intention, he is entitled to reconsider 
his original plan.338 Let us now review our harvesting example.
Gauthier’s suggestion to solve our initial harvesting problem is as follows.339 My aim is 
that my life goes as well as possible. At t, I understand that to harvest my crops with 
you is part of a plan that makes my life going as well as possible. But if I don’t help 
you, you don’t help me. Therefore to help you is also part of a plan that makes my life 
going as well as possible. To gain your help I have to promise you that I will help you 
in return when the time comes to harvest your crops. Once I have benefited from your 
help on the basis of my promise to help you, I make outcome 2 (in figure 1) 
intentionally incompatible with my promise. At t+1,1 have benefited from your help on 
the basis of my assurance. Not to help you is incompatible with my prior acceptance of 
your help. Therefore at t+1 I am left with only one possible outcome according to 
figure 1, namely to help you. It is the sincerity of my intentions to help you that 
convinced you to help me.
Like McClennen, he believes that:
• One should assess the rationality of a deliberative process in its ability to lead to the 
overall goal set. In reaching the goal set, I might have to perform ‘irrational’ actions i.e. 
actions which do not fit in the standard rational calculus (to help you in our example).
• From t already I can see that to help you is only my second best outcome but the best 
achievable outcome. At t+1 the assessment of the situation should be no different.
• The solution to the problem dwells in my intentions. The only way I can convince 
you at t that I will help you at t+1 is to genuinely intend to do so. In order to be able to 
give you this assurance sincerely I have to put mental constraints on my future choice.
I would like to challenge the last point defending two alternative solutions to the 
assurance game highlighting the danger involved in relying on intentions and sincere 
assurances. Gauthier and McClennen defend resoluteness almost as if there was only 
one supremely rational mode of deliberation, that we all acknowledge its superiority 
and adopt it. In any of their reasoning, whatever is not supremely rational is
338 See ‘Rethinking the Toxin Puzzle’, p 48-49
339 See ‘Assure and Threaten’, p 692-697
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disregarded.340 A. Morton claims: ‘If we had one kind of ideal rationality we would be 
able to bind ourselves to cooperative actions... We are not ideally rational. We waver 
in our resolutions, and we do not see problems until they are upon us.’ 341 Here, I want 
to argue that there are alternative rational options available. I do not claim that we will 
all deliberate as described below but for the sake of my argument, I just need to prove 
that some amongst us can use one of the following modes of deliberation. As before, I 
only need to prove the existence of a risk of non-compliance. Their mere existence 
threatens the supreme rationality of resoluteness.
Alternative 1: bluffing
It is possible to bluff. It is even more rational to be a successful bluffer than to be a 
genuine assurance giver. In short, if I successfully bluff you, I can secure my best 
outcome (you help, I don’t) rather than my second best outcome (You help, I help). 
Bluffmg might come more naturally to some agents than to others but the reality is that 
some amongst us are excellent bluffers.
We must remember the condition of the game: it is not an iterated game, there is no 
issue of reputation involved and I do not feel obliged by a pre-existing morality to keep 
my words. Based on pure rational ground, it makes perfect sense to bluff convincingly 
rather than to give a sincere assurance.
Gauthier or McClennen would object that I would not be able to convince you that I 
will help you later if I do not genuinely intend to do so. If such a claim was true it 
would mean that we are transparent. We are not. Even Gauthier had to assume that we 
are at best translucent. The same way some agents can disguise their dispositions, some 
can disguise their intentions. Bluffing exists and given the game structure, an agent has 
sufficient rational motivation to use her bluffmg skills if she has any.342
340 We must be careful not to claim that Gauthier and McClennen assume that agents have only one form of 
rationality. Both of them are perfectly aware of the various forms of rationality available from one agent to 
an other (See for example Gauthier’s ‘Public reason’). My only concern is that, at times, they seem to 
consider that what is not resolute or ‘constrained’ reflects a case of irrationality.
341 See ‘Psychology for Cooperators’, p 167
342 This argument is probably the main argument I hold against Gauthier’s solution to the toxin puzzle as 
argued in his ‘Rethinking the Toxin Puzzle’.
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The main argument that makes resoluteness a rationally superior mode of deliberation 
is that it saves on the cost of an enforcement mechanism. We looked at the limits of this 
argument at the intra-personal level with Michelle. At the inter-personal level this 
argument meets a new challenge. Resoluteness is a mere mental constraint imposed by 
rational deliberation. In a one-off game, the only way one can ‘check’ the resoluteness 
of others’ is to be convinced by their intentions.343 It does not take much imagination to 
see that there is here an obvious room for error that a good bluffer would endeavour to 
exploit.
In our harvesting game, if I convince you that I have the intention to help you after you 
have helped me, you will assume that I am resolute and you will not feel the need for 
an enforcement mechanism whether I am resolute or just a good bluffer.
Alternative 2: myopic choice
This alternative is based on Gauthier’s concept of resoluteness. His agents can 
reconsider their plan at each decision point and can make counter-preferential choices. 
Let us review once more our harvesting example.
At 11 can see that it is in my best interest to help you if I want to gain your help. To 
obtain it I am prepared to help you in return. I adopt a resolute mode of deliberation. I 
want to avoid the cost of an enforcement mechanism (for example, I leave a provisional 
penalty to a third party: if I help you, the third party will give me back my money; if I 
don’t help you , he will give it to you) and I form the intention to return your help. You 
are convinced by my sincere intentions and we decide not to have recourse to a third 
party. At t+1 however, we have harvested my crop and I no longer see the benefit I 
could gain from helping you. The question is now: does my original intention give me a 
reason to help you? Does my intention provide me with a rational obligation to return 
your help? I believe we can answer ‘no’ to both questions. Let us see why.
343 Obviously in an iterated game, agents can also refer to past history of the game.
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In a very good article344, J. Broome argues that intentions are not reasons. His main 
argument is rooted in M. Bratman’s famous ‘bootstrapping objection’: reasons cannot 
be created out of nothing. If something is not a reason, it does not become one because 
an agent takes it to be one. According to Broome, an intention is at best a normative 
requirement. If at the time of action, an agent has not changed her mind and her 
intention has not been ‘repudiated’, then it normatively requires her to do what she 
intended.
I believe that Gauthier would not dispute Broome’s argument. He is the first one to 
claim that the weight of an intention on further reconsiderations depends on its 
strength. Not every intention is strong or firm enough to support an assurance345. He is 
careful never to claim that intentions are reasons. Gauthier only refuses to divorce 
current intentions from future actions. Unlike Bratman, he rejects the contrast between 
deliberation about what one intends now and deliberation about what one will do later. 
He argues that when deliberating about whether to give a sincere assurance or not, one 
cannot simultaneously intend to reciprocate later and therefore give a sincere assurance 
and decide not to reciprocate. Gauthier assumes that we deliberate only once about 
what to do, at the beginning of a planning process. In deliberating, one decides on the 
outcome to go for and on the set of actions required to achieve it. Despite their 
temporal disparity, these future actions are part o f the same deliberation process and 
must therefore be consistent Within a plan, one does not deliberate anew, one merely 
reconsiders.
At t+1, when I have to decide whether I will return your help or not, Gauthier claims 
that I must review the situation within the deliberation framework I  had at t, when I 
made my plan. At t, I could foresee that in following my plan I would only achieve my 
second best outcome in sincerely assuring you that I will return your help. If the 
situation at t+1 is as I expected it to be then I have no ground to reconsider although 
continuing on this plan would no longer bring about the best outcome available from 
my new standpoint.346
344 See ‘Are Intentions Reasons?’
345 See ‘Intention and Deliberation’, p 45
346 See ‘Intention and Deliberation’, p 48-49
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Do rational individuals really deliberate this way? If I was to deliberate sequentially at 
each decision point, I would be called myopic. But better be myopic than blind! In 
effect, agents are required to close their eyes to outcomes technically still available to 
them and better than what they could achieve were they to pursue their plan. Gauthier 
would argue that I was able to secure my second best outcome because I had the 
intention to return your help. Had I not made the plan to return your help, I would not 
have been able to give you a sincere assurance and therefore I would not have benefited 
from your help. My plan enabled me to secure my second best instead of my worst at a 
time my first choice was not available. So now I must be faithful to my plan. This 
reasoning sounds more like a moral than a rational argument: I must be faithful to a 
plan that served me well although now it is no longer rational to keep it.
If I agree that an intention can support a sincere assurance and therefore lead an agent 
to keep her assurance, I also believe that an intention does not generate an obligation. 
Therefore it cannot secure compliance with the action planned. Some agents do reason 
sequentially. At t, it is possible to realise the benefit I could gain from returning your 
help and genuinely intend to do so at t+1. Yet, it is also possible to deliberate anew at 
t+1 rather than looking backward on past deliberations and decide not to help you. The 
problem is that I was able to give you a sincere assurance and you had no way to know 
whether I was resolute or merely myopic. Again, we are not transparent: you have no 
means of measuring the strength of my intention or assess whether I will carry out my 
plan. My argument is that this degree of uncertainty must be taken into account when 
choosing between rational modes of deliberation.
Intentions are not reasons and a fortiori, they do not create any rational obligations 
whether with oneself or with others. An agent is not bound by his plan, his intention or 
his assurance. Gauthier or McClennen would argue that she has a rational ‘mental 
bound’ to her plan. But this mental bound is as strong as the agent can or want to make 
it. An intention does not necessarily travel well. An agent can ‘suffer’ from a temporary 
shift of preference between the time at which she formed the intention to act later and 
the time of acting upon her intention. The strength of her ‘mental bound’ can be 
outweighed by the strength of her proximate preference. In such a case, she has no 
obligation to stick to her plan or keep her assurance. In the meantime, she was able to 
give a sincere assurance and was convincing enough to be believed.
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Defence of sophistication against resoluteness.
Our argument is very similar to the one presented at intra-personal level. Our main 
issue is that Gauthier and McClennen focus essentially on the agent giving the 
assurance. They argue that if he is sincere and adopts a resolute plan then he can 
convince his partner in the game of his resoluteness and together they can avoid paying 
for enforcement measures.
The alternatives presented above highlight one aspect: agents are not transparent. The 
agent giving the assurance can be genuinely resolute but the agent receiving the 
assurance has no way to know for sure whether the assurance received is genuine or 
not. If he accepts not to put in place enforcement measures, he runs a risk of being 
deceived or let down. We are back to the rational calculus described in table 1. Our 
demonstration of the superiority of sophistication over resoluteness follows the same 
path.
In short, the bigger the risk of being deceived or let down, the less likely agents will be 
willing to rely on the resoluteness of their partner. The game being one off, freed of 
pre-moral standards and without any issue of reputation being at stake, the risk taken by 
the agent receiving the assurance is rather substantial and will justify the cost of an 
enforcement system.
I believe, like Gauthier and McClennen that individuals are able to be resolute and that 
resoluteness could be made more rational than sophistication. However, resoluteness is 
not a natural mode of deliberation. The natural mode of deliberation is described in the 
standard account of rationality. It is what Gauthier once called straightforward 
maximisation. Resoluteness is an artificial or social mode of deliberation. Unlike 
Gauthier and McClennen, I do not believe that it will come naturally to straightforward 
maximisers precisely because of the risk taken by the ones who will have to perform 
first in any assurance situations. As long as resoluteness is not widely generalised, 
sophistication will remain the only rational mode of deliberation. Let me explain.
202
If we want resoluteness to get started in a society, agents must first change focus from 
the pursuit of individual benefit to the pursuit of mutual advantage. Contrary to what 
Gauthier and McClennen claim, resoluteness is not a stand alone rational concept. We 
are back to the comment we made about Gauthier’s bargainers in chapter IV. What 
Gauthier calls morality is an artificial virtue developed by individuals in social 
interactions and that is supported by a change of focus from pure individual gain to 
mutual benefit. For resoluteness to be a more rational mode of deliberation than 
sophistication, this change has to pre-exist the assurance game or any social interaction. 
If agents have internalised this shift of interest, then they have acquired the social virtue 
called morality. Only then can the risk of defection (or deception) be significantly 
reduced and enforcement measures avoided. Moral standards have to pre-exist the 
assurance game for resoluteness to be a rational mode of deliberation. This is 
incompatible with the assumptions of the game as described above.
Gauthier is aware that at a social scale, morality and obligation have to pre-exist 
compliance with institutions and practice rules. Once again he finds inspiration in 
Hobbes. We remember that through natural reason, agents derived the laws of nature. 
Gauthier argues that Hobbes’ laws of nature create an obligation to comply with the 
sovereign’s civil laws.
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CHAPTER VI: A RE-INTERPRETATION OF HOBBES’ 
CONTRACTARIAN THEORY AND PUBLIC REASON
In chapter I we saw that according to Gauthier, Hobbes distinguishes natural and 
conventional reason. Natural reason enables men to achieve their primary end i.e. self- 
preservation and leads them to lay down their right of nature. But as they lay down their 
right of nature they also lay down this very natural reason as their aim switches from 
self-preservation to peace i.e. from individual to mutual advantage. A new conventional 
reason then supersedes natural reason. Since right reason is individually devised, it is no 
longer a reliable tool to harmonise all individual behaviours towards a mutual 
advantage. Therefore, Hobbes needs to introduce an arbitrator (the sovereign) to decide 
on the common right reason, the conventional reason. Each has grounds to accept it as 
long as it is common knowledge that most persons accept it and expect others to adhere 
to it.
Gauthier claimed that Hobbes’s morality arises with the laws of nature that establish a
set of conventions constraining each man’s maximizing activity and distinguishing right
from wrong. Gauthier suggested rephrasing the second law of nature as follows:
‘As long as each person appeals solely to his natural reason, there can be no security to 
any man of living out the time that nature ordinarily allows. Thus a man must be willing 
when others are so too, as far as he shall think it necessary for peace, to lay down 
natural reason, and be contented with a standard of reason which allows him so much 
liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself347.
In the 1990’s Gauthier’s focus evolved and he developed two new themes in his 
interpretation of Hobbes. The first one was about Hobbes contractarian theory of law; 
he attempted to prove that the laws of nature, as commands of reason, do create an 
obligation to obey the sovereign. The second theme was a development of the 
conventional reason which he then named public reason. This littie detour through 
Gauthier’s interpretation of Hobbes will enlighten his latest research on a contractarian 
theory.
347 ‘Thomas Hobbes : Moral Theorist’, p557
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I repeat what I said before. Gauthier is a Hobbes scholar, I am not. In this chapter, 
wherever I refer to Hobbes, it is from Gauthier’s writings. Whether his interpretation of 
the Master is correct and conventional or not is irrelevant for the purpose of this chapter. 
My only reason to develop on Gauthier’s interpretation of Hobbes is to highlight the 
link between his understanding of the classic philosopher and his research on his own 
contractarian theory. Hobbes is an obvious source of inspiration in his research; his 
work on Hobbes is an integral part of his philosophy.
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Section 1: Hobbes’ theory of law.
In the state of nature, each agent is free and has a right to do whatever is necessary to 
further her own good which Hobbes assimilates to her self-preservation. Persons find 
themselves in competition and the right of nature of one opposes the right of others. 
Through reason, agents realise that in order to find security they all have to agree to 
give up their natural right. The laws of nature are the mere outcome of each individual’s 
prudential reasoning. They are not laws as such and certainly not edicts of a lawgiver. 
However, the exercise of these laws effectively curbs individual rights of nature. 
Gauthier claims that ‘in requiring us to curb the exercise of natural right, the laws of 
nature bring a moral order into existence.’348 I would like to stop a moment on this 
quote and attempt to understand it.
As we saw before, in Gauthier’s world, morality is an artificial virtue.
• It is artificial firstly because it emerges within social interactions and not in the state 
of nature. It is also artificial because it does not come naturally to individuals, it is 
derived through instrumental reason. It is supported by an artificial form of rationality 
where the pursuit of individual interest is supplanted by the pursuit of mutual advantage. 
Morality is the artificial impartiality that prevails in social interactions.
• Morality is a virtue because it applies to human beings as rational agents. Morality 
becomes a virtue once individuals have internalised the change of rationality or the 
change of focus required. Morality is ‘an impartial constraint on the direct pursuit of 
individual utility’.349 It is a self-imposed constraint on behaviour.
So how are we to understand the sentence ‘the laws of nature bring a moral order into 
existence’? I believe that the only way to read it is as follows. The emergence of the 
laws of nature creates moral standards, i.e. they dictate what individuals should do if 
they are rational and they want to secure their self-preservation. The laws of nature do 
not create the actual virtue but only the normative standards of the virtue. The
348 ‘Thomas Hobbes and the Contractarian Theory of Law’, p 20
349 Morals by Agreement, p 95
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acquisition of the virtue is a personal ‘effort’. It is an effort because it requires fighting 
the human (or ‘natural’) rationality and replacing it by a ‘social’ one. In Gauthier’s 
interpretation of Hobbes, it requires the acceptance of public reason over private 
judgement or natural reason. I believe it would be a massive mistake to assume that 
instrumental reason on its own is sufficient to tame human natural rationality. The fact 
that the change of rationality is a prudential edict does not mean that agents will actually 
perform the change required. The prudential edict creates the standards for morality but 
it does not create the virtue. The virtue appears only once the prudential command has 
been internalised by the agents.
Let us illustrate our argument with an example. Most of the rules of the road could be 
the outcome of instrumental reasoning. It is in our best interest not to use a mobile 
phone while driving, not to speed, or to stop at a red light. These rules are also in our 
social, mutual interest: when these rules are kept, roads are a much safer place for all of 
us, drivers, passengers and pedestrians. If we were in the hypothetical situation to 
decide whether we would choose these rules or not, we can safely assume that most of 
us would derive and agree on them. It does not mean that we keep them. It has rapidly 
become a necessity to make these common sense rules into laws and to enforce 
compliance to them. Every day people are caught by enforcement cameras or the police. 
We each have a good reason not to keep such or such rule (I am late and the roads are 
free) and we think that it will go unnoticed. We give priority to our local momentary 
needs or reasons over the mutual interest. Is it a case of irrationality? Or does it only 
mean that we have retained our ‘natural reason’ (or human natural rationality) and we 
have not yet switched to the social one?
Gauthier is fully aware that the link between the dictate of instrumental reason and the 
emergence of morality is an effort from each individual on his natural calculus and 
behaviour. ‘In requiring us to curb the exercise o f natural right, the laws of nature bring 
a moral order into existence.’ However, the inherent weakness of the natural laws, as 
mere prudential edicts means that they need to be backed by a powerful sovereign. 
Hence Gauthier continues:
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‘the laws of nature are in themselves insufficient. Only insofar as their rational authority 
is backed by the coercive power of the sovereign, can human beings be expected to 
conform to them.’350
We need now to turn to the creation of the sovereign and the link between natural and 
civil laws in order to understand the role of the moral standards created by the laws of 
nature in Hobbes’ contractarian theory of laws.
Through reason, agents realise that in order to find security they have to all agree to 
give up their natural right to govern themselves to an individual or group, namely to the 
sovereign. Hobbes’ sovereign is an artificial person, constituted by the authorisation of 
his subjects. At this point Gauthier notes the ambiguity of the sovereign. On the one 
hand the sovereign acts as the universal agent of his subjects which implies 
subordination to his principal. On the other hand, in giving up their right to the 
sovereign, persons have agreed to subordinate themselves to him.351 The key point to 
reconcile these two contradicting claims is to remember that, for Hobbes, there is no 
obligation on any man which does not arise ‘from some act of his own’.352. The 
sovereign’s words and actions are not his own by they represent the words and actions 
of his subjects. Therefore, ‘in owning the sovereign’s actions, each person is bound by 
them as if they were her own.’353 Gauthier argues that, underlying the authorisation of 
the sovereign, the agents’ intention involves giving up the right to govern themselves 
and so the assumption of an obligation to obey.
‘A command is a law if it is issued to those previously obligated to obey the issuer. For 
Hobbes, this obligation of obedience is assumed in the act by which those to whom the 
command is issued have authorised the actions of the person or group who issues it.’354
Gauthier insists that for Hobbes there is no obligation to obey a powerless sovereign. 
The purpose of the subjects in giving up their right to the sovereign is to secure peace 
and their self-preservation. No power to the sovereign means no security and no peace 
and therefore there is no rationale in authorising it. Firstly, an obligation to obey goes 
hand in hand with the power of the sovereign to protect and secure peace. It would be 
irrational to entrust the sovereign with my security if he does not have the power to
350 ‘Thomas Hobbes and the Contractarian Theory of Law’, p 20
351 ‘Thomas Hobbes and the Contractarian Theory of Law’, p 11
352 Leviathan, chap 21, p 561
353 ‘Thomas Hobbes and the Contractarian Theory of Law’, p 11
354 ‘Thomas Hobbes and the Contractarian Theory of Law’, p 12.
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protect me. Secondly, if the subjects are to be under an obligation to obey, the sovereign 
must have the power to enforce his commands. The sovereign laws would be vain if 
they were not enforced. The expectation of punishment does enter the individual 
rational calculus: a person who breaks the laws must expect to be punished so that the 
cost of breaking the law outweighs the benefit she sought to gain.
Now Gauthier details the connection between natural and civil laws. As we saw, he 
considers the natural laws as theorems of reason.355 On the one hand, the laws of nature 
are part of the civil laws since the sovereign gives the laws of nature determinate 
content. The sovereign is responsible for interpreting the laws of nature and for giving 
them their content. On the other hand, the civil laws are part of the laws of nature since 
the laws of nature dictate obedience to the civil laws. Gauthier is now able to distinguish 
between the legal obligations generated by the civil laws from the moral obligation 
generated by the natural laws. ‘One has a moral obligation to carry out one’s legal 
obligations.’356 Obedience to civil laws depends on a prior obligation. This prior 
obligation was acquired through instrumental reasoning and as such was a voluntary act. 
The natural laws are not proper laws until the sovereign gives them determinate content 
with the civil laws and enforces compliance to them. Reciprocally, the civil laws are not 
laws unless they are based on the prior obligation generated by the laws of nature.
Section 2: Public reason
The second key idea in Gauthier’s interpretation is that in giving up their right of nature, 
agents also give up their individual natural reason. There can be only one reason 
applying to all and it has to be the sovereign’s. The sovereign’s judgement of right and 
wrong supplants private judgements and provides a standard of public reason which is 
expressed in civil laws. In appointing the sovereign using our natural reason, we have 
given our approbation to public reason. ‘Public reason supplants private reason but is 
founded on i t ... It is itself a rational creation.’357
355 For a full demonstration of his claim see his ‘Hobbes: The Laws of Nature’. In this article published in
2001, he demonstrates that the laws of nature are primarily rational precepts and only secondarily
commands of God and commands of the sovereign.
356 ‘Thomas Hobbes and the Contractarian Theory of Law’, p 21
357 ‘Thomas Hobbes and the Contractarian Theory of Law’, p 13
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Why is it a rational creation? Gauthier explains: Hobbes is aware of the fallibility of 
human rationality. In a way there is no right reason until men agree to accept the reason 
of one man or group of men as right reason. The method of rational deliberation is then 
transformed:
‘The individual mode of deliberation, in which each person judges for herself what she 
has reason to do, is supplanted by a collective mode, in which one person judges what 
all have a reason to do.’ 58
Once individuals have agreed the Judge or Arbitrator’s reason as right reason, then 
rationality is exercised by him. An agent who then acts on the basis of his own 
judgement would exhibit a deficient rationality. The correct rationality would be to act 
in conformity with right reason.
In effect, it cannot be so difficult. Although, the sovereign remains the sole interpreter 
of the natural laws and no person may put her private reason in place of the public 
reason, each may and must use his private reason to determine what the public reason is. 
Gauthier argues:
‘each person than has rational access to the chain that leads from authorisation to law. 
By grounding public reason in each person’s private reason, Hobbes provides both a 
moral foundation for civil law, and a rational foundation for morality.’35
I would like to stop here just to make a couple of comments about this interpretation.
• Firstly, I believe that this explanation gives the full measure of the artificiality of this 
mode of deliberation. Natural reason is our human reason, the one we follow, listening 
to our interior voice. Through instrumental reason, we come to realise that we have to 
harmonise reasons amongst us, social persons. This harmonisation involves 
surrendering our rationality to follow someone else’s. It is asking a lot from an 
intrinsically rational being whose primary feature is to reason.
• Secondly, we can now see better the connection between Gauthier’s own research on 
a contractarian theory and his interpretation of Hobbes. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, Gauthier argues that rationality is to choose the correct mode o f deliberation.
358 ‘Public Reason’, p 25
359 ‘Thomas Hobbes and the Contractarian Theory of Law’, p 24-25
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We see now that right or public reason is the mode of deliberation that rational 
individuals would choose. One more step and we get: public reason, i.e. a common 
standard of deliberation and judgement, would be the one chosen by any rational 
individual reflecting on the most rational mode of deliberation from a hypothetical 
perspective.
Gauthier continues. Public reason is not only the means to resolve the controversies 
between the various private judgements, it is also meant to resolve the conflicts of 
interests between individuals. Even if reason was not fallible, we each pursue our own 
good (i.e. what is rational for us to pursue). Different agents might rationally reach 
different decisions about what is good and that, in itself, can create conflict and 
controversies. The Arbitrator, in harmonising private judgements also decides on the 
good and on what constitute moral actions. Each individual’s reason is directed to his 
own good whereas the sovereign’s reason is directed to ‘the impartial resolution of 
controversies among individuals’.360
At this stage of the interpretation Gauthier steps in the debate and suggest restricting the 
scope of public reason: ‘I accept what I take to be Hobbes’ idea that public reason 
justifiably supplants the private reason of the individual, but I want to insist that he does 
so only within limits.’361 The reason why Hobbes has to give full power to the sovereign 
is because individuals, once they have set up the Arbitrator, do retain their natural mode 
of deliberation.362 They will never accept the Arbitrator’s reason in place of their own 
and they will carry on deliberating about the laws, led by their individual judgement of 
the good. Public reason will never be brought into being.
Instead Gauthier makes the following suggestion.
‘The core of public reason is to be found in the transformation it effects in the 
deliberation of those subject to it... Public reason provides the citizen with a common 
standard for determining right and wrong, good and evil’.363
360 ‘Public Reason’, p 33
361 ‘Public Reason’, p 35
362 We come back to a comment that Gauthier made before about Hobbes i.e. that Hobbes gives a political 
rather than a moral answer to the Fool.
363 ‘Public Reason’, p 36
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Gauthier suggests that agents agree to authorise a public person to judge and will in 
their names. Agents through their authorisation agree to treat as right reason the public 
person’s judgement within the scope so defined. Once the public person is constituted, 
citizens can pursue their own good as long as it does not clash with right reason. In 
order to do so agents must have internalised the common standards established by 
public reason. Public reason becomes a ‘construction from the individual reasons of the 
member of society.’364
Morality arises once agents have internalised these common standards. We shall ask 
ourselves later whether, based on pure instrumental reason, one can actually internalise 
someone else’s reason. My claim is that one cannot. It takes a lot more than mere 
reasoning to change our intrinsic mode of deliberation especially to such an artificial 
one. Morality cannot be the outcome just of instrumental reasoning. But let us finish 
with Gauthier’s interpretation of Hobbes and the problem of punishment.
Public reason takes normative precedence within its scope of authorisation over what 
would otherwise be individually rational. However, normative precedence does not 
guarantee motivational efficacy, hence the need for enforcement to ensure that the 
normative precedence of public reason is motivationally effective. The problem of a 
contractarian theory is that it must accommodate punishment within the limits set by 
individual rationality when no rational person would directly will his own punishment. 
Punishment can only be portrayed as a necessary evil: the benefit expected from 
securing the others’ compliance outweighs the cost of being caught in case of one’s own 
violation.365
As we can easily suspect Gauthier cannot be entirely satisfied with such a ‘weak’ 
rational calculus. He argues that if an agent found it reasonable to authorise public 
reason, than surely it is less costly and therefore more rational to voluntarily comply
• y f j i
with its requirements. He sees agents as more sociable than Hobbes. He hopes ‘to 
use the language of rational agreement to articulate the basis and character of the 
institutions that enable the secure establishment of such co-operative and sociable
364 ‘Public Reason’, footnote 7, p 25
365 See ‘Thomas Hobbes and the Contractarian Theory of Law’, p 32 - 33
366 See ‘Public Reason’, p 41
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interaction.’367 Again he remains very evasive about the concrete reality of such a 
rational agreement. As I will argue later, rationality is not sufficient to establish what 
he calls ‘civic friendship’.368
367 ‘Thomas Hobbes and the Contractarian Theory of Law’, p 34
368 See ‘Thomas Hobbes and the Contractarian Theory of Law’
Conclusion
Before we turn to Gauthier’s latest contractarian theory, I believe we should recapitulate 
what he wants to borrow from Hobbes: firstly, the concept of prior moral obligation 
contained in the natural laws and secondly, the concept of right reason as a common 
standard of deliberation and decision, judgement and evaluation. Gauthier identifies five 
main normative features of Hobbes’ rational contractarian theory of law, skimmed from 
Hobbes own details. He suggests that a plausible normative theory of law would have to 
build on the following general Hobbism.
1) Law depends on a prior normative relationship between lawgiver and those to whom 
law applies; the subject has an obligation to obey the lawgiver.
2) The obligation to obey the lawgiver must issue from the rational agreement of those 
obligated.
3) The extent of their obligation is determined by their intention in authorising the 
lawgiver. In other words the scope of law is restricted and Gauthier specifies: it is 
restricted to the regulation of interactions for their mutual advantage.
4) In authorising a lawgiver, the members of society agree to treat the law as the 
expression of public reason. Each puts aside her own private judgment and accepts 
the judgment of the laws.
5) The obligation to obey the lawgiver depends on his power both to ensure mutual 
advantage and enforce his edicts.369
His primary focus is on the obligation created by the laws of nature and the 
authorisation of the sovereign. The obligation emerges with the agreement of all. Moral 
standards arise with the laws of nature and create an obligation to conform to public 
reason. The backbone of Morals by Agreement and of his contractarian theory is all 
contained in this general Hobbism. Gauthier concludes:
‘the contractarian idea is that reasonable conduct is to be evaluated ... in terms of the 
pursuit of one’s own interests constrained by the requirements of fair mutual advantage. 
So understood, reasonableness involves the internalisation by each member of society of
369 ‘Thomas Hobbes and the Contractarian Theory of Law’, p 15-16
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the same standard of decision-making that, for the contractarian, governs legitimate 
legislative and judicial activity.’370
It is now time to turn to his latest contractarian moral theory. Gauthier has written 
several articles on the topic but none develop a complete and overall theory. However 
based on Morals by Agreement, his latest work on resoluteness and his new 
development on Hobbes’ interpretation, we should be able to draw a fairly accurate 
picture of what Gauthier would consider as an adequate contractarian theory.
370 ‘Thomas Hobbes and the Contractarian Theory of Law’, p 26
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CHAPTER VII: GAUTHIER’S LATEST 
CONTRACTARIAN MORAL THEORY
This morning I opened my mail to find an unpleasant surprise: I was caught speeding at 
43 mph in a town centre where the speed limit is 30 mph. The upset was double: firstly 
because I had a £60 fine and secondly because I usually consider it irresponsible to 
speed in town streets. Had I been at a bargaining table where the speed limits were to 
be decided, I most probably would have lobbied for a 30mph speed limit in towns. So if 
I firmly believe that speed should be limited to 30 mph in town centres and I am caught 
speeding at 43 mph, am I being irrational? We shall attempt to answer this question in 
this chapter.
Introduction
I believe that Gauthier’s latest work is characterised by a complete revolution in his 
approach to contractarianism. However some features remain.
Common features of his contractarianism
Firstly, his contractarianism is hypothetical.371 Gauthier does not describe what 
happened or should happen in establishing a social contract. His approach is normative 
rather than descriptive. However, there is a difference in his approaches. In Morals by 
Agreement, Gauthier started from a state of nature in which agents were using the 
orthodox rationality referred to in both economic and game theories as individual utility 
maximisation. Interactions did not yield an optimal outcome and agents came to realise 
that they had to constrain their pursuit of individual interest. The state of nature 
represented natural interactions and was opposed to society. In his most recent writings,
371 Gauthier has developed that aspect of his theory in numerous (if not most of his) articles. Some are 
referred to in chapter HI. We can also mention ‘Public Reason’ or ‘Political Contractarianism’.
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Gauthier provides agents in the state of nature with tools to step back and evaluate their 
existing practices and institutions. His approach is still normative but the purpose is 
justificatory. Agents straight away adopt a mode of deliberation specific to social 
interactions. Equipped with this new mode of deliberation, agents should be able to 
reflect on their conditions of interaction based on purely rational grounds and in 
complete abstraction from any environmental influence. The integrity of the rational 
calculus should secure the agreement of all members of society who would attempt this 
normative exercise. This retrospective approval of a practice after rational deliberation 
is called the ‘contractarian test’372.
Secondly, his contractarianism is based on individual rational deliberation. Gauthier 
remains convinced that the key to morality is a change of rationality. Based on that 
change, Gauthier demonstrates how agents rationally derive moral standards 
understood as constraints on their behaviour. Even if Gauthier’s contractarianism takes 
a political turn in its most recent version, he remains faithful to the idea that agents, in 
changing their mode of deliberation, internalise the constraints required by the moral 
standards so derived and become moral. Roughly, he assumes that if someone 
rationally agrees with a rule (i.e. the rule passes the ‘contractarian test’) then the person 
has a sufficient reason for conforming to it. Even better, if the rule passes the 
contractarian test, then each agent is entitled to expect others to conform to it. 
Therefore, according to Gauthier, there are two theories within a contractarian moral 
theory: a theory of justice that characterises the common moral standards that should 
constrain the agents and a moral theory that deals with the internalisation of these 
common standards by the agents. Gauthier wrote: ‘That some justification must be 
afforded in support of deliberative constraints to the constrained individual is at the 
core of what I call a contractarian moral theory.’373 The only justification that can be 
appealed to relates to the deliberative rationality of the members of society.374 Only 
once a constraint is so justified can the agent agree to it and comply with it.
372 See for example ‘Political contractarianism’.
373 See ‘Mutual advantage and Impartiality’, p 130
374 See ‘Political Contractarianism’, p 141
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A new approach
Gauthier still wants to address the Fool’s challenge and give him a moral answer but
this time he wants to distance himself from the constraints imposed by economic
rationality. Gauthier no longer tries to artificially rectify market failures. Instead,
Gauthier refers to the market in order to emphasize the different mode of deliberation
between this naturally mutually advantageous venture and society as ‘a cooperative
venture for mutual advantage’375. Talking about the role of politics he writes:
‘One way of characterising this view of the role of politics is to represent it as making 
possible market success (by eliminating force and fraud) and remedying market failure 
(by eliminating free riding). But the reference to market success and market failure 
might misleadingly suggest the subordination of the political realm to the economic... 
The rationale of politics is to supplant or constrain strategic interaction... ’376
Politics is no longer in the service of economics, it has a rationale and a purpose of its 
own. In effect, it means that Gauthier negates any connections between the rationality 
required in politics and the one required in economics. He is freed from all the 
constraints imposed by the theory of rational choice and his theory is no longer about 
solving the problem of strategic interactions in game theory. Forget the artificial 
distinction between internal and external rationality, between straightforward and 
constrained maximisation and all these attempts to remain connected to the economic 
rationale. Gauthier starts with a clear page. As we saw above, he has resourced himself 
in Hobbes and he has a set of new philosophical tools to tackle his new challenge.
This change of approach has a huge importance in the coherence of his 
contractarianism. We remember that Gauthier is convinced that it is intrinsic to human 
nature to be able to change their rationality. In chapter IV, I wondered when that 
change was supposed to take place in the process described in Morals by Agreement. I 
noted that the change was supposed to take place after bargaining and I emphasised the 
incoherence caused by this timing. In assuming a complete new rationale to politics, 
Gauthier solves this incoherence de facto. Politics is about a completely new mode of 
deliberation that applies all along the process.
375 Gauthier regularly borrows this description from Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, p 4
376 ‘Constituting Democracy’, p 316
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In chapter IV I suggested that, in Morals by Agreement, morality was precisely about 
this change of rationality. What has happened to Gauthier’s project to derive morality 
from pure rational grounds? Where does morality fit in this new picture? I intend to 
answer these questions and address the dilemma posed by my speeding ticket in this 
chapter.
In order to do so I will attempt to draw a picture of Gauthier’s latest contractarian 
theory. I insist on the fact that what follows is a reconstruction of his theory derived 
from his most recent articles and based on my understanding of his approach. Since 
Morals by Agreement, Gauthier has never developed a new complete theory. He has 
merely commented upon contractarianism here and there, continuing to refer to Morals 
by Agreement for the broad lines.
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Section 1: Strategic interactions versus deliberative rationality
Overview
For the first time Gauthier opposes the rationale of the market to the rationale that 
prevails in the political area. The market is the area of strategic rationality whereas 
politics is the field of deliberative rationality. Deliberative rationality takes over when 
the perfectly competitive market fails to bring about natural harmony.
I would like to emphasise the fact that for Gauthier, market rationale continue to 
cohabit with the rationale of politics. Political tools are only there to take over wherever 
the market fails.
‘We do not want to replace the strategic interaction of free individuals, in those 
circumstances in which they are able to achieve optimal outcomes in which benefits are 
matched to costs, with the strategic interaction of an unrestricted majoritarian politics, 
which can by no means be expected to yield either optimal or fair outcomes. In effect 
then, we want to achieve a constitutional balance between two modes of strategic 
activity -  market and government.’377
The field of government is probably the one of public reason i.e. ‘on those matters and 
in those respects that significantly affect the interactions of the citizens and the public 
good available to them.’378 Gauthier distinguishes between the two forms of rationale 
and he expects them to exist side by side.
The implementation of an artificial harmony in the fields not covered by the market 
involves a double harmonisation exercise. The first level of harmonisation is through a 
centralised mode of decision-making.379 The centralised decision-making institution, or 
government, will be responsible for structuring agents’ interactions in such a way that 
its product, the social decision, will yield a fair and optimal outcome. The second level 
of harmonisation is through public reason as expressed in laws. Public reason is the 
expression of right reason and agents have to submit their private reason to the 
authority of public reason.
377 ‘Constituting Democracy’, p 325
378 ‘Public Reason’, p 37
379 ‘Constituting Democracy’, p 325
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The functioning of this artificial harmony involves constraints on strategic interactions. 
Gauthier excludes market-like dynamic interactions between individual life-plans and 
chosen social norms. The framework of social interactions is chosen once and for all. 
Social structures have to pre-exist the agents’ individual life-plans. Or said otherwise, 
agents have to bend their individual life plans to the requirements imposed by the laws 
and institutions.
We remember that the purpose of the contractarian approach is justificatory. The 
contractarian test is to ensure that an existing rule would be accepted by deliberators. 
Gauthier insists that the only common norm of deliberation between all members of 
society is rationality. Religious or other pre-established norms are not suitable since 
they are not common to all the deliberators. Rational deliberation is the only common 
ground. Not only all deliberators are required to justify their social norms on the sole 
basis of rational deliberation but deliberators who would reject deliberative rationality
^ 0 1
cannot be included in society.
This point is essential to Gauthier. Agents can make plans for their lives but they must 
do so within the existing social practices and institutions. Individual life-plans must 
bend to the social structure. If an agent has some non-rational normative requirements 
(such as religious requirements), he can include them in his life-plan as long as they fit 
in the social structure. The social structure should in no way be the outcome of non- 
rational deliberation or suffer from the influence of any non-rational norms. On the 
contrary, during deliberation, life-plans have to be reasoned and submitted to the 
critical considerations of the fellow bargainers for approval.382
We can see how the concept of resoluteness will fit in this picture. Agents must decide 
on what is in their overall best interest. Once they have chosen their most preferred 
outcome, they must constrain their choices and life plans accordingly. Deliberative 
rationality is about choosing the best outcome and aiming at it. It is the capacity to be 
resolute.
380 Gauthier refers specifically to the Constitution that frames the functioning of social interactions in a 
democratic state. See ‘Constituting Democracy’ p 327
381 See ‘Political Contractarianism’, p 142
382 See ‘Constituting Democracy’ , p 321
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Gauthier writes:
‘[A]ny actual system must largely pre-exist the real person who enjoy the benefits and 
fall under its constraints.’383 Or again ‘[Vjalues, aims and plans are all subjects for 
deliberation and choice... The contractarian supposes that social practices are to be 
justified, not primarily by showing how they accommodate independently-given life- 
plans, but rather by showing how they permit and encourage the formation of life-plans 
for which they offer the prospect of satisfying fulfilment.’3
About rationality
As emphasised before, rationality is an individual feature. An institution, a rule or a 
practice is rational if it is considered as such by a rational individual assessing it. In 
differentiating between economic and political rationality, Gauthier has to define a new 
form of human rationality. If political rationality is no longer about the maximisation of 
individual utility as it is in the economic realm, what is it?
Gauthier explains: beings act for reasons. Reasons are representations of the world. 
Beings can have the capacity to represent some features and to be moved by the content 
of those representations. Rationality is the capacity to be moved by the appropriate 
representations. It is the ability to assess the appropriateness of the reasons. A rational 
agent determines and endorses the fit between her actions and her beliefs. Rationality 
is therefore the normative extension of reason.
The most striking feature of this definition is its vagueness. How to evaluate the 
appropriateness of representations? One can give any content to this assessment and 
call it normative. Rationality so defined can only be fallible. Not only is rationality 
fallible, but it necessarily generates conflict of interests. We do not deliberate from the 
same standpoint. What is rationally good for you in your situation can be rationally bad 
for me in my circumstances. A controversy may arise between us about the state of 
affairs we each want to bring about. That is why we had to rely on a public agent’s
383 ‘Political Contractarianism’, p 133
384 See ‘Political Contractarianism’, p 138
385 See ‘Public Reason’, p 20
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reason. As we saw above, Hobbes and his interpreter Gauthier both agree that the 
only way to resolve the intrinsic weakness of rationality in social interactions is to 
appoint a public agent and to abide by her representations of the world.
Gauthier goes further. Agents do not only abide by the public agent’s concept of 
rationality they also internalise it. In doing so they alter their mode of deliberation; they 
give a common content to the appropriate representations of the world, namely the 
public agent's. They deliberate according to her representations. ‘The core of public 
reason is to be found in the transformation it effects in the deliberation of those subject 
to it.’387 Agents assess the appropriateness of representations of the world not according 
to their own perception but according to the common and mutually agreed perception of 
the public agent.388 Since they have endorsed her representations as their own by 
appointing her, Gauthier claims that this mode of deliberation is still individual. But is 
it really?
First of all, I find surprising to expect individuals to continue to use their private reason 
in market interactions and to expect them to use public reason in social ones. This dual 
rationality makes the internalisation of public reason more difficult and less probable.
More importantly, this transfer of individual rationality from each citizen to a public 
agent seems far-fetched. Can an individual actually internalise someone else’s reason? 
Is it really possible for someone to picture accurately someone else’s representations 
and deliberate according to them?
Gauthier is aware of this difficulty and he later comes back to it. If he remains 
convinced that the construction of social institutions relies importantly on the
386 Reason here is a synonym of rationality. Gauthier wrote: ‘Although some persons have insisted that 
rationality must yield some form of universality or unanimity, I am unconvinced by their arguments. No 
doubt that two agents, similarly placed ... will reach similar conclusions about what acts are rational. But 
this is uninteresting. The important question is whether the way in which two states of affair bear on a 
particular agent may rationally affect her decision as to which to bring about so that different agents might 
rationally reach different decisions. As long as this is possible, then even infallible reasoners may find 
themselves facing disputes and controversies. And nothing in my account of rationality would rule this out.’ 
‘Public Reason’, p 29
387 ‘Public Reason’, p 36
388 Citizens are allowed to reconsider their authorisation if the public agent betrays their expectations and 
does not fulfil the role he was allocated.
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deliberative normativity of the individuals, he acknowledges that it cannot be the only 
resource required.
‘[T]he idea that the only resources available for the construction of authority must come 
from individual norms of deliberation now seems to me to confuse the need to justify 
authority in terms of deliberative rationality with the endeavour to create authority 
through the transfer of deliberative rationality from the individual members of society 
to a social agent.’389
Beyond the problem of transfer of authority from individuals to a public agent, this 
concept of rational deliberation meets what we called in chapter HI the circularity 
problem. If I deliberate about an existing rule using the representations of the public 
agent already in place, I merely assess the consistency of the rule with the public 
agent’s right reason. C. Morris’ comment is truer than ever:
‘A choice would not be a fundamental evaluation of the institution, for its standards are 
not independent of the domain of evaluation. For a rational choice evaluation of a social 
practice or system to be fundamental the preferences are to be more than coherent and 
considered. They must also be independent of the practice or system. In the absence of 
such independence, all that can be shown by rational choice is that the preferences are, 
broadly speaking, consistent with the practice or system.’390
Description of deliberative rationality
In order to address some of these issues, let us make an attempt to construct Gauthier’s 
concept of deliberative rationality within his own framework.
To do so we need to come back to Gauthier’s interpretation of Hobbes’s laws of nature 
and public reason. We remember that he suggested that each agent should be able to 
rationally derive the laws of nature. The laws of nature are considered as the moral 
standards that must constrain the agents’ future strategic interactions. In order to give a 
unique content to these laws and to secure their enforcement, they appoint a public 
agent. This public person is considered as the interpreter and guardian of the laws of 
nature. She acquires her authority from the agreement of all on her appointment. 
Gauthier initially argued for a direct transfer of authority from individual reason to 
public reason in agents’ representations. Gauthier now claims that deliberative
389 ‘Political Contractarianism’, p 142
390 C. Morris ‘Relation Between Self-interest and Justice’, p 140.
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rationality alone is not sufficient to justify the public agent’s authority. So let us suggest 
the following alternative.
Agents first derive rationally the common moral standards. They then deliberate 
according to the representations provided by these moral standards. They assess their 
existing rules and practices, as provided by their current public agent, according to 
these representations. In other words, they step into the shoes of the public agent as an 
interpreter of the laws of nature. In order to do so they must not deliberate about each 
rule or practice in separation from the others. For the assessment work to be consistent 
and harmonious, they must assess their social structure as a whole.
There are then two possible scenarios. In the first one, the rules, practices and 
institutions of their existing social structure match the representations provided by the 
moral standards. The public agent has done her interpretation work properly. The fact 
that alternative interpretations were available is irrelevant as long as the existing social 
organisation is deliberatively acceptable as an interpretation of the moral standards.391 
Within its scope, public reason can then take over individual reason in deliberation. The 
authority of public reason over individual reason is now justified.
In the second scenario, the rules, practices and institutions of their existing social 
structure does not match the representations provided by the moral standards. The 
public agent has not done her interpretation work properly. In this case, either the 
public agent should be replaced by a more capable agent or she should be advised to 
change the existing rules.
Issues raised by this description
How can the agents rationally derive the moral standards in the absence of any 
representations of the world? That is where the state of nature enters the picture. I shall 
argue that the change of rational deliberation takes place in the state of nature and that
391 The possibility that other norms, practices and institutions might be equally reasonable to accept is no 
argument against an existing social order.’ ‘Political Contractarianism’, p 140
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it bears in itself the impartial constraints on individuals that bring about the moral 
standards.
Which representations do the agents need to internalise and when: the moral standards 
or the public reason? I believe that in Gauthier’s theory, the agents internalise first the 
change of rational deliberation and then whatever change comes with it. However, I 
shall argue that the change of rational deliberation is artificial and that it cannot carry 
the internalisation of the moral standards.
Has Gauthier solved the circularity problem? I believe he has but he had to take a 
Rawlsian turn to do so. Firstly, if individuals have to assess their existing systems, they 
have to abstract from their environment and their circumstances in the pre-bargaining 
position. They can no longer be real people in their real life. Secondly, they are now 
required to decide not only on the way to distribute the co-operative surplus but also on 
which society they want to live in. They have to agree on social practices and 
institutions. In doing so, they also devise the concept of value. I would like to develop 
both these points now.
Gauthier argues: agents become ‘real’ people in their real life only once in social 
interactions, i.e. once they have chosen their institutions and practices after rational 
deliberation. ‘[A]ny actual system must largely pre-exist the real person who enjoy the 
benefits and fall under its constraints.’392 So if the bargainers are not ‘real’ until they 
enter social interactions, who are they? Gauthier writes: ‘We regard each bargainer as 
serving as an ideal representative of the particular person he will be in the social world 
to be shaped by the constitution on which all agree.’393
The bargainers are no longer real people, but they are ‘proto-individuals’394 who select 
a social framework not according to who they are but according to who they will be in 
any of these frameworks. Individuals are structured by the social system in which they 
live and the moral frame has to be chosen before the individuals make any choices. The
392 ‘Political Contractarianism’, p 133
393 ‘Constituting Democracy’, p 324
394 This expression is borrowed from J. Hampton, ‘Can we agree on Morals?’ ( especially, pp 344-352). Her 
comments was then about the ideal chooser.
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deliberators have to leave aside the non-rational aspects of their life-plans and abstract 
from their moral and cultural environment.
Where does it leave the concept of value as a measure of coherent and considered 
preference? Is value still a measure of utility? Can we still say that value is relative and 
subjective?
‘[Vjalues, aims and plans are all subjects for deliberation and choice.’395 Value is the 
outcome of deliberation, it is the fruit of this double harmonisation process. In pure 
strategic interactions as exemplified on the market, outcomes result from the 
independent decisions of individuals whereas in deliberative politics, outcomes result 
from the decision-making of a centralised institution that artificially harmonises 
interactions. In pure strategic interactions, individuals are guided by their own private 
reason whereas, in social interactions, individuals are guided by public reason as 
expressed in laws. As explained above, ‘public reason provides the citizen with a 
common standard for determining right and wrong, good and evil’.396 Their interactions 
are structured and constrained by it. However, Gauthier cautiously argues that the 
constraints are also rationally derived. Agents have internalised the requirements of 
right reason and they therefore auto-constrain their life-plans. Once in society, they 
continue to pursue their own good but their conception of the good is then framed by 
public reason.
Value is no longer solely the outcome of individual rationality. It has also to be 
submitted to general confrontation prior to being adopted by the agents. Value is then a 
measure of rational and mutually acceptable preferences. It can no longer be accepted 
as a measure of individual utility but rather as a measure of mutual utility. As such it 
becomes difficult to consider it as plainly subjective and relative. Indeed, value is not 
subject to the sole rational assessment of the valuer but it has also to be accepted by his 
fellow bargainers; it is not relative to his present circumstances but to his future 
situation once deliberation has taken place. The concept of value is the object of 
deliberation between bargainers. Agents can only internalise a concept of value that has 
gained mutual approval.
395 See ‘Political Contractarianism’, p 138
396 ‘Public Reason’, p 36
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Section 2: Derivation of the common moral standards
This step is crucial since the full theory rests on it; Gauthier’s claim that morality can 
be derived from rational agency depends on it. In what follows, we shall develop a 
similar argument to the one developed in chapter IV: Gauthier’s agents change of 
rational mode in the state of nature. This change bears in itself the moral standards they 
arrive at. These standards are derived from ‘rational’ agency but the rationality referred 
to is already moral.
Gauthier’s agents start from the state of nature and have to work their way to society. 
The state of nature is the realm of unconstrained strategic interactions; it represents the 
social vacuum. The moral standards are mutual advantage and equal respect. How do 
the agents derive these standards from their state of nature?
About(civic friendship’
In one article Gauthier suggested relying on ‘civic friendship’ to go from the state of 
nature to society.397 We remember that Gauthier had to leave aside the assumption of 
mutual unconcern. However, he remained convinced that a contractarian theory could 
not rest on affective bonds. In the scenario below he develops instead an artificial 
concept of mutual concern.
In the state of nature, agents are interacting reluctantly and see each other as a cost. 
However, they come to realise over time that others can also afford opportunities. Their 
view on each other evolves: from being tolerated, they become useful partners. This 
change of perception creates artificial bonds of convenience. As the areas of mutual 
benefit expand, they see each other as sharing in a way of life. From useful partners, 
others become ‘public’ or ‘civic friends’. Their presence is then welcomed rather than
O Q O
merely accepted. A bond of mutual civic concern is bom and with it the standard of 
equal respect. Indeed, civic friends ‘affirm each other’s good in willingly making and 
honouring whatever commitments are needed to make their mutual activities successful
397 The concept of ‘civic friendship’ is mentioned in ‘Thomas Hobbes and the Contractarian Theory of Law’ 
but is described only in ‘Constituting Democracy’.
398 See ‘Constituting Democracy’, p 317-318
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from each partner’s perspective.’399 In doing so they treat each other’s life -plans with 
equal respect.
I believe that such a descriptive scenario does not fit in Gauthier’s otherwise normative 
and justificatory theory. Although I believe we must keep in mind the concept of civic 
friendship, I prefer to develop my argument on the path described in most of his other 
articles.
‘A co-operative venture for mutual advantage. ,
In most of his writings, Gauthier’s deliberators starts with a vision of society as a co­
operative venture for mutual advantage and work their way from the state of nature to 
such an ideal. Why should agents, deliberating from a state of nature, start from the 
idea of society as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage? It makes sense 
nowadays in view of the recent developments of modem moral and political 
philosophy. However, if individuals deliberate in abstraction from pre-conceived ideas 
of the social structure they want to put in place, how would they rationally derive this 
model? In the state of nature, the only representations that the agents have are their 
own. Their individual representations are full of their own best interest (and possibly 
the best interest of the persons they care for). Representations are strategic and 
unconstrained. How does the idea of society as a cooperative venture for mutual 
advantage spring from such representations?
The first step out of nature is the willingness to agree. Agreement is a voluntary act. 
Individuals must first realise that unconstrained strategic interactions do not yield an 
optimal outcome; they must be willing to escape the costs of disadvantageous 
interactions and benefit from co-operation. The existence of social structures is 
universally preferable to ‘the vacuum that would exist in the absence of norms and 
practices.’400
Gauthier assumes that agents come to realise that strategic deliberation will take them 
nowhere and that they must project themselves in the society they want to live in. In
399 ‘Constituting Democracy’, p 318
400 ‘Political Contractarianism’, p 140
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order to do so they change of rationale. They replace their individual representations by 
the representation of an ideal society. In deliberating, they no longer take into account 
their strategic advantages or weaknesses and they no longer pursue their sole best 
interest since these representations are doomed to failure. Instead, in deliberating they 
only take into account what would gain general agreement and therefore take them 
away from the state of nature. Their natural representation is replaced by an artificial 
one. They no longer reason from where they are but from where they want to be. They 
become the famous ‘proto-individuals who select a social framework not according to 
who they are but according to who they will be in any of these frameworks.’401 They 
project themselves in the future. They become resolute.
We can see how Gauthier has changed his strategy from Morals by Agreement. In this 
first version of his contractarian moral theory, he attempted a mimic of a bargaining 
process with real agents pursuing their best interest. He labelled it internal rationality. 
We demonstrated the artificiality of the process and brought about the underlying 
change of rationality that had really taken place. Here Gauthier no longer attempts to 
describe a bargaining process, he directly replace the rationale of the market by the 
rationale of politics. Strategic and dynamic interactions are replaced by deliberative 
rationality. However in changing the rational mode, Gauthier has replaced real 
individual with ‘proto-individuals’. These proto individuals are not moved by the 
representation of their best interest but by an impartial representation of the society they 
want to live in. They must constrain the pursuit of their own best interest in order to 
take into account the best interest of others that are parties to their endeavour of exiting 
the state of nature. In doing so, they exhibit impartiality.
The moral standards flow naturally from this change of rational mode. Agents want to 
agree in order to exit the state of nature. Agreement has to be voluntary and no agent 
would voluntarily agree to a constraint that is not mutually advantageous. Mutual 
advantage should be understood as
‘requiring that each normal member of society both find value and contribute value to 
others. Someone who did not find value in society would have no reason to agree to its 
conditions of interaction. Someone who did not contribute value to others would give 
them no reason to accept her within the scope of society’s conditions of interaction.’402
401 See above in the sub-section strategic interaction versus deliberative rationality.
402 ‘Political Contractarianism’, p 135
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Civic friendship can step in the discussion here. In order to pursue mutual advantage, 
agents constrain their life-plans. It means that among the life-plans that would fulfil 
their personal requirements (whether rational or not), they must choose one that can be 
acceptable to others i.e. that does not involve a net cost to society. Individuals are free 
to pursue the life plan of their choice as long as in doing so they are net contributors to 
society. As quoted above the now civic friends ‘affirm each other’s good in willingly 
making and honouring whatever commitments are needed to make their mutual 
activities successful from each partner’s perspective.’403 In doing so, they exhibit equal 
respect. Equal respect is clearly a by-product of mutual advantage and it secures 
impartiality.
Moral standards and Lockean proviso.
In imposing equal respect and mutual advantage to the agents deliberating about their 
social structures, Gauthier puts in place a forward-looking rationale that secures future 
compliance. Indeed, if my situation is treated with respect and if I do gain from the 
agreement then I will be motivated to comply. If the situation of others is treated with 
respect and they do gain from the agreement then it secures their compliance.
This rationale obviously belongs to the family of the Lockean proviso core conception. 
Gauthier suggests adapting the Lockean proviso and replacing it by the condition of 
equal respect that should ensure the ex-ante fairness of the institutions chosen. He 
writes:
‘Bargaining must proceed from an appropriate base point if it is to be considered 
deliberative. In Morals by Agreement I introduce a modified Lockean proviso to ensure 
that the base point does not incorporate force, fraud, or free-riding. Here, however, the 
concern to manifest civic friendship through the expression of equal respect is intended 
to safeguard against these ills. The question, pressed on me especially by Bruce 
Ackerman, is whether this concern may not also rule out inequalities in the base point 
that would be permitted by the proviso. I think not. Mutual advantage and equal respect 
do not require that the parties begin from an equality of condition.’
This last debate is of mild interest to me since it is marginally relevant to the present 
thesis. I will ignore it here.
403 ‘Constituting Democracy’, p 318
404 ‘Constituting Democracy’, see footnote 12, p 333
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About the internalisation process
Gauthier defines the human’s deliberative capacity as follows. It is
‘the capacity to be motivated by representations or states of affairs as they are and as 
they might be given one’s possible actions, and the further capacity to be able both to 
ask in any particular case whether it makes sense to be motivated to some act by some 
set of representations, and actually to be motivated in the light of the answer one gives 
to this question.’405
The process we have just described is a perfect illustration of this definition. Agents 
asked themselves whether it ‘made sense’ to be moved by their individual 
representations (the pursuit of best interest) -  ‘primary representations’ hereafter. They 
realised it did not and they changed their set of representations (to the pursuit of mutual 
advantage) -  ‘secondary representations hereafter’. The deliberative capacity described 
by Gauthier assumes the corollary ability to be motivated to act upon this new set of 
representations. Such an assumption amounts to an internalisation of the change of 
representations. Indeed, if someone can be motivated to act by a set of representations it 
surely means that this set of representations is sufficient to generate her action. Or is it?
I personally believe that the internalisation of the moral standards would require more 
than just rational deliberation. It is part of human nature, not to say part of human 
psychology, to pursue individual interest. In order to change this representation to 
impose the artificial pursuit of mutual advantage, I would suggest the old Aristotelian 
remedy: education.
I agree that agents act upon representations of the world in order to bring about their 
chosen state of affair. However, I do not believe that they can act upon abstract 
representations. These representations must have been experienced or felt before they 
can be vivid enough to motivate the agents to act upon them. At the stage we describe, 
the secondary representations are a mere rational and artificial abstract. They have no 
concrete reality and are meaningless to them. Representations of the world must be 
perceived to effectively motivate actions. In our example, I believe that agents must 
first be inculcated the moral standards. The pursuit of mutual advantage and equal
405 ‘Political Contractarianism’, p 133
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respect must become like a second nature to each of them. Once they have enjoyed the 
benefits to be gained from keeping these standards, they can then, but only then, 
internalise them.
In fairness to Gauthier, I believe that he has an intuition of this problem of 
representations. Several elements betray his intuition.
Firstly, his one-off description of civic friendship is nothing else than another version 
of the solution suggested here. Indeed, through practice of co-operation, agents 
experience the benefits of mutual advantage and slowly modify their perception of 
others. They then learn to treat them with equal respect. As mentioned before, the 
problem of such a descriptive concept is that it does not fit in Gauthier’s justificatory 
theory. The emergence of civic friendship would owe more to perceptions and emotions 
than to rationality and deliberation. Since civic friendship is an essential step to equal 
respect and therefore to impartiality, such an origin is not acceptable.
Secondly, we remember Gauthier’s doubt about the resources required to the transfer of 
authority from individuals’ reason to the public one. ‘Society may be conceptualised as 
a construction by deliberatively rational individuals, but it need not be a construction 
using only the normative resources of deliberative rationality.’406 Gauthier then falls 
short of suggestions for other resources but I believe that this doubt is another betrayal 
of his intuition.
Last but not least, he never claims that his deliberators internalise the moral standards. 
The internalisation process of his contractarian moral theory is always about the social 
structures not about the moral standards. I assume that it is because, at the stage of the 
reasoning, the moral standards don’t have the form of specific rules or norms. They are 
mere rational constructions without concrete representations. Let us continue our 
reconstruction of his theory.
406 ‘Political Contractarianism’, p 141
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Section 3: Agreement on social structure.
His agents have now left the state of nature and they deliberate about a compatible 
social structure. They constrain their life plans according to mutual advantage and they 
consider others as civic friends that they treat with equal respect. Gauthier expects his 
deliberators to evaluate their social structure seeking mutual benefit and equal respect. 
In doing so, they must display good will: ‘I understand good will as involving openness 
and good faith -  the willingness to acknowledge the nature and strength of one’s true 
concerns in the process of reaching agreement, and the subsequent willingness to 
adhere or keep whatever is agreed. Within the framework of agreement, each must 
exhibit a positive concern for impartiality and mutuality.’407 The outcome of this 
deliberation must be an agreement on social structure. If they find that their existing 
social rules, practices and institutions are compatible with the moral standards just 
derived, then they will have a moral obligation to keep them and comply with them as 
if they had derived them themselves.
Gauthier imposes two conditions to his contractarian deliberators.
• Condition 1: Equal desire to agree. Agents want equally to contract. ‘The pressure 
to reach agreement arises solely from its desirability, which is felt equally by the 
members of society, and not from any difference in capacity or temperament or position 
which might bear differentially on the members, and so benefit some at the expenses of 
others.’408 This condition seems to be more a corollary to the standard of equal respect 
than a stand-alone condition.
• Condition 2: Full information. This condition also prevailed in Morals by 
Agreement. Bargainers must have full information, they cannot bluff, threaten or 
exploit weaknesses. We have already commented upon the incredible demand of this 
assumption. However, it makes more sense in this new version of Morals by Agreement 
than it did in the original one. If agents seek mutual benefit and equal respect then: 
firstly they must know the situation of others to ensure that they do gain from the 
agreement without imposing a net cost to the others; secondly, as civic friends, they 
must not exploit differential advantage.
407 ‘Constituting Democracy’, p 324
408 ‘Constituting Democracy’, p 320
234
Since each agent retains his capacities, circumstances and constrained life plans, 
Gauthier insists that this stage should take the form of strategic bargaining between 
merely constrained deliberators. However, the combination of these two conditions 
amounts to the artificial equalisation of the bargaining powers of the deliberators. As 
argued in chapter IV409, this artificial equalisation removes any form of strategic 
bargaining from the deliberation process taking place. In treating others with equal 
respect, Gauthier’s bargainers are required to display impartiality; they impose 
constraints on their behaviour and exhibit morality. Gauthier’s pre-bargaining position 
is no less morally loaded than Rawls’.
It is clear that deliberators must assess the social structure as a whole. They cannot 
evaluate each rule or norm in isolation. In this global assessment, some rules will be 
advantageous to some agents and disadvantageous to others. Due to their difference of 
circumstances or capacities, agents cannot agree on all rules and practices. However, 
for mutual agreement to emerge, the agents must gain from some rules when they loose 
from others in such a way that their overall benefit is proportionally equal to the benefit 
of the other parties to the agreement.
Gauthier writes.
‘We should not expect the outcome of the social contract, or of any other agreement, to 
be the best possible for each party. What matters is that there be social structures that 
are clearly universally preferable to the vacuum that would exist in the absence of 
norms and practices, so that each party as a strong incentive to agree, and that the actual 
social structure not only in this way be mutually beneficial, but also that it ensures that 
the proportion between benefits and the contribution that each chooses to make be 
roughly the same for all. The terms of the cooperative venture are the same for all 
insofar as they provide for each to benefit in proportion to his contribution to the same 
degree as his fellows.’410
This balancing act between costs and benefits in agreement raise a new issue. Indeed, 
the advantage of this contractarian theory is to be rationally derived. I have a reason to 
comply with a rule if I have rationally agreed to it. Will I have a reason to comply with 
a rule that is rationally disadvantageous to me but that I accepted only in order to 
benefit from another one? How can I expect others to conform to a rule 
disadvantageous to them when I know that they agreed to it only to gain from another 
rule? That is where the concept of resoluteness takes its full dimension.
409 See Barry’s comments in Chapter IV.
410 ‘Political Contractarianism’, p 140
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Section 4: Compliance with agreement
What have we achieved so far? Agents have derived two moral standards and they have 
evaluated their social structure in the light of these standards If the structure has not 
passed the contractarian test, then they must supplant it by a compatible one. If the 
structure has passed the contractarian test, then they have acquired a moral obligation to 
comply with it. The rules and norms of their social framework have then the force of 
law. More importantly, and this is Gauthier’s moral answer to the Fool, the deliberative 
rationality of the agents in agreement has secured their internalisation of these social 
rules and practices. This is a key concept in Gauthier’s contractarianism. This is the 
moral theory within his contractarian theory. What was once called constrained 
maximisation is now called resoluteness but the concept remains at the heart of 
Gauthier’s contractarian theory.
About resoluteness
We can now see how resoluteness fits in the big picture. Our agents first realise that 
pursuing mutual advantage and seeking equal respect will take them out of the state of 
nature and will enable them to benefit from co-operation. They then assess their social 
structure in the light of these two standards. If their set of social norms and institutions 
pass the contractarian test, then it means that the social structure under scrutiny 
represents a good interpretation of the standards sought. Therefore, in complying with 
all the requirements of their social system, agents are secured to achieve their overall 
best interest i.e. benefiting from a co-operation that would not be available otherwise.
Deliberative rationality involves complying with all rules and norms of the social 
system, including the ones that are not directly advantageous. It is rationally justified in 
the bigger scheme of each agent’s life-plan. If, in social interactions, agents come 
across a rule that is disadvantageous to them but that they had a good reason to accept 
in their overall best interest at the time of agreement then they have a sufficient reason 
to conform to it now.
At the end of chapter V, I expressed my reservation about resoluteness as a mode of 
deliberation. I claimed that for resoluteness to be a more rational mode of deliberation
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than sophistication, agents had first to change of focus from the pursuit of individual 
benefit to the pursuit of mutual advantage. I argued that resoluteness was not a stand 
alone rational concept. We can now see why and how. Resoluteness is part of a 
deliberative process that begins with the derivation of moral standards; it is the part that 
deals with the keeping of these standards.
Has Gauthier established a moral theory? As repeated many times, morality is human 
virtue. The deliberative and resolute agents can be considered as moral agents if and 
only if they have internalised their social rules and practices. But have they? Have we 
solved our representation problem? To address this question, I suggest coming back to 
my speeding ticket.
About the internalisation of the social norms and practices
As explained at the beginning of this chapter, I have been caught speeding at 43 mph in 
a town centre where the speed limit is 30mph. Had I been at a negotiation table where 
speed limits were to be decided, I would have fought for a 30mph in town. My reason 
for wanting a low speed limit in towns is that there are a lot more pedestrians and a lot 
more occasions to stop then on an intercity road. In keeping a low speed limit, we can 
stop more quickly and avoid more accidents or at least avoid more fatal accidents. So 
what did happen to this rational deliberation process on that day?
The facts were as follows: it was a Sunday morning at 8.00 am, the streets were empty 
and I was on my way to an appointment with a doctor after being unwell during the 
night. I was well enough to drive and to think but... I was not thinking and I did not 
know that there was a speed camera on that road. Let me explain.
In most of the actions we perform, we act in the immediacy of the action. In the 
immediacy of the action, the only representations we appeal to are our natural ones i.e. 
our best interest ones. The streets were empty so I did not feel I was taking a risk. At 
that time of the day and on that day of the week, I did not expect to meet anybody and 
the speed limit rule did not strike me as obvious. Yet the rule still made sense since 
there could have been a couple of pedestrians -  for example an adult after a night of 
alcohol, or someone who, like me, had assumed that at that time on that day the streets
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would be empty. On the spur o f the moment, I reassessed the situation, not according 
to what was mutually advantageous but according to my most immediate interest: I 
wanted to arrive at the doctor as soon as possible. Had I realised that there was a speed 
camera, I would have surely slowed down... firstly in order to avoid a speeding ticket 
and secondly because it would have probably reminded me of the rule and of its 
purpose.
I believe that this example illustrate the weakness of Gauthier’s argument. It also gives 
some indications of the remedies. I agree with Gauthier that if we were to reflect (or 
rationally deliberate) on appropriate social interactions, we would be able to derive 
some common sense rules that are mutually advantageous and make sense if we want to 
live well together. However, I disagree with Gauthier if he thinks that rational 
deliberation is sufficient to secure the internalisation of the rules so arrived. In other 
words, I disagree with Gauthier when he claims: that the deliberative capacity includes 
the ‘further capacity to be able both to ask in any particular case whether it makes sense 
to be motivated to some act by some set of representations, and actually to be motivated 
in the light of the answer one gives to this question.’411
As noted above, I believe that the primary remedy is education. The pursuit of mutual 
advantage is a rational but artificial representation of the world. It does not come 
naturally to agents in their everyday interactions because it usually does not match 
exactly their immediate best interest. By definition, what is mutually advantageous is in 
each agent’s overall best interest but it will usually involve an immediate cost. 
Therefore, I am convinced that to link the deliberative capacity to the action, the 
motivation needs to be fed to the agents from an early age. In their everyday gestures 
and within the scope of social interactions, children must be taught to think mutual 
advantage rather than immediate best interest.
Let us take a simple example. We can all agree that clean and tidy streets are a lot more 
pleasant for everybody than filthy ones. However, many people dispose of their litters 
in the street. Most of the time, it is because they can’t find a bin when they need it and 
it bothers them to keep their litter until they can find one. Sometimes, they cannot even
411 ‘Political Contractarianism’, p 133
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be bothered looking for a bin. If they were to reflect on their gesture, they would 
probably agree that the practice of disposing of their Utter in a bin makes sense and is 
mutually advantageous. But, when acting, they deliberate according to their most 
immediate interest not according to what is mutually advantageous. Their most 
immediate interest is to get rid of their litter straightway without suffering the 
inconvenience of keeping it until they can find a bin.
Children should be taught to dispose of their litters in bins and they should be 
encouraged to think for themselves of the reason behind such a practice. This way, 
when they are adults, they naturally wait until they find a bin to dispose of their litter. 
They don’t evaluate the situation in the immediacy of the action when they can 
succumb to the temptation of immediate interest. They would act upon an inculcated 
practice that makes sense when they reflect on it. Only then can we consider that they 
have internalised public rules.
As more children are taught this way, more people keep the rules and practices The 
advantage of mutually advantageous rules don’t only make sense in abstract 
deliberation but agents can actually experience their benefits. It becomes easier and 
easier to keep these rules. It will come more naturally to everybody. As a consequence, 
if the pursuit of mutual advantage was like a second nature, we would hardly need an 
enforcement system. The enforcement system would be for the rarer agents who would 
not keep the rules or practices. For all the others, it would also act as a constant 
reminder of their commitment to public reason. Punishment is the secondary remedy to 
the weakness of Gauthier’s moral theory.
About punishment
As we saw above412, Gauthier sees a potential conflict between motivational efficacy 
and normative precedence of public reason over individual reason, hence the need for 
an enforcement system. The public person disposes of the power to enforce its edicts. 
Gauthier justifies this by the now famous contractarian test. Would someone,
412 For what follows see ‘Public Reason’, pp 41-42. We touched on the subject of punishment at the end of 
the previous section.
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deliberating from a state of nature from which such power was absent, agree to it? 
Gauthier claims that anybody would.
But Gauthier argues: ‘The judgement that an agent ought to be compelled or required to 
act in some way does not entail the judgement that the agent ought to act in that way 
voluntarily.’413 Laws and public reason appeal for the former type of judgement. If 
agents find it reasonable to act according to the requirements, then, considering the 
threat of punishment, they will find it costly not to do so voluntarily. Gauthier 
concludes:
‘the only rationale that should suffice for a general power to enforce certain edicts 
would also establish the normative priority of those edicts in the agent’s unforced 
deliberation and address simply the gap between normative priority and motivational 
efficacy.’414
As before, I do not believe that deliberative rationality is sufficient to short-cut the need 
of an enforcement system. As agents internalise public reason, society can reduce the 
costs of enforcement measures. However punishment is also part of the educational 
process. Children should be inculcated and explained the rules and practices they have 
to comply with. The fear of punishment is a constant reminder of public reason.
It took me a few months to write this chapter. I have had plenty of time to reflect on my 
speeding ticket. When I see the speeding cameras, I slow down. Only then do I 
remember their purpose. It still does not come to me naturally but I am a lot more 
aware of it. Not only does the prospect of punishment modify the immediate rational 
calculus to reconcile it with the outcome of deliberative rationality, but it also educates 
the agents and secures their compliance. Only from a generalised compliance, can the 
concept of resoluteness get started. As agents experience the benefits of complying with 
public reason, they internalise the constraints it comes with.
I insist that the fear of punishment is only a complement to education. If agents 
continue to think best interest and to despise mutual advantage, the cost of the 
enforcement system would be disproportionate to the advantage it is meant to secure.
‘Public Reason’, p 41
4,4 ‘Public Reason’, pp 41 - 42
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Conclusion
‘For we suppose that the capacity to make such choices [among dispositions to choose] 
is itself an essential part of human rationality. We could imagine beings so wired that 
only straightforward maximisation would be a psychologically possible mode of choice 
in strategic contexts. Hobbes may have thought that human beings were so wired that 
we were straightforwardly-maximising machines. But if he thought this he was surely 
mistaken.’415
Gauthier is convinced that we can change of mode of deliberation. He is convinced that 
this change can not only secure impartial bargaining but can also provide a moral 
answer to the Fool. In internalising this change of rationality, agents become moral.
In this chapter we detailed the rational change he suggests and we replaced it in a 
reconstruction of his Morals by Agreement. The outcome is a new contractarian moral 
theory which has taken a serious Rawlsian turn. It has gained in coherence, it flows 
more than Morals by Agreement but it carries the same weaknesses. Firstly, the change 
of rational mode occurs before bargaining and bears in itself the morality it is supposed 
to derive. Secondly, Gauthier’s agents are supposed to internalise a change of rational 
deliberation based on pure rational grounds.
I am like Hobbes. I believe that we are and remain wired ‘straightforwardly- 
maximising machines’. The change of rational mode suggested by Gauthier is artificial 
and incompatible with human nature. If I agree that people can deliberate rationally 
about their social interactions, I am not convinced firstly that they can agree and 
secondly that they can rationally internalise morality. Indeed, agents would retain their 
natural rationality in bargaining and play on any strategic advantage or weakness to 
tailor the outcome to their advantage. Agents would also retain their natural rationality 
in interactions and refuse most personal costs even if it is in the interest of mutual 
advantage. I believe that only education and fear of punishment can secure the 
realisation of Gauthier’s contractarian theory.
415 Morals by Agreement, p 183
241
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this thesis was to assess David Gauthier’s success in giving a moral 
answer to the Fool. Gauthier believes that it is possible to become moral by mere 
rational calculus. This belief is based on the assumption that agents are able to change 
mode of rational deliberation once in social interactions: ‘At the core of our rational 
capacity is the ability to engage in self-critical reflection. The fully rational being is 
able to reflect on his standard of deliberation, and to change that standard in the light of 
reflection.’416 His contractarian moral theory is primarily rooted in this belief and its 
supporting assumption.
In the first and the fourth chapters of this thesis, I emphasized the interactions between 
Gauthier’s interpretation of Hobbes’ Leviathan and his own contractarian moral theory. 
In particular I attempted to show how the idea of a dual rationality sprang from 
Hobbes’s distinction between natural and public reason. Gauthier took further this 
distinction and placed it at the heart of his own contractarian theory. Gauthier’s 
interpretation of Hobbes’ classic evolved over the years and we highlighted the parallel 
between the evolution of his interpretation and the development of his own research.
The first achieved answer to the Fool was given in Morals by Agreement. We detailed it 
in chapter n. Let us review briefly this first answer and our criticism of it.
Morality is defined as ‘an impartial constraint on the direct pursuit of individual 
utility’417. In order to take root, cooperation requires some bending of individual 
interest and therefore some constraints on individuals’ behaviour. Agents internalise the 
need for these constraints once they realise the benefits they can gain from cooperation 
over individually devised strategies. The internalisation of these impartial constraints 
comes with a change of mode of rational deliberation, i.e. a switch from the pursuit of
416 Morals by Agreement, p 183
417 Morals by Agreement, p 95
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pure self interest to the pursuit of mutual advantage. Morality is the artificial virtue 
supported by this change of mode of rational deliberation.
Gauthier defines rationality as utility maximisation and justifies at length the reason for 
this definition. He then demonstrates that, when pursuing mutual advantage, agents 
continue to maximise their utility but in a constrained way. The rationality that prevails 
in natural interactions is described as straightforward utility maximisation whereas, the 
rationality that prevails in social interactions is labelled constrained utility 
maximisation. Gauthier also distinguishes between internal and external rationality of 
the agreement. The internal rationality is about making the agreement and requires 
straightforward maximisation. It is the rationality that prevails during bargaining. The 
external rationality is about keeping the agreement and requires constrained 
maximisation. Gauthier claims that compliance to the agreement is dependent on the 
fairness of the process, which in turn depends on a fair baseline. In the state of nature, 
prior to any bargaining, agents must first erase the effects of past force, fraud, free­
riding or parasitism. That is what he calls his revised Lockean proviso. External 
rationality therefore includes not only compliance to the agreement once in social 
interactions but also the establishment of the pre-bargaining baseline. We saw in 
chapter IV that this second distinction between internal and external rationality is rather 
problematic. Let us briefly summarise why.
It is obvious that if the making of the agreement was based on constrained 
maximisation, the agreement would already be morally loaded. Indeed constrained 
maximisation is the instrumental rationality that supports morality. However, we 
demonstrated that Gauthier’s bargainers were constrained maximisers: firstly because 
no straightforward maximiser would accept Gauthier’s bargaining conditions and 
secondly because it seems irrational to expect the same agents to be constrained 
maximisers when establishing the baseline, straightforward maximisers when 
bargaining and constrained maximisers again once in social interactions. Either the 
agents have internalised the need to constrain their utility maximisation to benefit from 
cooperation or they haven’t. The theory has to keep some chronology to be coherent.
We saw that this first version of Gauthier’s moral contractarian moral theory had been 
the object of heavy criticisms. I reviewed most of them in chapter III. Gauthier had to
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surrender his assumptions of equal rationality and mutual unconcern. He had to put in 
brackets his defence of the market as a morally free zone and he had to suspend his 
minimax relative concession principle until further research. However, the core of his 
contractarian moral theory - i.e. the change of rationality that we highlighted above -  
was revived within a broader framework. Indeed, McClennen’s concept of resoluteness 
came to the rescue of Gauthier’s constrained maximisation. Gauthier very rapidly took 
the measure of the tremendous potential of resoluteness and has explored it ever since. 
In chapter V we reviewed the advantages and the shortcomings of McClennen’s 
concept. We also attempted to reconstruct what would be Gauthier’s latest contractarian 
moral theory
- using Morals by Agreement as the backbone;
- removing all the acknowledged failures of this original version and
- taking into account all of Gauthier’s latest publications on the topic.
Let us once again briefly recapitulate our findings.
In the newest version of Gauthier’s contractarian moral theory, both definitions of 
morality and rationality change but his purpose remains to derive morality from 
rationality. Gauthier’s social contract remains hypothetical and justificatory but his 
framework changes considerably.
Gauthier distinguishes between the rationale of the market -  strategic rationality - and 
the rationale that prevails in politics -  deliberative rationality. Both rationales cohabit 
in his new system and his focus is obviously on the latter. Deliberative rationality takes 
over when the market fails to bring about natural harmony between conflicting 
interests. This distinction means that rationality in politics is no longer connected to 
utility maximisation. Deliberative rationality is defined as the capacity to be moved by 
the representations provided by public reason. Public reason is the reason of a public 
agent appointed by the people to interpret the moral standards that should prevail in 
social interactions. In a hypothetical contractarian theory, the public reason is 
represented by the existing sets of public rules. Gauthier’s agents rationally derive the 
moral standards required to exit a hypothetical state of nature (described as a vacuum of 
rules and laws). They then assess the conformity of their existing set of public rules (or 
public reason) with the moral standards so derived. If their existing set of rules matches 
the moral standards, then they are justified in bending their individual life-plans to these
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rules. If their existing set of rules are not in conformity with the moral standards, then 
the set of rules needs changing.
Morality is the impartial constraint that individuals impose on their respective life plans 
in accordance with public reason once public reason has been rationally justified by the 
procedure described above. In the state of nature, individuals are moved by their 
individual representations (the pursuit of their best interest). Their deliberative 
capacities enable them to be moved by a new set of representations once this set has 
been validated by instrumental reason. This new set of representation encompasses the 
pursuit of mutual advantage. An agent has become moral once he has deliberated about 
his existing set of rules in the light of rationally derived moral standards, he has 
accepted its rationality and he has internalised it. The moral agent self-constrains his 
life plans in accordance with public reason.
I raised two issues. The first one was similar to the one made about Morals by 
Agreement: the change of mode of rational deliberation from strategic to deliberative 
has to pre-exist the derivation of the moral standards but this change carries all the 
requirements of impartiality that characterise morality. The second issue raised was 
about the internalisation of public reason. I wondered whether agents could internalise a 
set of rules based on sole rational justification. Although I cannot substantiate my claim 
without further research, I explained why I believe that education and punishment 
would have to play an indispensable complementary role in the internalisation process.
When I first read Morals by Agreement, I felt that I was reading an enduring 
masterpiece. Although I am now aware of its shortcomings, I remain convinced that the 
future of political philosophy lies in it. Like Gauthier and McClennen, I believe that it 
is possible to develop a contractarian moral theory. They have done most of the work. 
If I was to pursue my research in this field I would probably explore a more 
Aristotelian path and would abandon the project to connect morality solely to 
rationality.
I would probably start like them by highlighting the benefits that we could all gain from 
cooperating. I would insist on the overall rationality of cooperation for each individual. 
I would describe cooperation as politically moral or politically ‘right’. A contractarian
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moral theory deals only with the restricted field of political morality i.e. the set of rules 
that makes social life possible.
Then I would highlight the concessions on the immediate best interest that cooperation 
would impose on each of us. I would then be in a position to demonstrate the 
artificiality of the mode of deliberation that cooperation requires in day-to-day life. 
Using examples of conflict between individual and mutual advantage, I would highlight 
the necessity to remedy the fallibility of human rationality.
My remedy would obviously be education. I would develop an educational model 
destined at ‘shaping’ human reason so the cooperative mode of deliberation becomes 
like a ‘second nature’ to most agents. Children would be trained first to have the ‘right’ 
behaviour. Only once they would have experienced the benefits of such behaviour, 
would they be explained its rationale.
The agents so educated will have properly internalised the rules required by 
cooperation. These rules will be obvious and natural to them. Most importantly they 
will consider these rules as part of their well being and obvious to incorporate in their 
life-plans. They will no longer take them as self-imposed constraints.
Punishment would then be a mere safety net for the agents who would not comply with 
these rules. Punishment is a delicate issue and it is difficult to say more about it without 
proper research.
This very broad outline of an alternative theory obviously owes a great deal to 
Gauthier’s pilgrim work in the field. Despite all my criticisms, I remain an admirer of 
his achievement in political philosophy.
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APPENDIX: SETTING THE CONTEXT
This appendix is an introduction to the themes covered in Morals by Agreement. A vast 
range of concepts and theories is introduced as neutrally as possible, from the minimax 
theorem, the Nash solution, the Arrow’s theorems or Harsanyi’s general theory of 
rational behaviour to Rawls’s theory of justice or Buchanan’s theory of consent. Most, 
if not all, of these subjects have generated an important literature. We shall not present, 
discuss or criticise any of it here. We shall read them with Gauthier’s binoculars later.
However, we need to note one common point between all these theories: they all make 
the same basic assumption namely that individuals are rational and as such they are 
utility maximisers. The famous rationality postulates are at the core of modem moral 
and political philosophy. This assumption has become so obvious that it is the natural 
starting point of any modem political philosopher.
This appendix provides a selection of information relevant to the good understanding of 
the subsequent ones. Its purpose is two-fold: firstly, it is designed to present the 
context in which Gauthier worked and carried out his research. Most of the material 
presented here influenced his writings; secondly, it aims at providing the indispensable 
background knowledge needed to assess Gauthier’s contribution to moral and political 
philosophy.
Many subsections are borrowed from various authors whose names and publications are 
clearly given as and when. Those familiar with the materials presented can skip this 
appendix without any loss.
As far as game theory’s role in social science is concerned, we can (very!) 
schematically distinguish between before and after Harsanyi’s Rational Behaviour and 
Bargaining Equilibrium. The state of game theory and its potential use in social 
sciences before Harsanyi’s classic was more or less as described by Luce and Raiffa in
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1957418. In 1976, when the Nobel prize published his book, he considerably enlarged 
the debate. His work has been discussed and disagreed with at length in the literature 
but it remains an uncontested reference in the field. The first section is a presentation of 
game theory and the theory of social choice. The second section is a presentation of 
Harsanyi’s innovations in both fields. The third section is a presentation of the two 
most recent versions of modem contractarianism, namely Rawls’ theory of justice and 
Buchanan’s theory of consent.
418 Games and Decisions Introduction and Critical Survey.
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Section 1: Game theory and social choice theory
In 1944 and then 1947, Yon Neumann and Morgenstem published a book419 that 
launched a new field of research in social sciences, namely the use of game theory in 
social situations. In 1957, Luce and Raiffa provided a critical survey on the topic that is 
still referred to due to its clarity and use to understand the philosophical issues behind 
the mathematical formulas. This book also offers a broader picture of the subject since 
it also incorporates two chapters on utility theory and a chapter on welfarism and 
Arrow’s impossibility theorem. The table below provide their classification to be later 
compared to Harsanyi’s. In this section, we shall review each decision-making theory 
separately.
419 Theory o f Games and Economic Behaviour.
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LUCE AND RAIFFA’S CLASSIFICATION
Decision-making theories
Decision maker Individual Group
Theory a) Utility theory b) Game theory c) Social choice 
theory
Number of players One Two or more Large number
Conditions Certainty or 
Risk &/or 
Uncertainty
Another form 
of uncertainty
Definitions:
Individual vs group: ‘Any decision maker (single human being or organisation) which 
can be thought of as having a unitary interest motivating its decisions can be treated as 
an individual in the theory. Any collection of such individuals having conflicting 
interests which must be resolved, either in open conflict or by compromise, will be 
considered to be a group’.420
Condition of certainty: when each action is known to lead invariably to a specific 
outcome
Condition of risk: when each action leads to one of a set of possible outcomes, each 
outcome occurring with a probability known to the decision-maker.
Condition of uncertainty: When each action has as its consequence a set of possible 
specific outcomes but where the probabilities of these outcomes are unknown 42
Comments
Luce and Raiffa insist on the fact that any index could have been chosen instead of the 
ambiguous and often misused index of utility. However, due to convention they will 
use the concept of utility to refer to the measurement of preferences. They also insist on 
the fact that utility theory is not a part of game theory and it can stand apart from it. 
Like social choice theory, they inserted it in the picture to provide a better overview of 
the connections between all the decision-making theories.
420 Games and Decisions pi 3
421 Games and Decisions p i3
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a) Utility theory
The concept of utility has been extensively described and commented in the literature. 
We shall just bear in mind here that utility is used in decision-making theories as an 
index reflecting preference-orderings. For mathematical convenience, we attribute a 
numerical value to a preference but one must be careful not to confuse this numerical 
value with a reflection of the satisfaction level. Preferences (and the corresponding 
utilities with them) have to satisfy the condition of transitivity (if A is preferred to B 
and B to C then A is preferred to C). We shall distinguish below the three conditions of 
decision-making as identified in the above table, namely conditions of certainty, risk 
and uncertainty.
Under conditions o f certainty, each action is known to lead invariably to a specific 
outcome. Decision making under certainty can be summed up as follows: given a set of 
possible acts, one has to choose one (or all) of those that maximize the utility index. If a 
person’s preferences satisfy certain consistency and continuity axioms, then his 
preferences can be represented by a well-defined, continuous and ordinal utility 
function. Rational behaviour is then equivalent to maximizing this utility function.
Under conditions of risk, each action leads to one of a set of possible outcomes, each 
outcome occurring with a probability known to the decision-maker. In the case of 
decision-making under risk, Bayesian decision theory then identifies rational behaviour 
with maximizing one’s expected utility i.e. the mathematical expectation of one’s 
cardinal utility function.
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If a person is able to express preferences between every possible pair of gambles, where 
the gambles are taken over some basic set of alternatives, then one can introduce 
expected utility associations to the basic alternatives. If a person ‘is guided solely by 
the utility expected value, he is acting in accord with his true tastes, provided only that 
there is an element of consistency in his tastes’422. The consistency of his tastes is 
described through six axioms423.
Given a finite set of basic alternatives (or prizes) that we denote A i,..., An, each lottery 
assigns to each alternative a known probability. The set of probabilities is noted pi, ..., 
pn with pi>0 and Spi = 1.
For any two lotteries L = (piAi, P2A2 , ...,pnAn) and L’= (p’lAi, p*2A2 , ...,p’nAn), if they 
satisfy the six consistency axioms, then
- there are numbers ui associated with each Ai such that the magnitude of the expected 
value of L and L’ are respectively pi ui+ p2 U2+ +pn un and p’ 1 ui+ p ’ 2  U2+ +p’n un
- these magnitudes reflect the preference between the lotteries in the sense that 
u(L)>u(L*) if and only if L>L*.
In 1954, Savage generalised Von Neumann Morgenstem utility function to conditions 
of uncertainty in which probabilities were not given exogenously, but derived 
subjectively from the preferences themselves. Savage named the probabilities so 
arrived ‘personal probabilities’.
b) Game theory
So far we have only reviewed the case of an individual choosing in situation where his 
environment and the behaviour of others are given. But choices are more often made 
when other agents’ behaviour is a variable. Game theory deals with the various issues 
raised by agents’ interactions and strategies.
422 Games and Decisions p 21
423 The six axioms are: ordering of alternatives, reduction of compound lotteries, continuity, substitutability, 
transitivity and monotonicity.
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Players in the game are to be characterised by three assumptions:
i) Each player has preferences over the outcomes which meet the axioms of expected 
utility theory
ii) Each player is fully aware of the rules of the game and the utility functions of each 
of the players
iii) Of two alternatives that give rise to outcomes, a player will choose the one which 
yields the more preferred outcome, or more precisely, in terms of the utility 
function, he will attempt to maximize expected utility424.
Assumption ii) is obviously rather problematic since it is unlikely that in real situations, 
the actors will have the knowledge assumed. Discussion on this problem is beyond the 
scope of the present review.
Assumption iii) is referred to as the postulate of rational behaviour. We will see later 
the central role of this assumption in Harsanyi’s work.
A player’s preferences can be represented by a linear utility function Ui (or payoff 
function) whose values depend upon the strategy choices of all the players. A game 
consists of a set of n players, n sets of pure strategies Si and n linear payoff functions Ui, 
one for each player.
A vast category of games (potential social situations) is encompassed under the generic 
term of game theory. We shall first review the variety of game situations prior to 
entering any further details about some of them.
First of all we have to distinguish the game situation by the numbers of players. Before 
Harsanyi, most of the research was on two-players games, although some solutions had 
been found for n-players games where n>2. When there are more than two players, 
new extra-game-theoretic concepts are introduced such as side payments, coalition 
structures, limitations on collusion, correlated strategies, transferable utilities and 
interpersonal comparisons of utilities. For the purpose of understanding Gauthier, we
424 Games and Decisions p 49-50
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don’t need to review the technical (lack of?) solutions for n-person games (where n>2). 
We will limit our presentation to two-person games.
The second distinction regards the type of situations.
- Games can be strictly competitive or non strictly competitive. In the first case, it 
means that whatever one player gains is lost by the other player. There are also called 
zero-sum games because when you add up the utilities of each player to the game, the 
total makes zero. In the case of non-strictly competitive games, the players can gain 
from cooperation and or bargaining since their utilities can be convergent.
- Games can also be cooperative or non-cooperative. Can the players communicate and 
agree on a joint strategy that can be beneficial to both? If yes, then there is room for 
cooperation. Cooperative games are a lot more difficult to handle since players can 
have recourse to threats and assurances during bargaining or violate after bargaining the 
agreement reached during bargaining. Some psychological aspects have to be taken into 
account that are not necessarily easy to formulate mathematically.
The table below provide a summary of the solutions to the various game situations just 
mentioned for two-person games. Each solution will be broadly presented but without 
proofs or technical details.
Two-person games
Non cooperative Cooperative (arbitration schemes)
Strictly competitive 
(zero-sum)
Non strictly 
competitive
Strictly competitive 
(zero-sum)
Non strictly 
competitive
Minimax theorem 
Equilibrim pairs 
with pure or mixed 
strategies.
Nash solution 
equilibrium pair(s) 
of mixed strategies
1) Von Neumann 
Morgenstem (set of) 
solutions
2) Nash bargaining 
problem
1)Shapley value
2)Nash extended 
bargaining pb
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Non cooperative - strictly competitive games: Maximin (or minimax) theorem
Strictly competitive games are also called zero sum games. In such games, whatever is 
gained by one player is lost by the other. Each player attempt to maximize his security 
level i.e. maximize his gain and minimize his loss. An equilibrium pair is obtained 
when the maximum gain of one equals the minimum loss of the other. Von Neumann & 
Morgenstem proved that under certain conditions such an equilibrium exists. This 
theorem is known as the maximin theorem.
Non cooperative -  Non strictly competitive games: Nash ‘solution’
There are two players and each has a set of pure strategies. Both players have 
knowledge of all possible outcomes and of each other’s preferences. They also have a 
preference ordering over these outcomes. Player 1 has the set a = {ai, a*, ...., am} 
and player 2 has the set p = {pi,..., Pj, ...., pn} of pure strategies.
For each strategy choice ai, pj from respectively players 1 and 2, there is a certain 
outcome Oij with utility ai for player 1 and bj for player 2.
A player’s mixed (randomised) strategy is obtained by applying a probability 
distribution to his set of pure strategies. A mixed strategy set for player 1 is a ’ = xa = 
{xiai,.., Xiai, ...., xmam} with all probabilities Xj>0 and xi+ ...+xm = 1 and for player 2 
is P’ = yp {yipi, ...,yjPj, ynpn} with all yj>0 and yi+ ...+y„= 1.
Two equilibrium pairs (xa, yP) and (x’a, y’P) are equivalent if the returns to each 
player are the same i.e. UI (xa, yP) = UI (x’a, y’p) and U2 (xa, yp) = U2 (x’a, y’P). 
They are interchangeable if (xa, y’p) and (x’a, yp) are also in equilibrium.
A strategy pair (xa, yp) jointly dominates strategy pair (x’a, y’P) if each player prefers 
(xa, yP) i.e. if UI (xa, yp) > UI (x’a, y’P) and U2 (xa, yP) > U2 (x’a, y’p).
Nash proved in 1951 that
• every non cooperative game with finite set of pure strategies has at least one mixed 
strategy equilibrium pair.
• A non cooperative game is solvable if all equilibrium pairs are interchangeable.
• The solution to the game is its set of equilibrium pairs
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‘A Nash solvable game need not have equivalent equilibrium pairs, so Nash was led 
to define the upper value for a player as the most he can get from some equilibrium 
pair and the lower value as the least he can possibly get’425.
Cooperative eames -  Nash’s bargaining problem.
Von Neumann and Morgenstem identified a solution set as follow:
• It belongs to the set of possible payoffs.
• It includes all the jointly undominated outcomes that yield each player at least as 
much as he can secure independently by playing his maximin strategy.
• The solution set hereby obtained is called the negotiation set.
The set of all undominated outcomes is known as the Pareto optimal set.
The problem is now to find within the negotiation set an optimal outcome. That is 
where communication between players comes into the picture.
Luce and Raiffa seemed convinced that cooperative games were dependent on an 
arbiter. Their argument in favour of an arbiter is rather simple: in negotiation, the 
players can fail to reach an agreement because they are not prepared to make 
concessions. However in most cases, it is more advantageous to all (and therefore 
rational) to reach an agreement than not. An impartial arbiter can more coolly assess the 
situation. Luce and Raiffa note: ‘We may suppose that the arbiter sincerely envisages 
his mission to be “fairness” to both players; however, there are not, as yet, any simple 
and obvious criteria of “fairness”, so, in effect, he is being asked to express a part of his 
ethical standards when resolving the game’426. They therefore see all the suggested 
solutions to cooperative games as arbitration models with different views on fairness. 
As we shall see later, both Harsanyi and Gauthier disagree with this approach, although 
on completely different grounds.
425 Games and decision p 106-7
426 Games and decision pl21
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In 1950, Nash tried to give a formal definition and find a solution to the bargaining 
problem between employer and labour union427. The game can be described as follows: 
two players come to the market with each a bundle of good to exchange. Each trade T 
brings about a different outcome. Their preferences over randomised outcomes are 
consistent and therefore can be mirrored by a numerical utility index. To each trade T 
corresponds a pair of utilities (u, v) with u representing player l ’s utility and v 
representing player 2’s. Amongst all possible trades, there is one corresponding to no 
trade: T* (u*, v*). Let us call R the region of all possible trades and randomisations 
between trades. R is bounded, convex and closed (see figure below).
Player 2 ’s 
Utility
R
(u*, v*)
Player l ’s
Utility
Each bargain is represented by a region R and a status quo point (u*, v*) and denoted 
[R, (u*, v*)]. Any trade off would be a point above and to the right of (u*, v*) (the 
existence of such points is assumed). The problem is to identify a unique payoff (u°, v°) 
that is “fair” to both players. In other words we look for a function F that operates on 
[R, (u*, v*)] to give a unique (u°, v°).
After formulating the problem in such a way, Nash suggested the following solution.
i) Change the origin of measurement of utility for each player so that the point (u*, v*) 
is transformed into (0, 0), and let the resulting transformation of R be denoted by R \
ii) In the region R’ find the unique point (u°\ v°’) such that u0’, v0’ is the maximum of 
all products uv, where (u, v) is in R’, i.e.,
a) (u°\ v0’) is a point of R’, u°’>0, v°’>0
b) u°’v°’ > uv for all (u, v) belonging to R’ such that u > 0 and v > 0.
427 The following paragraphs are borrowed from Luce and Raiffa’s presentation of Nash’s bargaining 
problem, (see Games and Decisions, p 124-137)
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The point (u°\ v0’) is the Nash solution to the bargaining game [R\ (0, 0)]. The 
solution to [R, (u*, v*)] is obtained by inverting the utility transformations on (u°\ v°’). 
this point can be characterized by the unique point (u°, v°) of R such that 
(u° - u*) (v° - v*) > (u -  u*) (v -  v*), for all (u,v) belonging to R and such that u > u* 
and v > v*.
Nash’s function is the only function that satisfies four indispensable rationality 
properties that a solution should fulfil namely: invariance with respect to utility 
transformation, Pareto optimality, independence of irrelevant alternatives and 
symmetry (independence of labels of players).
It is important to note that Luce and Raiffa understand Nash’s solution as an arbitration 
model and therefore concentrate their criticism on the ‘fairness’ of the solution 
obtained.
Nash attempted to extend his model to non-strictly competitive games. In short, each 
player adopts a mixed strategy as a threat. The pair of threats establishes a payoff that, 
in turn, acts as the status quo point for further bargaining; and the bargaining problem is 
solved as above. Each player’s purpose is therefore to select a threat strategy so as to 
influence the status quo in the most favourable manner. The solution hereby obtained 
belongs to the negotiation set and is Pareto optimal but it fails to be unique.
c) Social choice theory and welfarism
It is not the place here to give an historic of social choice theory and welfarism but 
minimum background information is appropriate to understand the issues at stake.
Through two different approaches of welfare theory, we shall review two problems:
• The nature of the welfare function (cardinal or ordinal) and the problem of 
aggregation of utilities or rankings.
• The role of ethics and morality in social choice theory.
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Welfare Economics428
Although welfare economics is no longer really in fashion, it is worth emphasizing 
some of its salient features. As a definition Winch offers: ‘Welfare economics is the 
study of the well being of the members of a society as a group, in so far as it is affected 
by the decisions and actions of its members and agencies concerning economic 
variables.’429
Welfare economics takes the objectives of society as given and work out the 
appropriate policies as means of achieving them using testable and tested economic 
tools. One of the main tool used by classical economic theory is the utility theory 
combined with the theory of rational behaviour that we reviewed above. In short, the 
preference of an individual can be represented by her utility function; if rational her 
objective will be to maximize this utility function.
In the case of an individual (or single household) the utility function Ui is composed of 
a bundle of goods (XI, ...Xg) the acquisition of which to maximize under the 
constraint 2 Pi Xi -  I = O where Pi is the price of good Xi as set by its supply and 
demand on its competitive market and I is the income of the individual exogenously 
derived from the individual’s work factors sold.
In the case of an entrepreneur, the utility function Ui is composed of bundle of goods 
(XI, .. .Xg) the production of which to maximize under the constraint 2 Pi Xi -  (T + ri) 
= O where I’ and % are respectively the total cost and the profit of the firm.
Analogously, society as a whole has to maximize its welfare function dependent 
positively on its components utility levels. Winch notes that most of the conventional 
theories of welfare economics rest on the Paretian’s objective: if one person is better
428 This subsection owes much to David Winch’s Analytical Welfare Economics, which is often referred to 
in Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement.
429Analytical Welfare Economics, p 13
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off, and no one is worse off, welfare is increased. As a consequence, welfare is an 
increasing function of individuals’ utilities: W = W (U I,..., Un) with 8W / 5Ui>0.
Under certain assumptions and conditions, welfare economics is then able to identify 
the Pareto optimum. In particular, the assumption of perfect competition can lead to the 
identity o f the equilibrium, obtained when all forces in the model have worked 
themselves out, to the optimum, the desirable situation as defined by the theory. The 
theory also provides some solutions to the problems posed by the removal or 
modification of some of the basic assumptions or conditions.
The analogy between the maximization of individuals’ utility function and the 
maximization of the social welfare raises three major ethical issues.
1) Objectives and social values
The role of welfare economics is not to decide what the objectives of society ‘ought to’ 
be, it is rather to take this objectives as given. The role of setting the objectives of 
society belongs to moral and political philosophy.
However, Winch insists: ‘all economics is concerned with the making of choices, and 
rational choice necessitates the stipulation of an objective. The nature of the objective 
depends entirely upon the value judgements of the person stipulating it.’430 When 
classical economics assume that individuals maximize their utilities, there is no 
implication that such behaviour is good or bad.
‘To assume that individuals attempt to maximize their own objectives makes the 
outcome of the economic system dependent on the individuals’ value judgements, but it 
says nothing about the desirability of those values. Concepts of morality, by contrast, 
stipulate social values that override individual choice.’431
The welfare function is dependent on the objectives of the policy makers and these 
objectives themselves depend on the assumption of certain value judgements. We saw 
that by convention the Paretian criteria had been chosen in welfare economics but the
430 Analytical Welfare Economics, p25
431 Analytical Welfare Economics, p26
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reality of policy making is a lot more complex than what the theory assumes. Would 
welfare economics be sufficiently equipped to deal with other value judgements?
2) Pareto optimum and distributive justice.
Do we consider the initial factors (work or production) as given? If we do so, is the 
optimum derived from the theory fair and equitable? Winch discusses the distributive 
justice of the optimum obtained in condition of perfect market competition and 
concludes:
‘either the competitive equilibrium achieves distributional equity as a matter of 
definition, because equity existed in the initial pattern of factor ownership, and 
therefore exists in the results that ensue therefrom; or equity is considered to be an 
attribute of the distribution of income or utility, rather than factor ownership, in which 
case any effort to achieve distributional equity in a changing world undermines the 
foundations on which the efficiency of the competitive system was based.’432
3) The existence of a ‘collective ’ rationality.
The analogy of utility with welfare maximization is based on two related assumptions.
- The first assumption is that such a welfare function does exist.
- The second assumption is that there is such thing as a collective rationality. It is 
assumed that, the same way individuals maximize their utility function as a mean to 
achieve their individual goals, society maximizes its welfare function as a mean to 
achieve common goals.
Do such common goals exist? This issue raises the problem of aggregation of 
individual wills and preferences. It is now time to turn to Arrow’s impossibility 
theorem.
432 Analytical Welfare Economics, p99
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Arrow’s impossibility theorems433.
How do we aggregate the preference rankings of more than two individuals? It has been 
proven that, due mainly to intransitivity, simple majority rule is not an option. So what 
else? Arrow in 1951434 proved that, given five apparently innocuous conditions of 
aggregation, it was impossible to obtain a social ranking of preferences from individual 
ones. We shall provide below a broad picture of his social choice theory.
Arrow is an ordinalist concerned with collective social choice and two connected 
problems: 1) the mechanisms for such a social choice and 2) the consistency of various 
value judgements as to the mode of social choice. Arrow excludes the concepts of 
cardinal utility and interpersonal comparisons of utility.
Two definitions
Social state: ‘a complete description of the amount of each type of commodity in the 
hands of each individual, the amount of labour to be supplied by each individual, the 
amount of each productive resource invested in each type of productive activity, and 
the amount of various types of collective activity’ 435
Social welfare function: ‘a process or rule which, for each set of individual orderings 
Ri, ...Ri,..., Rn for alternative social states (one ordering for each individual i) states a 
corresponding social ordering of all alternative social states, R.’436
Two axioms about the social ordering
Given several individuals (voters) and a minimum of three alternative social states x, y 
and z, we shall write ‘x is preferred or indifferent to y’ with the symbol xRy.
433 In what follows I have chosen to present Arrow’s original theorems although Sen’s version o f these 
theorems is more widely accepted nowadays. Gauthier refers to (and question) both version in Morals 
by Agreement (See pp 123-125)
434 Social Choice and Individual Values
435 Social Choice and Individual Values pl7
436 Social Choice and Individual Values p23
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Axiom I: (Connectivity) For all x and y, either xRy or yRx.
Axiom II: (Transitivity) For all x, y and z, xRy and yRz imply xRz.
Three Assumptions:
- There is a basic set of alternative social states that can be presented to voters.
- Each individual in the community has a definite ordering of all conceivable social 
states, in terms of their desirability to him.
- Individuals are rational i.e. their social orderings Ri satisfy axioms I and II 
Five conditions about the welfare function
Condition 1: there are at least two individuals ordering a minimum of three alternatives. 
The social welfare function is defined for all possible individuals’ orderings.
Condition 2: (Positive association of social and individual values). If one alternative 
social state rises or remains still in the ordering of every individual without any other 
change in those orderings, then it rises or remains the same in the social ordering.
Condition 3: (Independence of irrelevant alternatives). It requires that the social 
ordering of any two outcomes shall not be influenced by the presence of any other 
alternatives in the set to be ordered.
Condition 4: (Citizens’ sovereignty). No social ordering can be imposed on society. 
Said differently, the social ordering is dependent on, and derived from individual 
orderings.
Condition 5: (Non dictatorship). The social ordering shall not coincide with the 
ordering of any particular individual regardless of the ordering of others.
One ethical note
Arrow distinguishes between the voters ordering of social states ‘according to the direct 
consumption of the individual and the ordering when the individual adds his general
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standard of equity. We may refer to the former ordering as reflecting the tastes of the 
individual and the latter as reflecting his values’437 ....The individual orderings which 
enter as arguments into the social welfare function as defined here refer to the values of 
the individuals rather than to their tastes.’438 This embryonic dichotomy will become 
relevant once we present Harsanyi’s ethical theory in the next section.
Two theorems
The two theorems are known as the possibility theorem for two alternatives and the 
general possibility theorem (when there at least three alternatives). Both theorems state 
that no welfare function can satisfy the five above conditions simultaneously.439
437 Social Choice and Individual Values p i8
438 Social Choice and Individual Values p23
439 See Social Choice and Individual Values p 48 and 59
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Section 2: Harsanyi and the general theory of rational behaviour
Harsanyi has extensively written and developed on his theory. His main publications 
are a collection of essays written between 1953 and 1976440 and his famous Rational 
Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations respectively 
published in 1976 and 1977. In both publications, he attempts to demonstrate the 
supremacy of Bayesian decision theory in what he calls the theory of rational behaviour 
whether on parametric or strategic situations of choice.
He notes that in social sciences most of the games are two persons nonzero-sum games 
or n-persons games but that these games don’t have real solutions. In this context 
Harsanyi offers a theory that suggest a solution for these games within a more unified 
framework. His ambition is to treat all the independent decision-making theories 
reviewed above under the large umbrella of a general theory of rational behaviour and 
to provide a systematic solution to each type of situation. In order to achieve this goal, 
he defines the rational-behaviour concept by means of a few additional and more 
powerful rationality postulates. Harsanyi’s purpose is also to make game theory a 
readily available tool at the service of social sciences and the analysis of social 
behaviour.
Harsanyi’s classification (shown on the table below) provides relevant background 
information to understanding his approach. One can note two essentials departures from 
Luce and Raiffa’s classification that reflects the innovations made by Harsanyi.
1) He removes the partitioning between the various theories. The independent decision­
making theories are now all part of the same general theory of rational behaviour
2) The moral dimension belongs solely to social choice theory. Morality is not a 
concern of the social scientist when dealing with utility and games theories.
^Essays on Ethics, Social Behaviour, and Scientific Explanation
265
HARSANYI’S CLASSIFICATION
General Theory of Rational Behaviour
Theory of Rational Behaviour Theory of Moral 
Value Judgements
Theory of individual interests Theory of common 
interests
a) Utility theory b) Game Theory c) Ethical Theory
Classical
Economic
Theory
Modem
Decision
Theory
Situation
(under)
Certainty Risk &/or 
Uncertainty
Another form of 
uncertainty
Maximization Utility Expected
Utility
Individual
Utilities
Average 
Utility Level
Perspective One individual Several individuals 
interacting
Impartial
Impersonal
Choice Parametric Strategic Social (moral)
Definitions
Condition of certainty, risk and uncertainty : same definitions as above
Parametric choice: choice in which the actor takes his behaviour to be the sole variable 
in a fixed environment and regards himself as the sole centre of actions.441
Strategic choice (case of interaction -  Game situations): choice in which the actor takes 
his behaviour to be but one variable among others so that his choice must be responsive 
to his expectations of others’ choices while their choices are similarly responsive to 
their expectations.442
Expected Utility: utility assigned to a lottery i.e. the sum of the products obtained by 
multiplying the utility of each of the prizes (or outcomes) of the lottery by its 
probability.
441 Morals by Agreement p21
442 Morals by Agreement p21
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a) Utility (decision) theory
There is not much innovation in the way Harsanyi proves the existence of a utility 
function and uses the corresponding rationality axioms in situation of certainty or risk.
In the case of uncertainty, we saw earlier that Savage had established in 1954 the 
existence of ‘personal probabilities’ and a utility function based on seven consistency 
postulates. He had extended the concepts of expected utilities and Bayesian decision 
theory to situations of uncertainty by amending the (rationality) postulates. Harsanyi 
uses Anscombe and Aumann’s axiomatisation which combines Savage and Von 
Neumann Morgensten’. The ‘personal probabilities’ are now called ‘subjective 
probabilities’. As we shall now see, Harsanyi applies the tools of subjective probability 
and Bayesian decision theory to game theory.
Up to that point, Gauthier does not have much to object to Harsanyi’s classification:
‘The theory of rational choice identifies practical rationality with utility maximization. 
If the utility of a lottery is its expected utility, then in condition of risk and uncertainty 
practical rationality is identified with expected utility-maximization. This is the central 
thesis of Bayesian decision theory. Although the theory does not command universal 
assent, we shall not enter into its merit and defects here, but only assert (dogmatically!) 
that we know no satisfactory alternative.’443
b) Game theory444
Two central novelties in the use of game theory in social sciences,
Harsanyi’s method leads him to unique solutions for each game situation.
i) Extension o f the Bayesian theory of rational behaviour not only to utility theory under 
uncertainty but also to game theory by using subjective probabilities.
‘Our theory of rational behaviour in game situations will be a direct generalisation of 
the Bayesian theory of rational behaviour under uncertainty. Following the Bayesian
443 Morals by Agreement, p 44
444 In this sub-section, we follow Harsanyi’s own presentation of his theory step by step.
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approach, we shall assume that any player i will express his expectations about the 
behaviour of another player j by assigning subjective probabilities to various alternative 
actions that player j may possibly take’44 .
However, each player does not decide arbitrarily of the subjective probabilities. Instead, 
these probabilities rest on two essential principles:
- The principle of mutually expected rationality.
The subjective probabilities that player i will assign to various possible actions by 
player j have to be consistent with the assumption that player j, like player i himself, 
will act in a rational manner in playing the game. Decisions about the subjective 
probabilities players should entertain play an important role in Harsanyi’s theory since 
it enables him to define a determinate solution to each particular game.
- Zeuthen’s principle
Most of the game theorists before Harsanyi relied on the pay-off dominance relations 
and intuitively assumed that they were all based on the principle that rational players 
will always prefer strategies yielding higher payoffs. Unfortunately this approach, as 
we saw before, did not provide a determinate solution in most situations. Harsanyi 
believes that the concept of payoff-dominance relations should be replaced with risk- 
dominance relations. This concept is based on Zeuthen’s criterion: ‘at any given stage 
of bargaining between two rational players, the next concession must always come 
from the party less willing to risk a conflict -  if each party’s willingness to risk a 
conflict is measured by the highest probability of conflict that he would be prepared to 
face rather than accept the terms proposed by the other party’446.
ii) The use o f bargaining models rather than arbitration models
Harsanyi clearly distinguishes between game theory that deals with players pursuing 
their respective self-interest and ethical theory that deals with the common interests of 
society as a whole. Morality comes into the picture of decision making only when 
dealing with social choice. Moral issues within game situations are incorporated in 
utility functions and should not pollute the decision-making process. Each player
445 Rational Behaviour, p 11
446 Rational Behaviour p 12
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attributes positive utilities to what he values most. If each player worries only about 
maximization of his own (expected) utility function, the game theorist only 
concentrates on the rationality postulates that go with this maximization process. 
Gauthier completely disagrees with this dichotomy and prefers to reintroduce the 
concept of morality in game theory but not using arbitration schemes.
Therefore rather than arbitration models, Harsanyi prefers to refer to bargaining 
models. This method solves the cumbersome problem of the fairness of the solution(s). 
Another side effect of this method is that there is no need for interpersonal comparisons 
in game theory. As we shall see below, interpersonal comparisons according to 
Harsanyi become relevant only in the context of his ethical theory.
Two classes of rationality postulates
Class A: postulates o f rational behaviour (i.e. criteria for players' strategies)
AI: Maximin postulates. In a game G unprofitable to you always use a maximin 
strategy
A2: Best reply postulate. In a game G profitable to you, always use a strategy oi 
representing a best reply to ai of the n-1 other players.
A3: Subjective bet reply postulate (Bayesian expected utility maximization postulate). 
In a bargaining game when the other players bargaining strategies are unknown us, we 
have to rely on the subjective probabilities that we assign to the various combination of 
the other players’ bargaining strategies. Hence, in a bargaining game, our bargaining 
strategy (3 is a subjective best reply to the other players’ expected mean bargaining 
strategy combination.
A4: Acceptance of higher payoffs postulate. If, in a bargaining game, a player agrees to 
a joint strategy a, then, if there exists a joint strategy a* yielding him a higher payoff 
than a, he would be even more willing to agree to a*.
A5: Postulate o f indifference between strategies yielding equal payoffs (equiprobability 
or centroid postulate).
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Class B: postulates o f rational expectation, (i.e. criteria for players ’ expectations about 
each other's strategies). The validity of the subjective probabilities is reliant on this 
second class of postulates.
Bl: Mutually expected rationality postulate. Always expect the other players to follow 
the class A and B rationality postulates.
B2: Symmetric expectations postulate. Never expect the other players to choose a 
strategy (especially a more concessive strategy) that you would not choose should you 
be in his situation.
B3: Expected independence o f irrelevant variables postulate. Don’t expect the other 
players to establish their strategies on variables which relevance for bargaining 
behaviour cannot be established on the basis of the rationality postulates.
Two person cooperative games -  The Nash solution.
Unlike Luce and Raiffa, Harsanyi interprets Nash’s solution to two-person cooperative 
games as a bargaining model rather than as an arbitration model447. Harsanyi’s theory, 
based on the Zeuthen principle and the strong rationality postulates leads to the Nash 
solution in the case of two persons cooperative games. This solution is called the Nash 
-  Zeuthen -  Harsanyi solution in Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement.
Harsanyi demonstrates three important results:
Zeuthen’s principle in bargaining leads to the Nash solution.
Harsanyi’s strong rationality postulates (i.e. A3, A4, Bl, B2 and B3) leads to similar 
bargaining behaviour as the Zeuthen’s principle and brings about the Nash solution.
In the general case of cooperative games, Harsanyi demonstrates that Nash’s extended 
solution of optimal threats is once again equivalent to the Zeuthen’s bargaining 
behaviour. In substance: ‘the solution is based on the concept of mutually optimal 
threat strategies. Intuitively speaking these represent the best possible compromise 
between trying to maximize the damage that one can cause to the opponent in a conflict 
situation and trying to minimize the cost of the conflict to oneself.’448 Therefore, the
447 Games and Decision p 145-6
448 Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium, pl79
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Nash -  Zeuthen -  Harsanyi’s solution takes the form of a minimax (or maximin) 
formula.
c) Ethical theory
Harsanyi’s version of welfarism is also a major innovation since he clearly places 
morality at the heart of his welfare function. Let us follow him.
General features
• Harsanyi’s ambition is to provide a model of moral value judgement freed from any 
cultural or pre-conceived input and assessed exclusively on rational grounds. His model 
is meant to unable us to assess rationally the morality of a situation, system or society. 
Harsanyi does not provide a rationally derived moral system, he only provides us with 
rational tools to assess the morality of existing situations. Ethics is defined as being in 
the service of the common interests of society as a whole.
• Moral rules should comply with the principle of universality suggested by Kant, 
hence Harsanyi’s preference for rule utilitarianism over act utilitarianism. In his 
opinion, a moral rule is a basic general rule which is valid in any given situation of the 
same sort and is therefore a ‘behavioural rule that would maximize social utility if it 
were followed by everybody in all situations’ it applies to449.
• The principle o f consumers* sovereignty states that the consumer is free to choose 
and his preferences are not judged or morally assessed. The interests of each individual 
must be defined fundamentally in terms of his own personal preferences and not in 
terms of what somebody else thinks is right for him. However, Harsanyi allows some 
major exceptions to this principle through the true and the antisocial preferences (see 
below).
449 Rational Behaviour, p41
271
• Harsanyi considers that an agent biased by the pursuit of his personal interests is not 
capable of a moral value judgment. A moral point of view has to come from an 
impartial observer i.e. an outside observer whose personal interests are not involved, or 
at least from an agent consciously and willingly ignoring his personal interests to assess 
the morality of a situation or a system. Morality emerges from and is guaranteed by 
impartiality and impersonality.
• One can notice some similarities with the concept of veil of ignorance later 
developed by Rawls450: an individual i’s choice amongst alternative social situations 
would satisfy the requirement of impartiality and impersonality,
‘if he simply did not know in advance what his social position would be in each social 
situation’451 or more specifically ...
‘if he thought he would have an equal probability of being put in the place of any 
among the n individual members of society’452. This latest point is known as the 
equiprobability postulate. This postulate enables an individual to abnegate his own 
position.
• According to the similarity postulate, ‘once proper allowances have been made for 
the empirically given differences in taste, education etc.., between me and another 
person, then it is reasonable for me to assume that our basic psychological reactions to 
any given alternative will be otherwise much the same’453. Because it is not open to any 
direct empirical test, the similarity postulate is to be considered as an a priori postulate. 
According to this postulate, it is possible to make interpersonal comparisons 454
Model of moral value judgement 
A, B, C... are social situations;
Ui is the von Neumann-Morgenstem (VNM) cardinal utility function of individual i 
(i=l» -.,n);
450 Although Harsanyi was the first one to create the concept of the original position.
451 ‘Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour’, p 49
452 ‘Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour’, p 50
453 Rational Behaviour, p50
454 This postulate is obviously highly controversial. A discussion on it would be out of scope here. We know 
that Gauthier completely rejects it.
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Now, let
1) Ai denote i’s personal objective position in social situation A (with regards to 
income, wealth, consumption level, health...) and
2) Pi denote his subjective attitude (including his personal preferences).
3) Ri denote a vector consisting of all objective causal variables needed to explain the 
subjective attitudes expressed in Pi.
When individual i tries to make an interpersonal utility comparison between the utility 
levels Ui (Ai) and Uj (Bj), it amounts to deciding whether he would prefer to be in the 
objective position Ai with his own subjective attitudes Pi ([Ai? PJ) or rather to be in the 
objective position Bj with j ’s subjective attitudes Pj ([Bj, Pj]). An individual’s 
preferences among extended (hypothetical) alternatives such as [Ai, Pi] and [Bj, Pj] are 
called extended preferences.
Let Vi = Vi [Aj, Pj] be the extended utility function455 for individual i over all extended 
alternatives [Aj, Pj] with j = l...n , then:
(1)U j(A j) = U j(A ) = Vi[Aj,Pj]
(2) Wi (A) = (1/n) 2  Vi [Aj, Pj] = (1/n) 2  Uj (A)456
In other words, a rational individual i attempting to force upon himself a moral attitude 
would choose to maximize his welfare function which is nothing else than the social 
average utility level.
In his model, Harsanyi identifies several types of preferences.
• The personal (or manifest) preferences that guide our everyday behaviour and are 
expressed in our utility functions Ui.
455 The utility function representing the extended preferences.
456 When individual i is constructing his social welfare function Wi, he is required to make interpersonal 
utility comparisons by comparing the utility units of the n individuals utility functions Ul...Un using the 
appropriate conversion ratio qj to homogenise them. As a result his social welfare function becomes: Wi (A) 
= (1/n) 2  qj Uj (A)
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• The moral / social (or conditional) preferences are the preferences that would guide 
our thinking would we force a moral attitude upon ourselves. They are expressed in our 
social welfare functions W).
• The extended preferences are the expression of what individual i would prefer if she 
had to decide about j ’s preferences placing herself in j ’s objective position (income, 
wealth, health, social position) and assessing j ’s subjective attitude (as expressed by 
Uj). Extended preferences are imaginary and are embodied in the extended-utility 
function V,.
• The true preferences are the preferences we would have if we had all the relevant 
information, we always reasoned with the greatest possible care and we were in a state 
of mind most conducive to rational choice. Our rational wants are those consistent with 
our true preferences whereas irrational wants are those that fail the test. This has 
repercussions for i’s assessment of Uji ‘instead of using j ’s actual utility function Uj 
which represents j ’s actual manifest preferences, i may wish to use a corrected utility 
function U), representing i’s own estimate of what j ’s preferences would be if j had 
better information about the relevant facts’457.
• The antisocial preferences are preferences that in Harsanyi’s opinion should be 
excluded since utilitarians’ ‘basis of all moral commitments to other people is a general 
goodwill and human sympathy’458. If j ’s preferences conflict with i’s own fundamental 
value judgments, i would be justified in using a censored utility function U’) instead of 
Uj in order to disregard j ’s antisocial preferences.
We have now reviewed the necessary background to the theory of rational choice as 
well as to the game and social choice theories. It is now time to turn to field of 
contractarianism.
457 ‘Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour’, p 61
458 Rational Behaviour, p56
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Section 3: Two modern versions of contractarianism
It is now time to present two versions of contractarianism, contemporary to Morals by 
Agreement, chronologically Rawls’s theory of justice and Buchanan’s theory of 
consent. Rawls is probably more known but both these theories have inspired Gauthier 
and are direct challengers to his Morals by Agreement. Buchanan, like Gauthier, 
follows the Hobbesian contractarian tradition, whereas Rawls is more Kantian in his 
approach.
A) Rawls’ theory of justice
A Theory o f Justice was published in 1971. It is a classic of moral and political 
philosophy. The main features of the theory are usually well known and it is not our 
purpose to summarize it all here. We shall only raise a few relevant issues. After 
providing the basic features of the theory, we shall focus on the Kantian background, 
the conception of justice obtained and the concepts of rationality displayed in the 
theory. Through each of these issues, we should have a better grasp of Rawls’s project 
and a broader picture of his achievement. It is important to note that, when writing this 
book, Rawls was familiar with Harsanyi’s early works on the general theory of rational 
behaviour and he extensively compares his approach to Harsanyi’s.
Basic features of the theory
a) The method
Rawls adopts a two step theory: 1) from practical reasoning, the agents derive their 
concept of the right (i.e. the principles of justice for the basic structure of society as 
well as for individuals); 2) Then within the framework of the right so derived, they each 
choose their individual good (i.e. their individual long term rational life plan).
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The first question to answer is therefore: what principles of justice would rational 
agents choose if they were placed in a specified original position. Since to each original 
position chosen corresponds a different set of principles of justice the next logical 
question is: how to choose the original position? Rawls suggests adjusting the original 
position and therefore the principles of justice to our ‘considered judgements’. As we 
grow, we develop a sense of justice and we acquire a skill of judging what is just and 
what is unjust. We have a desire to act in accordance with this sense of justice and we 
expect others to feel the same. The principles rationally derived should match the moral 
capacity so acquired. If they don’t, either one needs to modify the original position and 
the corresponding principles of justice or one needs to modify one’s considered 
judgment until one feels happy that the principles obtained satisfy a finely tuned sense 
of justice. Judgements and principles are then in reflective equilibrium. Rawls seems to 
work his way backward: from our considered judgements he chooses the principles of 
justice one should arrive at and then deduces the corresponding original position. We 
shall follow his logic here.
b) The principles o f justice
There are of two sorts of principles of justice: some apply to the basic structure of 
society (primarily institutions) while others apply directly to individuals. We shall only 
provide the social principles of justice here.
First principle: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system 
of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberties for all.
Second principle: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
principle and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity.
Priority rules: the principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore (a) 
[priority of liberty] the first principle has priority over the second one; (b) [priority of 
justice over efficiency and welfare] the second principle of justice has priority over 
efficiency and maximizing of the sum of advantages; fair opportunity is prior to the
276
difference principle.459 Rawls regards such a ranking as analogous to a sequence of 
constrained maximum principles.
Rawls demonstrates that anybody in the original position would choose the above 
maximin principles of justice. Why choose maximin principles and not the expected 
utility or the average utility principles? Rawls provides an interesting argument. We 
shall only recall the following points: 1) in the original position the agents lack 
information or known probabilities to calculate any expected utilities. The maximin is 
therefore their safest option; 2) the principles must be such that all the parties will keep 
to them once in society, even the worst off amongst themselves; the agreement would 
not be stable otherwise; 3) the priority rules guarantees that the agents treat each other 
as ends rather than as means and each endeavours self respect.
c) The original position
The circumstances of justice are as follows: individuals are roughly similar in physical 
and mental powers so no one can dominate the others, there is a condition of moderate 
scarcity so cooperation is necessary but fruitful ventures can flourish; individuals have 
a common interest in cooperation despite conflicting claims on the resources available; 
individuals knowledge are incomplete and their power of reasoning and memory are 
naturally limited.
Individuals are placed behind a veil of ignorance when choosing the principles of 
justice. This means that they don’t know their place in society, their conception of the 
good (i.e. their individual long term rational life plan), the special features of their 
psychology or the particular circumstances of their own society. However, they do 
know the general facts about human society; they understand political and economic 
affairs and they know the laws of human psychology460.
459 A Theory of Justice p266
460 As a side comment, one can note two common points between Harsanyi and Rawls: 1) morality goes 
with impartiality; 2) They assume the existence of basic human psychological laws.
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A Kantian background
Rawls is Kantian and he is the first one to acknowledge and emphasize his affiliation461. 
Here are the main features Rawls claims to borrow from Kant.
1) Rawls is a contractarian: ‘My aim is to present a conception of justice which 
generalises and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social 
contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau and Kant.’462 Like Kant’s, Rawls’s social 
contract is hypothetical: ‘Kant is clear that the original agreement is hypothetical’463. 
The contract is not historically grounded. Rather, it is the result of what rational agents 
would choose if placed in a certain original position. The original position has nothing 
to do with a general assembly taking place at a given time. Rather, it must be 
interpreted ‘so that one can at any time adopt its perspective. It must make no 
difference when one takes up this view point, or who does.’464
2) Being contractarian, Rawls rejects any form of teleological theory. However, he 
admits that rational agents must pursue some individual good. Each person’s good is 
determined by what is for her the most rational long-term plan, given favourable 
circumstances; a rational plan is one that cannot be improved upon. Each individual 
good must be framed within the right. The concept o f right acts as a constraint upon 
individual plans as well as on the principles of the basic structure of society or any 
other ethical principles The concept of right is anterior to the one of the good. The 
priority of the right over the good is a central feature of Rawls’s justice as fairness but it 
is also, according to Rawls ‘a central feature of Kant’s ethics.’465
3) The concept of right itself seems to be borrowed from Kant. A conception of right is 
a set of principles that fulfil five conditions: 1) they are general in form; 2) they are 
universal in application (i.e. ‘they must hold for everyone in virtue of their being moral 
persons ... [they] are to be chosen in view of the consequences of everyone’s
461 See A Theory of Justice §40, pp221-227 and ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory’. From his first 
chapter, he waves away the Hobbesian heritage with a simple comment: ‘For all his greatness, Hobbes’s 
Leviathan raises special problem’. (A Theory of Justice, p 10 n4). That is it about Hobbes!
462 A Theory of Justice, plO
463 A Theory of Justice, pi 1 n5
464 A Theory of Justice, pi 20
465 A Theory of Justice, p 28 nl6.
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complying with them’466); 3) They are publicly known (‘The publicity condition is 
clearly implicit in Kant’s doctrine of the categorical imperative insofar as it requires us 
to act in accordance with principles that one would be willing as a rational being to 
enact as law for a kingdom of ends.’467); 4) They must impose an ordering on 
conflicting claims (Completeness and transitivity of the ordering); 5) Reasoning 
successfully from them is conclusive (i.e. they must pass the test of practical 
reasoning).
4) Rawls assumes that individuals are to choose the social principles of justice from 
behind a veil of ignorance. They don’t know how the various alternatives will affect 
them and they are obliged to evaluate the principles from a general point of view. 
According to Rawls, the formulation of the veil of ignorance is implicit in Kant’s 
doctrine of the categorical imperative:
‘Kant held, I believe that a person is acting autonomously when the principles of his 
action are chosen by him as the most adequate possible expression of his nature as a 
free and equal rational being. The principles he acts upon are not adopted because of 
his social position or natural endowments, or in view of the particular kind of society in 
which he lives or the specific things that he happens to want. To act on such principles 
is to act heteronomously. Now the veil of ignorance deprives the persons in the original 
position of the knowledge that would enable them to choose heteronomous 
principles.’468
5) In the original position, individuals are assumed to be mutually disinterested. In 
other words, they try to advance their system of ends as far as possible without seeking 
to confer benefits or impose injuries on one another. They are not moved by affection, 
rancour, envy or vanity. Again this assumption parallels Kant’s notion of autonomy. 
Any of these feelings would pollute individuals’ rationality when establishing the 
principles of justice. It is part of their liberty to be freed from their interest in others, 
whether this interest is positive or negative. Men have common as well conflicting 
interests but they must allow for freedom in the choice of a system of final ends when 
deciding on the principles of justice.
466 A Theory of Justice, p i 14
467 A Theory of Justice, pi 15
468 A Theory of Justice, p222
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The concept of justice obtained
a) Narrowing down of the field of justice to distributive justice.
Rawls understands justice as fairness. According to his concept of justice, society is
interpreted as a ‘cooperative venture for mutual advantage’.469 Rawls is cautious not to
call his theory a moral theory. He restricts the field of morality to the one of justice
putting aside straight away the concepts of value or moral worth470. Within justice he
tackles primarily social and individual justice (in this order) leaving aside the laws of
nations. Within social justice, he narrows down his theory to the field of distributive
justice. Whatever is to be distributed is the fruit of cooperation therefore the
distribution process is an integral part of the cooperation process. In procedural justice,
‘the correctness of the distribution is founded on the justice of the scheme of 
cooperation from which it arises and on answering the claims of individuals engaged in 
it. A distribution cannot be judged in isolation from the system of which it is the 
outcome or from what individuals have done in good faith in the light of established
, 4 7 1expectations.
He distinguishes his conception of distributive justice from the utilitarian conception of 
allocative justice.
b) An egalitarian conception o f justice
Rawls insists that the difference in initial endowments between individuals is neither 
just nor unjust but is a source of injustice if taken as such in society. Therefore he 
suggests using the ‘principle of redress’472: undeserved inequalities generated by the 
difference in initial endowments should call for redress. For example, greater resources 
should be spent on the less intelligent or less socially advantaged children rather than 
on the most intelligent or the ones with a better social background. The principle of 
redress is a natural corollary of the principles of justice. It does correct the arbitrariness 
of the natural assets distribution or of the initial position in society.
469 A Theory of Justice, p4
470 ‘Justice as fairness is not a complete contract theory. For it is clear that the contractarian idea can be 
extended to the choice of more or less an entire ethical system, that is, a system including principles for all 
the virtues and not only for justice.’ A Theory of Justice, p 15. The next step would be the concept of ‘right 
as fairness’.
471A Theory of Justice, p76
472 A Theory of Justice p 86 -88
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The concepts of rationality displayed in the theory
Rawls seems to distinguish between two concepts of rationality that bring about two 
different concepts: the concept of right and the concept of individual good.
a) Social rational prudence and the concept of right
Free, equal and rational individuals placed in the original position should be able to 
derive a concept of right (i.e. principles of justice). If the approach is essentially 
Kantian, the rationality in question belongs to the prudential category. Rawls 
acknowledges his debt to Gauthier for this concept:
‘Just as an individual balances present and future gains against present and future 
losses, so a society may balance satisfactions and dissatisfactions between different 
individuals... The principle of choice for an association of men is interpreted as an 
extension of the principle of choice for one man. Social justice is the principle of 
rational prudence applied to an aggregative conception of the welfare of the group.’473 
Rawls substitutes for an ethical judgment a judgment of rational prudence.
Although both for Rawls and Gauthier, rational prudence is at the root of mutual 
advantage and of compliance with the social contract, they don’t understand rational 
prudence in the same manner. Gauthier understands it as individual: prudent agents 
rationally bring about a social order. Rawls understands it as social: rational prudence 
applies directly to the social order and frames individual goods, hence the anteriority of 
the concept of right over individual goods. In Rawls theory, when the agents choose the 
principles of justice, they don’t know their individual long-term plans and therefore 
cannot apply rational prudence to their individual circumstances. When choosing, they 
merely assume that they will prefer more primary social goods rather than less. The 
primary social goods are rights, liberties, opportunities, income and wealth.
b) Individual rationality and the concept o f good
A person’s good is determined by what is for her the most rational long-term plan of 
life given reasonably favourable circumstances. A rational plan is a plan that cannot be
473 A Theory o f Justice p 21
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improved upon. It is constrained by the principles of justice that prevail in the society 
she belongs to. Individual rationality is the standard rationality used in social theory: ‘a 
rational person is thought to have a coherent set of preferences between the options 
open to him. He ranks these options according to how well they further his purposes; he 
follows the plan which satisfy more of his desires rather than less, and which has the 
greater chance of being successfully executed.’474The only exception is to the standard 
theory is that Rawls’ agents do not suffer from envy and they are mutually 
disinterested. This feature has already been discussed above. Rawls seems to assume 
that individuals each have a life plan that they keep in the long term. This is an implicit 
assumption that we find as well in Gauthier.
B) Buchanan’s limits of liberty475.
Buchanan is an economist who wrote mainly in the 1970’s. His intrusion into the field 
of political philosophy was motivated by his frustration at the increasing role of the 
state in every day life. His ambition was to find the right balance between on the one 
hand the anarchy’s useless waste of resources in defence and predation and on the other 
hand the Leviathan’s potentially abusive restriction on individual liberty. He was in 
favour of an enforcement system, but within the limits of individuals’ consent.
More originally, he wanted to rethink the ‘original position’, or the position from which 
individuals come to contract. Economic theory takes as ‘given’ individuals’ initial 
endowment. Buchanan wanted to look behind the curtain and reflects on this initial 
endowment, on any pre- and contractual stages. He noted that any exchange depends 
upon mutually agreed and defined rights and laws. How we came to agree and define 
these rights was the question Buchanan wanted to address. Starting from the beginning, 
he wanted to know: how was the initial distribution established, what was the threshold 
for viable (stable) agreement to take place, what did we agree on, who was to enforce 
the social contract and within which boundaries, how to deal with the special case of 
public goods and what should be the dynamic of any constitutional contract. In order to
474 A Theory of Justice p 124
475 The limits o f liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan
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answer these questions, he distinguished between three periods in the making of the 
social contract:
• The stage of natural distribution is based on the assumption that individuals are 
unequal.
• The stage of constitutional contract is the stage at which the laws, the property rights 
and the state as enforcement system are created
• The stage of post constitutional contract is the stage at which trading can commence
- in private goods: being the traditional field of modem economic theory, it is well 
known and therefore not discussed in the book.
- in public goods: being often neglected in traditional analysis, it is an integral part of 
his theory.
Natural distribution
We are all different in style, beauty, intelligence, personality, talents and we don’t all 
come from the same environment. Buchanan starts from the rather revolutionary 
assumption that we are by our very nature different and therefore unequal. Our 
inequalities are rooted in our differences in preferences or tastes, capacities, skills or 
talents and environmental settings. These three types of differences characterize the 
natural distribution.
At the beginning, in the state of anarchistic jungle, unequal individuals have to survive. 
In order to do so, they have to waste some of their resources in predation and defence. 
Buchanan demonstrates that even in this pre-contractual stage, individuals do reach an 
equilibrium since each comes to know the limits of what she can take and protect from 
others. This equilibrium is stable since there is no incentive for any person to modify 
his behaviour in the absence of external shocks. As such, chaos does not accurately 
describe this anarchistic equilibrium since there exists a certain degree of predictability.
Can we move from this equilibrium to a Pareto better position? A way to improve our 
position would be to save on predation and defence resources. The question is then to
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find out from which threshold we could all gain from, and therefore agree on, a change 
of behaviour (no need to attack or defend). Agreement can only emerge from a 
mutually advantageous state of affair. Precisely because we are unequal, some amongst 
us might prefer the anarchistic equilibrium. Let us call ‘direct-production position’ the 
position in which we each keep for our own use what we produce given our natural 
preferences, capacities and environmental settings without wasting resources in 
predation and defence. Buchanan demonstrates that the anarchistic equilibrium is not 
necessarily Pareto inferior to the ‘direct-production position’.
Let us imagine a society made of two individuals A and B. A can produce more goods 
than B with less efforts. B will not agree to change his behaviour unless A is prepared 
to transfer some initial quantity of goods or endowments to B prior to negotiating any 
change of behaviour agreement. The temptation for B to attack A will be too strong for 
any such agreement to be stable. Once the transfer of good or endowment has taken 
place, a new anarchistic equilibrium is reached. As phrased by Buchanan: ‘Positive 
rights may be established, once the initial transfer has taken place to bring the two 
parties into a setting where the direct-production assignment is, in fact, Pareto-superior 
to anarchistic equilibrium’.
Constitutional contract: the theory of law.
Once the natural distribution is in the anarchistic equilibrium described above, 
agreement can take place. Two questions come to mind immediately.
• Are the agents behind a ‘veil of ignorance’? For Buchanan, when agreeing on a 
constitution, individuals do know their position, their initial endowment, preferences, 
capacities and environmental settings; they can actually ‘use’ the agreement as a means 
to adjust some of the known inequalities they suffer from. The constitutional contract 
takes more the form of a collective bargain. Each individual makes an economic 
calculus of what is best for him in terms of utility maximizing. This approach is 
obviously a lot closer to Gauthier’s than to Rawls’ or Harsanyi’s.
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• What about justice in this process? Buchanan considers justice as an economic 
calculus in disguise and as a hypocritical tool. When talking about constitutional 
changes over generations, here is the way he refers to ‘justice’: ‘In those situations 
where individuals may have rational economic reasons for accepting some 
reassignments of rights, where genuine constitutional change may be possible, the 
public discussion may be conducted in the rhetoric of “justice”. Even the advocates of 
structural change may not be fully aware of the rational or utility-maximizing 
motivation that lies at the base of their proposals... Arguments which may find their 
origins in rational economic calculation, ... when presented under the disguise of 
justice tend to attract support.’476
The constitution will be an agreement between all parties about:
1) Behavioural changes or disarmament contracts
2) Property rights as established in the natural distribution
3) Conditions of enforcement
4) Rules regarding public goods.
1&2) Disarmament contract and property rights.
The first two sets of laws are rather straightforward. I use all my own endowment to 
produce my own goods without wasting any resources on predation or defence and 
whatever equilibrium we reached in the anarchistic stage puts the limits of what is mine 
and what is yours. You don’t attack me and I don’t attack you. The disarmament 
contract and the property rights are directly derived from the natural position.
3) The protective state and enforcement system
‘Straightforward utility maximization will lead each person to defect on his contractual 
obligation if he expects to be able to accomplish this unilaterally.’477 The bigger the 
society, the more likely such calculus and the whole agreement quickly becomes void. 
Therefore, when contracting, the parties must enter into some sort of enforcement
476 The Limits of Liberty, p80-81.
477 The Limits of Liberty, p64
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agreement. Individuals write the rules that are to be kept by the enforcing agent (usually 
referred to as the state). It is not the role of the protective state to write or interpret the 
rules or to make value judgements. Its role is purely scientific, mechanical: was the law 
violated yes or no and if yes what punishment is applicable for such violation.
The establishment of the state as enforcement system is part of the constitutional 
contract. The rules and the precise role of the enforcing agent are agreed upon as part of 
the social contract. The reason for this is two-fold. Firstly, as straightforward utility 
maximisers, it is more rational to defect than to comply when others do comply. 
However, the viability of the contract depends upon the general knowledge of mutual 
compliance. The enforcing agent is the guarantor of post contractual compliance.
Secondly, as human beings, we are weak by nature and even if we know what is best 
for ourselves in the long term and decide upon a plan of actions, we might be tempted 
to behave adversely to our best interest at the time of action. Buchanan gives the 
example of Crusoe who, aware of his interest to wake up early and work when the sun 
was low, built and set an alarm clock. Buchanan writes:
‘Crusoe imposes rules on his own behaviour because he recognises his own 
imperfection in the face of possible temptation.... Crusoe constructs his alarm clock, an 
impersonal and external device designed to impose constraints on his own choice 
behaviour. He may, of course, also select internal rules or precepts which, once 
adopted, will be rigorously followed. But there remains an important difference 
between the two cases, one that has significance for the broader problems. With the 
alarm clock, Crusoe disturbs his dozing in advance. He closes off one behavioural 
option that would continue to remain open under a voluntaristic rule.’41*
When we agree on an enforcement system at the time of contracting, we program in 
advance an external constraint that will force us to keep a beneficial agreement. This 
approach will obviously become highly relevant when we consider Gauthier’s concept 
of constrained maximization.
Buchanan also raises several issues about the enforcing agent (or protective state) such 
as what constraints on the enforcing agent’s behaviour or what limits to its power, how 
to reassess its role over generations. Unfortunately, these issues fall outside the scope of
478 The Limits of Liberty, p 93
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this presentation. Buchanan offers original analysis and suggestions that would deserve 
attention in another enquiry.
4) The productive state and rules regarding the public goods
The state will have the responsibility of creating, managing and monitoring public 
goods. As such, it becomes a productive state. However the dividing line between 
private and public sector of the economy is settled in the basic constitution Why is the 
problem of public goods sorted out at the time of constitutional contracting and not 
later? Buchanan’s argumentation is worth a little detour since it will become highly 
relevant when we review Gauthier’s concept of translucency.
The distinction between public and private goods is established as follows: private 
goods are rivals in consumption (if you use it, I cannot use it), they are usually divisible 
amongst persons, whereas public goods are usually available to all. The markets 
‘naturally’ regulate the distribution of private goods. An abundant economic literature 
exists on the topic. Free riding problems arise once we turn to public goods. In short: 
‘The individual maximizes his utility by refraining from making an independent 
contribution toward the provision and the financing of the commonly shared good and
,479service.
The dilemma posed by public goods can be summed up as follows: Pareto optimality or 
efficiency cannot be attained until all persons are brought into the trading agreement. 
Unfortunately, some might benefit less from public goods than others and might require 
more gains out of it. Such unequal treatment at the outset is contrary to any basic 
principle of political order. Therefore, Buchanan suggests the concept of exclusion. In 
order to respect the rule of unanimity and the choice of some to keep out of public 
goods cost sharing, it is possible to put in place an exclusion mechanism. Exclusion can 
be extremely costly and resource wasteful to those in the sharing group but might never 
be observed since the certainty of being excluded from the enjoyment of the subsequent 
benefits could motivate all persons to join in the basic contract. In short, each 
individual has to decide at contracting time whether she wants to participate in public
479 The limits of liberty, p37
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goods financing or not. If she does, she is allocated a right to enjoy the benefits of the 
public good, if she does not, she is deprived of such a right and she is excluded from 
the community.
Buchanan notes two important points:
• ‘The outcomes that defines the amount of publicly provided goods and services and 
the means of sharing their costs are themselves contracts, and as such, these, too, 
require enforcement. This creates a necessary interface between the productive and 
the protective state.’480
• ‘The necessary condition is only that public goods exchange, conceived as games, be 
positive sum for all participants. There is no necessity that aggregate payoffs be 
maximized.’ However, ideally, the state is a productive process when it ‘enables 
the community of persons to increase their overall levels of economic well-being, to 
shift toward the efficiency frontier.’482
Post constitutional contract
Now that all the rights have been allocated, trading can commence both in private and 
public goods under the conditions and rules specified in the constitutional contract.
Buchanan then introduces a fabulous dynamic in his theory. All the above is very nice 
as long as the parties to the contract are the ones who have to keep the rules ex-post. 
What about the following generations who had no part in the original constitutional 
contract? They might be more inclined to defect unless the rules can be adapted. 
Buchanan describes the Status Quo as the existing current situation of a political order. 
Whether it falls within the description above given or not is irrelevant. The rules are as 
they are and have to be modified from there not from where they should be. Once again 
the dynamic part of Buchanan theory falls outside the scope of this presentation but 
would deserve attention elsewhere.
480 The limits of liberty, p 98
481 The limits of liberty, p 47
482 The limits o f liberty, p 97
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